Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

70. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 19, 1955¹

Washington, September 19, 1955

SUBJECT

• President’s Proposal in Disarmament Subcommittee

PARTICIPANTS

• S—The Secretary
• U-Mr. Hoover
• S/P—Mr. Bowie
• IO—Mr. Wainhouse
• JCS— Admiral Radford
• Defense—Mr. Gordon Gray
• Gov. Stassen²
• Col. Firehock

Admiral Radford stated that he was concerned about the British, French and Canadian attitude on wanting to broaden the President’s proposal to include countries other than the US and USSR. He felt that to include other countries before the President’s plan was agreed to and put into operation would open the gateway to a host of problems and bog down the plan.

The Secretary stated that the President’s proposal is not an answer to the disarmament problem and was never offered as such. He was concerned about how terribly complicated the matter had become. His effort now must be directed toward getting the President’s proposal back on the tracks.

The Secretary stated that he did not think we could get a resolution on the President’s proposal through the General Assembly without loading the proposal down with amendments and splitting us off from the UK, French and Canadians. To press forward with a resolution, he went on to say, would be premature and would get us into difficulties. There are many implications of the plan about which we are not clear and which we must think through.

Admiral Radford commented that the President’s proposal got off the tracks because it was being discussed in the UN Subcommittee on Disarmament although it is not a disarmament problem. Moreover, he could not understand why the British regard their not being included in the plan at this juncture as detrimental to their prestige.

The Secretary referred to a conversation which he had with Sir Robert Scott³ who expressed two concerns which the British have—one is that we might get out of Europe, and the other is that we might deal directly with the Soviets.

Mr. Gray stated that Defense and State are being called upon to give answers to terribly difficult questions with “dreadfully short deadlines”, referring particularly to the pressure which was placed upon him in connection with getting out the Outline Plan for the Implementation of the 21 July 1955 Presidential Proposal at Geneva.

Admiral Radford shared Mr. Gray’s feelings about being given dreadfully short deadlines and stated that the Outline was whipped out in a hurry. He saw no objection to using this Outline as a working paper but it had never occurred to him that Mr. Stassen wanted to use the paper as document in the UN Disarmament Subcommittee. The Outline as introduced in the Subcommittee, he remarked, omitted the last two paragraphs, one of which was important.⁴ [Admiral Radford was referring to the following paragraphs: “Limitations. It is recognized that world-wide implementation of this outline plan would eventually involve inspection of forces and facilities outside the continental limits of the US and the USSR, and that such would necessarily be contingent upon the consent of the governments concerned; Future Procedure. Upon successful accomplishment of the herein-described actions, procedures may be agreed upon for further exchanges of information of more sensitive nature, based upon demonstrated proof of good faith.”]⁵

[At this point Mr. Stassen and Colonel Firehock joined the meeting]

Mr. Stassen stated that the Soviets in the Subcommittee were showing unusual reserve and respect for the President’s proposal. He did not know whether this was due to a desire not to tangle with the President because of the world-wide popularity of the proposal or for some other reason. The Soviets seemed to be afraid that the adoption of the President’s proposal would not lead to reduction of armaments. He wondered whether that fear was not heightened by the speech which Secretary of the Air Force Quarles made on September 2, 1955.⁶ Mr. Stassen stated that there was great need for care on the kind of speeches government officials make on disarmament.

Mr. Stassen went on to say that our Allies are seriously concerned about the impact of the slogan “Ban the Bomb”. Public opinion in European countries has been enamoured with the slogan. It is for this reason that Mr. Nutting (UK) has suggested that a committee of scientists be appointed to study the matter of inspection and control of nuclear weapons. This would allay the fear that the President’s proposal means giving up the quest for a control system which would include the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Stassen reported that the task forces expect to bring in their segmental reports by the middle of October. He will then develop a comprehensive report to submit to the interested departments for comment and after that take up the comprehensive report in the NSC.

Mr. Stassen asked whether the Secretary expected him to go to Geneva. The Secretary assumed that the disarmament item will arise sometime in the middle of November and said that Mr. Stassen should be in Geneva.

Mr. Stassen stated that the Subcommittee would make a report to the Disarmament Commission and that the Disarmament Commission would report to the General Assembly after Geneva. He inquired whether the Secretary anticipates a report from the Subcommittee for Geneva. The Secretary gave no indication of his views on this.

Mr. Stassen referred to the press problem and said that the Allies, from the very first, were and continue to be sticky about our press policy.

Mr. Stassen said that he would like Ambassador Amos Peaslee to join him as a senior adviser. Ambassador Peaslee has broad international experience and it would be helpful if he, Stassen, could get him on his staff.

The Secretary showed Mr. Stassen the section on disarmament in his UN speech. The Secretary incorporated various suggestions that were made.⁷

The Secretary said that the real approach to the disarmament problem is to create conditions where armaments haven’t got the same utility. He does not believe that nations do anything which is not in their vital interest and what we must do is create conditions that would eliminate the need for the use of armaments. The idea that we would do anything to give up our armaments as such is not in our national interest.

Mr. Stassen commented that if you adopt the Eisenhower proposal and have no agreement on attacking forces you would eliminate the virtue of the proposal. That is why you have to go on with armaments limitation.

The Secretary reverted to his doubts about a resolution in the General Assembly. He said that originally he thought that such a resolution would be desirable and was not now excluding the idea of a resolution. Mr. Stassen said that he would not write-off the idea of having a resolution and that Ambassador Lodge also wants it. Mr. Wainhouse suggested that the matter of tabling the resolution should await the outcome of the Geneva Four Power discussions. We could then assess all the considerations, to see whether a resolution should be tabled. The Secretary expressed the view that the Soviets will not buy the Eisenhower proposal. He felt that they are going to finesse it and that they do not want to do anything that would offend President Eisenhower.

Mr. Wainhouse raised the question of coordinating the Government’s position on the disarmament problem while Mr. Stassen was in New York operating in the UN Disarmament Subcommittee. Mr. Wainhouse felt that the State Department should coordinate such positions with the other interested agencies. Mr. Stassen, however, felt that this should be done by the President’s Special Committee. There was no opportunity to discuss this point further since Mr. Stassen was obliged to leave to catch a plane for New York.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/9–1955. Secret. Drafted by Wainhouse.
2. A notation on the source text indicates that Stassen and Firehock joined the meeting later.
3. Minister of the United Kingdom in the United States.
4. Regarding the U.S. outline plan, see footnote 17, Document 59.
5. All brackets are in the source text.
6. Quarles’ speech is summarized in The New York Times, September 3, p. 7.
7. Secretary Dulles addressed the U.N. General Assembly on September 22 during the general debate phase of proceedings. For text of his address, see Department of State Bulletin, October 3, pp. 523–529.