Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

73. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations¹

Washington, September 22, 1955—6:01 p.m.

197. For Stassen. Following replies Sobolev and Moch questions (your 312)² now approved State, Defense and AEC.

Sobolev second question:³

1. “This question of the Soviet delegate, it would appear, might have two different premises. If the question assumes that the USSR and the US have agreed to the Eisenhower proposal and have proceeded to implement this proposal and that a general disarmament convention is being drafted with many states as parties to it (including members and non-members of the United Nations), and if the question then seeks information as to whether it is the view of the United States that aerial reconnaissance should be a part of the inspection and control over all states in such a disarmament convention, the answer is affirmative. The United States believes that aerial reconnaissance is an essential part of the permanent inspection and control procedures over all states in a permanent disarmament convention.

2. But if the question of the Soviet delegate is directed toward the initial proposal of the President, then I wish to make it clear the President’s proposal is that a beginning should be made by agreement between the USSR and the United States within the framework of the United Nations for an exchange of military blueprints and of aerial reconnaissance, including photography, from one end to the other of each country. It is this proposal as further described in this subcommittee which constitutes the gateway through which progress can be made toward the limitation and reduction of all armaments and armed forces.

3. The United States believes further that the agreement between the USSR and the US putting the President’s plan into effect without delay might also provide for the adherence and participation, as agreed, of designated countries on an equitable basis once the plan is in operation between the USSR and US.

4. The United States further believes that, as soon as the plan is in operation, the countries participating in it and other states concerned might proceed at once to negotiate concerning the participation and contribution which countries, including members and non-members of the United Nations, other than those originally designated, may make on an equitable basis.”⁴

Moch question:⁵

“As I have explained in my reply to Mr. Sobolev, the proposal of the President is directed toward providing against the possibility of a great surprise attack of any kind with any weapons.”

With respect Sobolev first question⁶ following answer formally approved AEC this morning and is concurred in by State and Defense:

“The proposal of the President is directed toward providing against the possibility of great surprise attack. For this purpose, necessary information regarding all weapons, including atomic, hydrogen, conventional and other types, would be exchanged. Such details as numbers, characteristics, and designs of nuclear weapons, which details do not bear on the President’s immediate objective—prevention of a great surprise attack—would not be exchanged. Other precise and specific information to be exchanged would be a matter of exact agreement between us, under the principles enunciated by the President. The information would be recriprocally exchanged in progressive stages. The acceptance by the Soviet Union of the President’s proposal would then lead to detailed negotiations. There would be very many important details but we are confident we could reach agreement on details, because the acceptance of the proposal itself would be evidence that we both have the same objective in this matter, we have similar information, related problems, and a common interest in providing against the possibility of great surprise attack.”

We prefer language contained in para 3 of reply to Sobolev’s second question as quoted above to that suggested urtel 323.⁷ Concerned that UK, France, Canada, etc. will interpret this as allowing them to participate in negotiations on President’s proposal from outset.

Hoover

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/9–1955. Secret; Niact. Drafted by Wainhouse and Spiers.
2. Telegram 312 from New York, September 19, gave the draft of proposed answers to Sobolev’s and Moch’s questions in the subcommittee. (Ibid.)

3. Sobolev’s second question asked:

   “Is the aerial reconnaissance to be confined to the territories of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, or is this form of control to extend also to the other States parties to the disarmament convention?” (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/PV.59, p. 19)

4. Stassen used almost the exact words of paragraphs 1–4 when he responded to Sobolev’s second question at the 63d meeting of the subcommittee, September 23. (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/PV.63)

5. Moch’s question was:

   “I wonder whether the United States representative can clarify a point for me. Several times in his statement he stressed that this plan would make it possible to prevent a surprise attack. Similar formulae occur in the Soviet note of 10 May, but in the latter the surprise attack was regarded as a concentration of troops and conventional matériel possibly supporting a thermonuclear attack. Is the United States representative using the expression “surprise attack” in this sense or does he also include attack in a possible future war, a war which might be conducted by means of thermonuclear weapons only without employing conventional armaments?” (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/PV.59, pp. 12–13)

6. Sobolev’s first question reads:

   “It is important that we should receive some clarification as to whether the part of President Eisenhower’s proposal dealing with the exchange of information about armed forces, which Mr. Stassen has introduced in the Sub-Committee, covers information about atomic and hydrogen weapons as well as conventional armaments.” (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/PV.58, p. 16)

7. The reply to Sobolev’s second question in telegram 323 from New York, September 21, reads:

   “The proposal of the President was directed toward providing against the possibility of a great surprise attack of any kind and by any weapons, whether primarily by land or sea or air or by a combination of all three, whether primarily against one nation or another nation or a group of nations. It is the view of the United States that the possibility of a great surprise attack must be provided against in the context of all weapons of today as well as in the context of future weapons which can now be foreseen. Peace is the objective. The assurance that there will be no great war any more is the aim. A great surprise attack would certainly mean war. The prevention of a great surprise attack would be an important assurance of peace. This is the purpose of the proposal of President Eisenhower.” (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/9–2155)