Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

45. Memorandum of Discussion at the 253d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 30, 1955¹

Washington, June 30, 1955

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments (NSC 112; “Progress Report on Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament”, Volumes I, II and III, dated May 26, 1955, from the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament; NSC Actions Nos. 1328 and 1411; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 23 and 28, 1955; Memo for the President from the Secretary of Defense, subject: “Progress Report on the Control of Armaments by the Special Assistant to the President”, dated June 28, 1955)²

Mr. Dillon Anderson informed the Council that in accordance with prior NSC action, Governor Stassen had revised his earlier report to the Council on an acceptable disarmament plan, and had now presented Volume IV of his progress report on this subject,³ which constituted the results of his discussions with the interested departments and agencies. He said that Governor Stassen would summarize orally for the Council the main features of the revised plan (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting).

Governor Stassen proceeded to brief the Council on the contents of Volume IV of his progress report. Among other things, he noted and read a comment on this plan made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum to the Secretary of Defense dated June 16, 1955⁴ (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting). This comment indicated what the Joint Chiefs considered as favorable aspects of Governor Stassen’s plan. It was based on a sound assessment of Communist intentions, ambitions and lack of good faith. It prescribed no ban on atomic weapons. It insisted on an adequate inspection system and, if implemented in full, it would leave the free world at least temporarily in an over-all position of military superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc.

After further comment on the views of the several departments which had resulted in the revision of the plan now set forth in Volume IV, Governor Stassen again referred to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, likewise from their memorandum of June 16, indicating the firm view that there would have to be concrete evidence of a revolutionary change in the ambitions and intentions of the Soviet regime before the United States could safely agree to enter into any kind of arms limitation agreement with the USSR. It was their view, said Governor Stassen, that it was better to continue with the present situation and the arms race than to enter an agreement with the Soviets. This course of action provided a more effective deterrent to war than the conclusion of an arms limitation agreement. Governor Stassen also referred to the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that if any arms limitation agreement was entered into, Communist China should be involved in it from the beginning.

After summarizing the recommendations in Volume IV, Governor Stassen said that this constituted his review of the situation. The next question before the Council was where we went from here. The Council might wish to direct a continuing study of the disarmament problem; it might suggest a study of what further limited steps might be taken to test Soviet intentions; it might direct consultation on the problems presented by the Stassen plan with the UK and other U.S. allies.

At the conclusion of Governor Stassen’s presentation, the President called on the Secretary of State for comment. Secretary Dulles wondered whether it might not be more useful to hear from the Defense Department first because, he said, the views of the State Department on Governor Stassen’s disarmament plan appeared to be somewhere between those of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and those of Governor Stassen.

The president replied by pointing out that he was calling on Secretary Dulles for the very good reason that in the near future Governor Stassen might find himself acting, as it were, as an agent of the Secretary of State in discussion of the disarmament plan with our allies. The President expressed with conviction the view that the United States was going to get nowhere with its plans for disarmament unless it succeeded in getting a much greater degree of international support. He felt that there was no use whatever in developing a full program and plan for limitation of armaments before we had at least tried out the problem of obtaining support for such a plan from our major allies. He said he personally favored the idea of opening consulation on Governor Stassen’s plan with the British, and again reminded Secretary Dulles that if this were to happen Governor Stassen would be acting under the direction of the Secretary of State. On the other hand, concluded the President, if Secretary Dulles would prefer to have the Defense people speak first, it might be a good idea if Secretary Wilson were to discuss the main point made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Department—namely, that major change in the attitudes and policies of the Soviet Union was an absolute condition precedent to any acceptable plan for arms limitation.

Secretary Dulles replied with emphasis that he did not agree with this general position of the Defense Department. The President added with even greater emphasis that he likewise did not share this view. He then called on Secretary Wilson to enlarge on this position of the Defense Department.

