95. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)1

SUBJECT

  • Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament (NSC Action 1419)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff submit herewith their comments and recommendations on a report by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, subject as above,2 which is being scheduled by the Executive Secretary for consideration by the National Security Council at its meeting on 26 January 1956.3

2. The report summarizes pertinent circumstances in the progress of disarmament negotiations. Further, it recommends the approval of specific policy statements, previously considered in the revision of Section VI of Volume V, sets forth arguments and counterarguments, and indicates disadvantages that would result should the proposed policy statements not now be accepted. The report concludes that the recommendations presented in the 22 December 1955 memorandum, and not considered in the current report, appear sufficiently understood and all are presented for approval or postponement of approval, as specified in that memorandum. Included in the report is the preliminary draft of a proposed letter from President Eisenhower to Mr. Bulganin. The letter is in draft form and while subject to revision, is “...4 submitted now to indicate the manner in which the recommended policy would be pursued and reflected to the USSR and to the people of the world”.

3. The comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the policy statements in the revision of Section VI of Volume V were [Page 269] submitted to you by a memorandum dated 20 December 19555 and transmitted with your concurrence and remarks to the National Security Council on 21 December 1955. In paragraph 3 of their memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff commented on the lack of clarity of the proposed policy as a whole; specifically, as to whether proceeding step-by-step from the President’s Proposal to a comprehensive disarmament policy is to be adhered to. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, noting that there are no modifications in the policy statements in Mr. Stassen’s latest report from those proposed in his 22 December memorandum, consider the views they previously expressed are even more valid in view of the elaborating information provided in this report.

4. For example, the following comments are addressed to certain of the numbered items presented to the National Security Council in Mr. Stassen’s 22 December memorandum. After full consideration of his justification for their retention in the 26 January report, these items are unacceptable from the military point of view:

a. Item 7: “Accept modest initial reductions in conventional armed forces and armaments on a reciprocal basis if tied to the first full year of experience in the implementation of the President’s Proposal, to be worked out in detail with the Department of Defense, contributing toward the early lessening of the burden of armaments.”

Recommend deletion.

Reason: The Joint Chiefs of Staff still consider their previous comments to you a valid basis for deletion of this item. In Mr. Stassen’s latest report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note for the first time that the modest initial force reductions being considered indicate personnel ceilings of 2.5 million men for both the United States and the USSR. For the United States this would mean a reduction in excess of 300,000 men, or more than ten percent of our present strength, without change in our world-wide commitments. Acceptance by the USSR of such a ceiline would involve a considerably greater reduction for them; however, because of the many variables involved, an improvement in our security position would not necessarily follow. In the light of experience in our relations with the Soviet Union, it would be hazardous to base a reduction of our forces on agreement of the Soviets that they would do likewise, without first proving the effectiveness of any agreed inspection and control system. The inspection and control system envisaged6 as a part of the President’s Proposal to provide against great surprise attack falls far short of providing this proof. In the [Page 270] absence of proof, no other evaluation of the impact of such reductions on our security can be made than that an unacceptable risk would be involved.

b. Item 16: “The United States will not agree, in the absence of a new decision which it is anticipated would need to be based on facts not now foreseeable, to any of the following: The withdrawal of overseas bases, as a part of a disarmament agreement, prior to a major verified reduction of USSR weapons carry-capacity and the resolution of major issues between the USSR and the United States.”

Recommend deletion.

Reason: The reasons previously given7 for recommending deletion of this item from the proposed statement of United States policy on disarmament remain valia.

c. Item 17: “If an inspection system such as here described is installed, the United States will contemplate a gradual equitable reduction on a reciprocal basis of nuclear weapons carrying capacity and of conventional forces and conventional armaments, but such specific reductions shall be the subject of National Security Council consideration in the light of conditions then existing, and no blanket commitments of figures or percentages or other indication of levels shall be made in advance of such National Security Council consideration.”

Recommend change to read: “If a reliable inspection system is installed, and proved, the United States …”

Reason: In its present context the phrase “such as here described” has no definite point of reference. The changed wording is in conformance with that part of the President’s statement made at the Geneva Conference on 21 July 1955, which reads: “The United States is ready to proceed in the study and testing of a reliable system of inspection and reporting, and when that system is proved, then to reduce armaments with all others to the extent that the system will provide assured results.”

5. This latest report by Mr. Stassen includes a suggested procedure for the initial implementation of the policy proposed. While he does not specifically recommend approval of his suggestion, its inclusion in the report invites discussion by the National Security Council. While recognizing that the manner of policy implementation is primarily within the province of the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the substance of certain proposals set forth in the preliminary draft letter from the President to Mr. Bulganin would, from the military point of view, be unacceptable in its present form. As now worded, it appears not wholly consistent with the policy recommended for consideration and approval by the Council on 26 January. As an illustration, the draft letter would indicate United States willingness to enter into an agreement that “all future production of nuclear material anywhere in the world shall be devoted to peaceful purposes”, with only two provisos: (1) “if the ground and [Page 271] aerial inspection system is agreed upon and implemented” and (2) “[if] suitable technical inspection to verify the fulfillment of the agreement [is established]”.8 In contrast, item 8 of the recommended policy indicates that United States agreement on this provision would be forthcoming only “within a comprehensive arms control system”. Other objections, from the military point of view, are evident and, under the circumstances, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assume that if such a letter is to be sent they will be given further opportunity to express their views.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have noted the remarks you made in transmitting their comments on Section VI of Volume V, and on the revision thereto, to the National Security Council.9 These remarks have emphasized that (a) each step we take with respect to any disarmament plan must enhance the security of the United States, (b) items proposed for approval are interdependent and do not lend themselves to decision on an individual basis, (c) consideration of individual items will militate against an objective evaluation of the policy as a whole, and (d) action to approve policy recommendations should be deferred until opportunity has been afforded to study the forthcoming inspection and control plan.

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that, at the meeting of the Council on 26 January:

a.
You adhere to the position formerly expressed, as outlined in paragraph 6 above; and
b.
In the event Council decision indicates approving action will be taken, the foregoing comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff constitute the basis for the Department of Defense position.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Arthur Radford10
Chairman
  1. Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Inspection—NSC. Top Secret.
  2. Supra.
  3. See Document 103.
  4. All ellipses in this document are in the source text.
  5. Not printed. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Inspection—NSC)
  6. President’s letter to Mr. Bulganin dated 12 October 1955 and U.S. Outline Plan for the Implementation of the 21 July 1955 Presidential Proposal at Geneva Regarding Disarmament. [Footnote in the source text. References are to Eisenhower’s letter of October 11, 1955 (which was delivered by the Embassy in Moscow to Bulganin on October 12), and to the U.S. outline plan submitted to the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee on August 30, 1955. Both are printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. I, pp. 501–503 and 528–529, respectively.]
  7. Memorandum for Secretary of Defense dated 20 December 1955, subject: “Proposed Policy of the U.S. on the Question of Disarmament (NSC Action 1419)”. [Footnote in the source text.]
  8. Brackets in the source text.
  9. Secretary of Defense Wilson’s letter to Stassen, December 7, 1955, commented on Volume V, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson’s memorandum to the Executive Secretary, NSC, December 21, 1955, forwarded the JCS views on the revised Volume V. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy)
  10. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.