Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

42. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President¹

Washington, June 28, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Progress Report on the Control of Armaments by the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament—Volumes I, II, and III, 26 May 1955, and Volume IV, 23 June 1955²

It is the purpose of this memorandum to inform you of the views of the Department of Defense on the armament regulation problem generally and on the approach to it recommended in the subject Report which is to be considered by the National Security Council on 30 June 1955.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have expressed their views on the preliminary proposals contained in Volumes I, II, and III of the Progress Report. After careful review with the Armed Forces Policy Council, I endorsed the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and transmitted them to the Special Assistant on 21 June 1955.³ Volume IV of the Progress Report, which is now at hand, contains certain revisions of the preliminary plan which meet some of the points raised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have subsequently reviewed Volume IV and I am attaching copies of their two memoranda to me summarizing their views.⁴

It is the unanimous view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Armed Forces Policy Council, which I strongly endorse, that the basic philosophy of dealing with arms regulation in advance of the settlement of the major political issues causing international tensions is unrealistic and contrary to the best interests of our national security. Holding this view, it seems to me that I might be most helpful to you in this connection if I addressed myself to the stark realities of the military situation, leaving to later discussion the development of the political actions to be taken under the circumstances.

The Department of Defense subscribes wholeheartedly to the national objective of the subject Progress Report—a lasting peace, with security, freedom and economic well-being for the people of our country. It is our conviction that this basic objective would not be served by an arms limitation agreement under present world conditions, primarily because the atomic revolution in weaponry, combined with the Iron Curtain which the USSR maintains between the Free and Communist Worlds, seems to have made the enforcement of any such agreement impracticable.

A fundamental component of the policy the United States, in concert with our allies, has pursued in the search for a just and lasting peace has been the maintenance of sufficient arms strength to deter the Soviet Union from acts of overt aggression. Unquestionably, the military posture generated under this policy has been an effective restraint on Soviet imperialism. Thus, to the extent that confidence in our strength and in the righteousness of our basic objective has guided us and shaped our policy, we have been successful. Under these circumstances, there appears to be no good reason to abandon this policy.

Events of recent years, particularly the Soviet detonation of a thermonuclear device, have caused some of our allies, and even some of our own people, to be preoccupied with illusory short-cuts to security instead of facing up to the tougher problems of achieving a lasting peace. We must recognize and counter the danger that such fear complexes might cause the Free World coalition to abandon the determination which has brought us a considerable degree of success, and to substitute for it unrealistic or escapist concepts which could have disastrous consequences.

The Progress Report outlines a three-phase program: The first involving armaments limitation agreements which would call for leveling off total armament efforts under the surveillance of an International Armaments Commission; a second phase in which there would be a resolution of the major political issues causing international tensions; and, following this, a third phase in which there would be a progressive reduction of armaments.

The key issue here is one of proper sequence. It is the view of the Department of Defense that the proposed second phase should, in fact, be the first. This is based on our conviction, after careful study, that the same fundamentals which make resolution of major political issues a condition precedent to agreements to reduce arms, would apply equally to agreements to level off arms. We believe that any arms control arrangement will be hazardous until there is proof of Soviet intentions to live as a peaceful member of the World Community.

Furthermore, we doubt that the USSR would enter in good faith into leveling-off agreements which would seem to them to have the effect of weakening their position in the resolution of political issues. We conclude that any leveling-off agreements that could be made at this time would neither strengthen our negotiating position nor contribute to the resolution of political problems. Moreover, we believe such agreements would be dangerous. In the light of the past ten years’ experience, agreements on arms level-off or reduction would, in themselves, be a source of additional friction and tension. I, therefore, urge that level-off, as well as arms reduction agreements, follow rather than precede the resolution of major political issues.