Secretary Wilson explained that Defense did not mean that all the major political controversies between the U.S. and the USSR would have to be settled before serious discussion of an arms limitation plan could commence. He merely meant that some evidence of progress in settling these issues should precede the conclusion of an arms limitation agreement. In the absence of evidence of such progress the Soviets would merely make use of negotiations on an arms limitation agreement to add to the existing frictions and tensions in the world. After all, said Secretary Wilson, he could not be very well impressed with the type of inspections which had resulted from the armistice agreement in Korea; nor was he pleased with the Soviet interpretation of the agreements respecting Berlin. It would be impossible to get the kind of inspection and supervision the United States requires on an arms limitation plan if such Soviet attitudes and policies did not significantly change. As a start, suggested Secretary Wilson, we should insist that the Russians make a complete disavowal of the Third International. The President interrupted to say that such disavowals had been made in the past and were not notably useful. Secretary Wilson, however, believed that the Soviet disavowal of the Third International in Mr. Roosevelt’s time had been followed up to some extent by action to this end.

Secretary Wilson then went on to suggest as the next step that the Iron Curtain should be cracked and reversed. The President again interrupted to point out that the Soviets say that they are obliged to maintain this Curtain out of fear of the United States. All these points seemed to the President part and parcel of the same problem.

Secretary Wilson then said he would mention briefly what the United States could do if the Soviets made some of these concessions. He believed, he said, that we ought to change our attitude with respect to controls and restrictions on East-West trade; for example, maintaining our restrictions only on the sale to the Soviet bloc of actual munitions of war. To this we might add steps which would produce a freer movement of peoples and of information. A series of moves such as these by the U.S. and the USSR might ultimately lead to a world situation in which an arms limitation agreement would really prove possible. After all, it was only too simple to break such an agreement if there were not good faith on both sides. Secretary Wilson then summed up the Defense Department opinion that some, at least, of the moves such as he had described should precede any agreement for the limitation of armaments between the U.S. and the USSR. There was no other safe way to approach the problem.

The President then inquired if anyone else wished to comment on the problem. Ambassador Lodge replied that he wished to warn the members of the Council that the Soviets would bring up the disarmament issue at the forthcoming Summit Conference if for no other purpose than to prosecute the cold war. To prove his point he quoted from Molotov’s recent statement at San Francisco that the USSR had made a number of concessions in its May 10 proposals on disarmament, and that the next move accordingly was up to the U.S. and the Western powers. Ambassador Lodge predicted that a lot of specific points would be thrown up by the Soviets at Geneva, and that the U.S. must be ready with its answers. Over and beyond this, continued Ambassador Lodge, Governor Stassen would be well advised to study the matter of proceeding under Article 51 of the UN Charter if there were no arms limitation agreement concluded.

Admiral Radford then asked for an opportunity to amplify the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He said that both he and the other Chiefs, individually and collectively, believed that this was the most important decision which they had been faced with in their period of service in this Administration. They were very concerned, therefore, that they had had so little time to get themselves adequately prepared on so grave a subject.

Admiral Radford then said that he would like to read paragraph 3 of the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary of Defense dated June 27, 1955,⁵ in order to make clear that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not agree with Governor Stassen’s view, contained in his progress report and earlier alluded to in his oral remarks, that there was general agreement in the Government that the proposed new Stassen policy was preferable to the existing policy as set forth in NSC 112 and in the Baruch plan.⁶

After Admiral Radford had read this paragraph, the President said that of course the Joint Chiefs had come to reject the Baruch plan in toto, whether or not they believed the Stassen plan was preferable. Admiral Radford admitted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the so-called Baruch plan, calling for the elimination of atomic weapons and international control of atomic energy, was unworkable; but so likewise they believed that Governor Stassen’s plan was unworkable. In order to make specific the Joint Chiefs’ objections to the Stassen plan, Admiral Radford read from the JCS memorandum of June 16 listing the unfavorable aspects of the Stassen plan as outlined in paragraph 6. He explained that among other reasons why the Chiefs of Staff felt that China must be included in any workable arms limitation agreement from the beginning, was the ease with which the Soviets could hide nuclear weapons in the vast spaces of Communist China. He went on with an explanation as to why the Joint Chiefs of Staff felt that the feature of surprise attack had been somewhat overemphasized, even though the danger of surprise attack had been emphasized in the report of the Killian Committee⁷ and other relevant reports. Summing up, Admiral Radford expressed the opinion that if the United States followed the courses of action recommended in Governor Stassen’s plan, it would eventually reach a position of absolute military inferiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. This would constitute a threat to the security of the United States.

