69. Memorandum for the File, by the Secretary of State’s Special Assistant for Atomic Energy Affairs (Smith)1

SUBJECT

  • Discussion with Dr. Rabi—Technical Planning for IAEA

Dr. Rabi came in to discuss where we go from here in the matter of technical planning for the IAEA. I suggested that while the engineering study was going forward in the AEC2 we needed a parallel political study on the feasibility of various methods of controlling the diversion problem. He agreed and expressed the hope that the bilaterals3 would merely be interim to an ultimate multilateral approach. I pointed out that the multilateral approach should be such as to ultimately be evolveable into a comprehensive international system of the control of atomic energy. Rabi said that we must get these controls working before our reactors are constructed abroad. He believed that even a country like India, when it had some plutonium production, would go into the weapons business.

I asked him if he thought it would be feasible to require nations receiving assistance from an agency to renounce the rights to construct weapons. He thought not, saying this would have to be done by some collateral agreement which he thought would only be successful if it was universal.

Rabi felt that we shall be designing our own reactors so that diversions therefrom could be easily detectable and that reactors which we might build abroad under bilaterals should also be so designed. I pointed out that I believed that no thought had been given to this problem in the current design activities of American manufacturers.

Rabi pointed out the sources of strength in the present American position—not only that we had a near monopoly of enriched material but also our ability to lend technological help. Unless we see to it that controls are established during this present preliminary stage, he believes that the situation will shortly get out of control. He expressed the opinion that the Russians had a community of interest in controlling this question with us.

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He asked about the possible overlap between our efforts to set up controls and the work of Stassen’s technical panels. I told him I had made inquiry as to what they were doing and would let him know but that I felt we had one segment of the problem and it would admit of separate treatment from that of the over-all disarmament problem.

I undertook to have the State Department request AEC to make the engineering study which Rabi has proposed.

  1. Source: Department of State, Atomic Energy Files: Lot 57 D 688, IAEA—Control and Inspection. Secret.
  2. See Document 61, recommendation 3.
  3. Reference is to agreements for cooperation in civil uses of atomic energy between the United States and individual countries, which were authorized under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.