In lieu of armament regulation as a first step toward our goal of a just and lasting peace, I suggest an alternate course which I believe entails far less risk and promises greater assurance of success, as follows:

(1) That the United States join the other great powers in disavowing aggression as a national policy and in reaffirming their pledges to seek resolution of world problems by peaceful means;

(2) That the United States seek four-power agreement to explore, through the United Nations or other appropriate international channels, mutual and reciprocal means of evidencing to each other and the whole world their good faith in the performance of this pledge; and

(3) That the United States, while seeking by every proper means to adjust political issues and promote a just and lasting peace, maintain, pending such adjustment, basic military strength necessary and adequate to destroy the military power of any nation which seeks world conquest through military aggression.

The Department sees no possibility of discouraging or preventing the USSR from building up and maintaining a substantially equivalent military position. Under such circumstances, non-aggression is no more than enlightened self-interest, and we should do our utmost to see that this is clearly recognized on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

There is an impression that such a formula calls for an all-out arms race that would result eventually in economic disaster. This is not so. The United States is not now engaged in an all-out arms race since it is not allowing its military effort to be an intolerable drain on its technological, economic and manpower resources.

Because an all-out arms race is neither necessary nor desirable, and because international control seems impracticable and dangerous, under present circumstances I believe deterrence by armed strength is our best real hope for peace. So long as the Free World, while disavowing aggression itself, retains the capability of destroying an aggressor, regardless of initiative, so long will deterrence be effective. This concept visualizes an armed truce, perhaps of many years, during which the great powers would work actively to resolve world problems. The period of truce would be a prelude to and an incentive for the realization of a world in which international differences would be adjusted by peaceful processes.

The Department recognizes that fear of massive surprise attack is one of the elements contributing to international tensions. It is our view, however, that in a military sense the subject Report places far too much emphasis on the effective advantage to be gained by surprise. While we see serious difficulties under present circumstances in the way of creating an effective mutual warning system without the disclosure of vital technical, strategic and tactical information, we agree that the subject of reciprocal ways and means to minimize the effect of surprise should receive careful examination.

The Department has even stronger misgivings about the practicability of inspection and control plans as a means of enforcing arms limitations or reductions. Technology has come to play such a tremendously important role that, to be effective, inspection and control would have to cover a vast array of research and development programs and industrial processes. We see no prospect that the USSR would concede such access to and control over their technical and industrial affairs. Even the United States would find such an invasion of our scientific and industrial privacy extremely disruptive of our economic system. In a world where small packages of tremendous destructive power can be transported by ordinary, conventional means, it is difficult to imagine an inspection and control system that would be effective and fool-proof. We specifically disagree with any concept of limiting the forward march of technology in military fields, for example, by the elimination of further nuclear weapons tests.

The mutual deterrence course of action is a “fail-safe” course in that, if the USSR acts in bad faith, the U.S. position will be no worse than it would otherwise have been. On the other hand, the armament control course is not a “fail-safe” course in that, if the USSR acts in bad faith, the U.S. relative position could be irreparably damaged.

I respectfully recommend:

(1) That the first phase plan set forth in the proposal for the control of armament (Progress Report Volume IV) not be approved until major political issues have been resolved; and accordingly that the consultations with allies along the lines suggested in Volume IV not be initiated by the United States at this time;

(2) That the resolution of major political issues be clearly a condition precedent to any arms leveling-off agreements as well as arms reduction agreements;

(3) That non-aggression through mutual deterrence, rather than disarmament, be accepted as the only path to a just and lasting peace under present conditions; and

(4) That at the forthcoming four-power conference, the United States express its willingness to work with the USSR and others on a listing of all specific political problems which are, in the opinion of either side, currently contributing to international tension and to collaborate in good faith on the resolution of such problems.

C.E. Wilson

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Disarmament. Top Secret. A handwritten note on the source text by Goodpaster reads: “President informed of contents (by Dillon Anderson) 29 Jun 55. G”.
2. For text of Volumes I and IV, see Documents 33 and 40. Volumes II and III are not printed. (ibid., Project Clean Up, Disarmament—Basic Papers)
3. For text of the JCS views, see Document 38. Wilson’s transmittal letter to Anderson, June 21, is not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records)
4. Documents 38 and supra.