The President replied with considerable warmth that so far as he could see, Admiral Radford believed that the United States should proceed as at present in the arms race despite the fact that this was a mounting spiral towards war. If the Joint Chiefs of Staff really believed this, the President said he wondered why they did not counsel that we go to war at once with the Soviet Union. In reply, Admiral Radford pointed out that the United States had very great military power at the present time. On the other hand, the Soviets were encountering considerable difficulties. The Joint Chiefs of Staff accordingly believed that an opportunity had now presented itself to reach important political settlements and agreements with the Soviet Union. If these were actually achieved it might lead to the formulation of an adequate system of supervision and inspection in an armaments limitation agreement.

The President said that he was at a loss to grasp what political agreement with the Soviet Union could lead to the adoption of an acceptable inspection system which was not already capable of being inserted in the agreement itself. He said he failed to understand Admiral Radford’s position on this point. Admiral Radford cited Korea as an example of Communist violation of agreements setting up inspection. Governor Stassen pointed out that any forthcoming agreement with the Soviet Union on an arms limitation inspection system need not contain the bad features of the Korean inspection system.

The President said that Governor Stassen’s plan contained the safeguard that if the Soviet Union did not play a straight game with us in respect to inspections, we were legally entitled to abrogate the arms agreement. In reply to this point, Admiral Radford again cited the Korean armistice agreement. Legally we had a right to abrogate the armistice clauses relating to the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission teams because the Communists were failing to observe them. Nevertheless, world opinion has prevented us from doing so. We might well face a similar problem if the Soviet Union violated the provisions of any arms limitation agreement. Both the President and Governor Stassen pointed out that the Stassen plan provided the U.S. with measures of relief short of abrogation in the event the USSR violated the agreement.

Secretary Wilson then said that he had another point in the argument which he wished to lay before the Council. In his view, he said, the reestablishment of any reasonable balance of power had not been worked out since the end of World War II. It was the considered military opinion that at the present time no effective military plan for the defense of Western Europe existed except plans which involved the use of atomic weapons. Without these weapons the Soviets had an overwhelming advantage over the free world nations. Our situation respecting balance of power in the Pacific, moreover, was such that we were practically impotent against the enemy there unless we had resort to our nuclear capabilities. How was it possible, inquired Secretary Wilson, to unscramble this problem of an arms limitation agreement until and unless the rearmament of Germany in Europe and the rearmament of Japan in Asia had proceeded far enough to achieve once again something like a genuine balance of power in these two areas? Japan and Germany must, therefore, be rearmed and admitted into the United Nations. The military believed that Governor Stassen’s proposal for a leveling off of armaments at their present peaks was essentially just as difficult a business as the actual elimination or reduction of armaments.

The President said that he agreed with the difficulties inherent in Governor Stassen’s leveling off plan, but pointed out that this plan at least had the advantage of providing a basis for negotiating. We have got to find out what these Soviet villains will do to find out what could be achieved by way of an acceptable inspection system. The President then said he would like to hear from Secretary Dulles with respect to an acceptable inspection system.

