Office of the Historian

72. Memorandum of a Staff Meeting, New York, September 21, 19551

New York, September 21, 1955

Mr. Stassen made the following points:

1.
The Soviet did want to get Five Power agreement on goals for reduction and elimination. This letter2 admits that they haven’t succeeded and shows that our tactics have been successful.
2.
Therefore, they have to come in on a discussion of the President’s proposal and try at that level to swing the discussion back to May 10.
3.
There are three questions: What does the Secretary of State say tomorrow?3 Should it be released? What kind of an answer does the President give and when does he give it?
4.
Mr. Stassen felt that there should be no early release of it; that the Secretary of State if it had been released should counter it by counter arguments and that the President should not get into negotiation by letter.
5.
Stassen said that they are tapering off on elimination and using prohibition of use. The letter does not bring up political issues. There is no need for a hurried response. We can easily surmount this one. This is definitely an answer to the Eisenhower proposal.
6.
Stassen would not recess the Sub-Committee because of the implication that the Soviets would wish to place that we were stalling. There is no need for a comprehensive plan. We would never have gotten a letter if they hadn’t felt we had made headway. They really don’t hit the bases question as the staff thought they would. We have them admitted that they want to move on reductions and they admit that they can’t. Allies will be easier to handle with this than they were before. This is not a rejection. It is continuing negotiation. Our reaction should be reserved. If the Five Powers had agreed on everything the Soviets had wanted, think what adverse reaction throughout the world regarding a unilateral let-down by the free world. Fact is we have them talking now about aerial photography.
7.
Secretary Dulles didn’t quarrel with HES’ analysis of the Bulganin memo. He favored the simplicity of the Eisenhower proposal and wanted to keep out ground troops.

  1. Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Name File—Official Correspondence—Matteson. No drafting information or list of participants is given on the source text.↩
  2. See the editorial note, supra.↩
  3. Regarding Dulles’ address, see footnote 7, Document 70.↩