Secretary Dulles said that he believed that this whole issue of arms limitation was of tremendous importance for the entire future of the United States. Perhaps, as Admiral Radford had stated, there had not been adequate time to work on it. The President interrupted to say that he certainly agreed on this point. Secretary Dulles went on to say that nevertheless, and despite the shortness of time, he had at least a few very clear views on the disarmament problem. For one thing, the United States must certainly be prepared to make some positive move in the direction of disarmament. If we did not do so, Secretary Dulles predicted that we would lose very important assets, such as the support of our allies and the right to use bases in allied countries, which are the assets which make the U.S. power position in the world tolerable. Not only can we not stand still, said Secretary Dulles; we cannot afford, either, to wait until a whole series of political problems with the Soviet Union are settled before we move ahead on disarmament. Arms limitation and political settlements with the Soviet Union should go forward concurrently. Political settlements cannot be a pre-condition of U.S. movement in the direction of arms limitation.

Secondly, Secretary Dulles said he believed that the Soviets genuinely wanted some reduction in the armament burdens in order to be able to deal more effectively with their severe internal problems. Accordingly, the Soviet Union may be prepared to make concessions.

As to the problem of how the Council and Governor Stassen should proceed from here on out, Secretary Dulles said that there were two main parts of the problem. The first part was the substantive aspects of the Stassen plan, the idea of a leveling off at the existing levels of armament possessed by the U.S. and the USSR. The second major element in the problem was that of policing any plan that was adopted. In his opinion, continued Secretary Dulles, the acceptability of any substantive plan for arms limitation depended in fact on what we and the Soviets were willing to do with regard to the policing of the plan. Governor Stassen’s present plan was one that best served the interests of the United States, since in essence it freezes our present nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. However, it was not a plan which would be readily welcomed by our allies or by world public opinion. Our allies want not a freezing of existing levels of nuclear armaments; they want these armaments to be eliminated or at least reduced. Accordingly the Stassen plan will not be welcomed by the British or the French. Moreover, as Admiral Radford had correctly pointed out, the Soviets would do their best propaganda-wise to get the British and French to bring pressure upon us to make concessions which might result in a considerable weakening of the advantages which the Stassen plan in its original form would confer on the United States.

Accordingly, Secretary Dulles recommended that heavy initial emphasis from now on be placed on the problem of inspection and policing. He pointed out that no detailed and concrete study of this problem had yet been made by Governor Stassen or anybody else. We must know where and how many inspectors will be put in place. We must understand what we are willing ourselves to accept. How will we react to a lot of Soviet representatives scattered throughout our industrial and military centers? All of this confronts the United States with a serious problem when you actually got down into such disagreeable details. Nevertheless, we must admit some willingness to be policed by Russians if we were to insist on policing them. Indeed, this problem of policing appeared so impossible to those who had formulated the Baruch plan that they concluded that the problem could not be solved, and they abandoned the attempt to do so in favor of the alternative of international ownership of atomic energy. Secretary Dulles said he believed this was the point that needed to be explored first, and also the point where any kind of disarmament plan was likely to break down. In any event, until the problem of policing had been resolved, the United States could not know whether it endorsed a leveling off plan or some other plan for disarmament.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that the Soviets in the past had always called for a disarmament plan first and solution of the inspection problem afterward. He would reverse this process and first study the problem of supervision and policing and thereafter formulate the plan that was to be policed. If we proceeded in this fashion, Secretary Dulles predicted that we would have world opinion on our side rather than on the Russian side.

At the conclusion of Secretary Dulles’ statement, Ambassador Lodge said that he believed the Secretary of State was absolutely right in his contention that inspection was the crux of the problem. On the other hand, he said he wished to point out the apparent change in the Soviet attitude toward inspection as it was outlined in their May 10 disarmament proposal. Ambassador Lodge again quoted from Molotov’s speech on this point at San Francisco, and indicated that the Soviets were attempting to convince the world that they actually favored real inspection.

The President then explained that he could not wholly agree with Secretary Dulles that the problem of policing and inspection could be so readily separated from the substantive content of the disarmament plan itself. As the President saw it, the type of plan we selected would obviously influence the kind of inspection system we required. He did agree, however, with what the Secretary of State and Ambassador Lodge had had to say about the difficulties of devising and operating an acceptable inspection system.

Changing the subject, Secretary Dulles reverted to Governor Stassen’s query as to the desirability of talking with the British on the subject of the disarmament plan in the near future. He said that of course we might be able to do so, but he doubted the wisdom of this step until such time as we have “a national position” on the problem of disarmament.

Secretary Humphrey expressed emphatic agreement with the position on discussions with the British which Secretary Dulles had taken. He said it was essential that the United States know where it wants to go before talking with any other government. An agreement on disarmament, in his opinion, was worth nothing at all unless it was to the advantage of both parties and unless both parties really wanted it. If the U.S. and the USSR were unable to get along in the world together, no verbal agreement was worth anything. Nor, said Secretary Humphrey, could we proceed on any course of action which separated the problem of arms limitation from the problems of a political settlement. These two problems went together. In the meantime, while we were negotiating with the Soviets we must deal with them from a position of strength. We must not, therefore, reduce our nuclear capability. For all the problems it raised, nuclear energy was here to stay. In fact, it was our great strength and the strength of the free world.

With a smile, the President turned to Secretary Humphrey and said, don’t change your speech when budget time rolls around.

Secretary Humphrey continued with the thought that it might be possible to contemplate limitation of the means of delivery of atomic weapons—aircraft, submarines, and the like—but not a limitation of atomic weapons themselves. The thing to do was to set up an inspection system over the means of delivery; but the United States simply could not afford to ban atomic weapons.

The President said that at least this much should be clearly understood by everyone present: The Russians were not deserting their Marxian ideology nor their ultimate objectives of world revolution and Communist domination. However, they had found that an arms race was much too expensive a means of achieving these objectives, and they wished to achieve these objectives without recourse to war. If the United States rejects this attitude and seems to prefer a military solution, it would lose the support of the world. Thus our real problem is how we can achieve a stalemate vis-à-vis the Russians in the area of the non-military struggle as we have already achieved such a stalemate in the military field.

Admiral Strauss then said that he had a suggestion to make. Secretary Dulles had stated that the United States could not stand still, and must make some move in the direction of disarmament. It was generally agreed that the Baruch plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons was outmoded. The present outlook was very bleak. We were obliged to assume that the USSR would be acting in bad faith. It was very doubtful indeed if there would be any genuine major change in the Soviet attitude and policy. In the light of all this, Admiral Strauss said that the best solution was a return to the plan outlined by the President in his December 8, 1953, speech calling for creation of an atomic energy pool, to which both the Soviets and the United States would make a contribution and thus drain off some of the fissionable materials which would normally go into weapons. If we returned now to the plan advocated by the President in this speech, we would be making the best possible move. It would put the Russians at a great strategic disadvantage, and would take some of the heat of world opinion off the United States.

The President did not comment on Admiral Strauss’ suggestion, but with regard to the next step suggested that the National Security Council have another meeting at which it would discuss acceptable methods of inspection and policing a disarmament plan. It should consider what kind of a system we think would work and modify our plan to conform to such a system of inspection, and if agreement could be achieved, present it to the Soviets. He inquired whether such a procedure seemed suitable to Governor Stassen, and said he would like to see included in future work by Governor Stassen’s group the idea of common contributions to an atomic energy pool, as suggested by Admiral Strauss.

The Attorney General commented that the creation and putting into effect of a genuine system of policing and inspection of an arms limitation plan might well require an amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Secretary Wilson said that he wanted to make the point that even if atomic capabilities had not been developed by the U.S. and the USSR, the world would still face very much the same kind of situation with respect to arms limitation that it was now facing; so the real question was what can we do to reduce world tensions and to cut down the burden of armaments. Secretary Wilson said he believed that discussion of this problem for a few months more was desirable before negotiation either with our allies or with the Soviets. Secretary Dulles replied that while there was some time still for discussion, we certainly did not have months in which to make up our mind. The President said that he was much intrigued with the idea of trying to formulate a U.S. position on policing and inspection, and thought it desirable to talk this problem over with the British.

Mr. Allen Dulles suggested that the first concern of any inspection system should be directed to the inspection of bases from which atomic weapons or guided missiles could be delivered. He said that we already know something about guided missile sites. Secretary Dulles reaffirmed his view that any study of the methods of policing were bound to have a substantial effect on the substance of any disarmament plan which we formulated.

Governor Stassen argued that he had already given a good deal of time to the problem of policing and inspection, but that he had felt that there must be some agreement on the general features of a disarmament plan before proceeding further with the details of inspection. Furthermore, all the members of the Council should be mindful of the fact that this was a solemn moment in history, when the United States had very great power indeed and when both sides have tremendous military capabilities. Accordingly, it was absolutely vital, in the light of history, that an effort be made to get control of these great potentialities.

Secretary Wilson then said that in the course of future study of inspection and policing, could we not simultaneously list, one by one, the various outstanding political issues between us and the Soviet Union and see what can be done to try to solve these problems. Smiling, Secretary Dulles turned to Secretary Wilson and said, “Charlie, what do you think I do? Did you read my speech in San Francisco?” (Laughter)

The Vice President commented that he did not believe that there was anything more important from the political point of view than the formulation of an inspection system which offered the hope of penetrating the Iron Curtain. This also would be the best propaganda position for the United States.

At this point Mr. Dillon Anderson summed up the main positions taken by the National Security Council, and the remainder of the discussion was devoted to the formulation of the Council’s action on Governor Stassen’s progress report.

The National Security Council:⁸

a. Noted and discussed Volume IV of the “Progress Report on Proposed Policy of the United States on the Question of Disarmament”, prepared by the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament in response to NSC Action No. 1411–c, in the light of the views of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference memoranda dated June 28.

b. Agreed that the U.S., in its own interest, should, as interrelated parts of our national policy:

(1) Actively seek an international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments.

(2) Concurrently make intensive efforts to resolve other major international issues.

(3) Meanwhile continue the steady development of strength in the U.S. and the free world coalition required for U.S. security.

c. Agreed that the acceptability and character of any international system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and armaments depends primarily on the scope and effectiveness of the safeguards against violations and evasions, and especially the inspection system.

d. Noted the President’s directive that the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament, in consultation with the interested departments and agencies, should:

(1) Develop methods of inspection which would be deemed feasible and which would serve to determine what would be acceptable on a reciprocal basis to the United States.

(2) Modify his proposed plan as necessary to conform with the above-mentioned inspection system.

(3) Take into account in his proposed plan the suggested incorporation of the international pool of atomic energy materials for peaceful uses outlined by the President in his speech of December 8, 1953.

(4) Report his proposed plan, as modified by the foregoing, and including the methods of inspection developed under (1) above, to the President through the Council for further consideration.

Note: The action in d above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament for implementation.

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on July 1.
2. For text of NSC 112, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. I, p. 477. For Volume I of Stassen’s progress report, see Document 33; Volumes II and III are not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Disarmament—Basic Papers) Regarding NSC Actions Nos. 1328 and 1411, see footnote 22, Document 7, and footnote 3, Document 34, respectively. The memoranda from the NSC Executive Secretary to the NSC, June 23 and 28, are not printed. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy) For Wilson’s memorandum to the President, see Document 42.
3. Document 40.
4. Document 38.
5. Document 41.
6. Bernard M. Baruch, U.S. Representative on the U.N. Atomic Energy Commission, presented the U.S. position on international control of atomic energy to the commission on June 14, 1946. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. I, pp. 7–16; or Department of State Bulletin, June 23, 1946, pp. 1057–1062.
7. The Killian Committee, known officially as the Technological Capabilities Panel, was a 42-member panel of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization, headed by Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., of M.I.T. The purposes of this committee were an examination of the present vulnerability of the United States to surprise attack and the Nation’s technological capabilities to reduce that vulnerability. Information on the Killian Committee and portions of the committee’s report are scheduled for publication in volume XIX.
8. Paragraphs a–d and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1419, approved by the President on June 30. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)