Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

237. Department of State Position Paper¹

Washington, June 11, 1957.

US POSITION ON FIRST PHASE OF DISARMAMENT

General

1. The following paragraphs outline provisions of a first phase agreement on disarmament proposed by the United States. These provisions will be considered as inseparable parts of a whole, unless the contrary is stated.

The first phase agreement will become effective upon ratification by such states as may be agreed.

2. Each party will have the right to suspend its obligations, partially or completely, by written notice to the Control Organization, of either—

a. an important violation by another party, or

b. other action by any state which so prejudices the security of the notifying party as to require partial or complete suspension.

At its option a party may give advance notice of intention to suspend, so as to afford opportunity for correction of the violation, or prejudicial action, prior to actual suspension of obligations by the notifying party.

3. Each party will agree:

a. to cooperate in designing, installing, and maintaining effective inspection systems to verify compliance with the terms of the agreement by all parties, and

b. that the obligations under the agreement will be conditioned on the continued effective operation of the agreed inspection systems.

Nuclear Provisions

4. The parties will not use nuclear weapons, except in individual or collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter against an armed attack—

a. which includes the use of nuclear weapons, or

b. which is of such a nature and magnitude that, in the decision of a party, the attack cannot feasibly be repelled without the use of nuclear weapons.

(Note: It is understood that this provision will not imply any obligation (a) to maintain non-nuclear forces for repelling non-nuclear attacks; or (b) for any specific distribution between nuclear and non-nuclear armaments.)

5. The parties will agree:

a. to devote all future production of fissionable materials exclusively to non-weapons purposes including stockpiling, starting one month after the installation of an inspection system adequate to verify compliance (hereinafter called the “cut-off date” and estimated as July, 1959, or later), and

b. to cooperate in the prompt design, installation and maintenance of such an inspection system.

(Note: The obligations under this provision will not affect the use, after the cut-off date, of fissionable materials on hand at that date—(1) to complete the fabrication of weapons in course of manufacture, and (2) to refabricate and maintain weapons then on hand or completed under (1).)

6. To provide for equitable transfers of fissionable materials in successive increments from previous production to internationally inspected non-weapons purposes, including either national or international stockpiling, the USSR, UK and US will—

a. fix in the agreement the specific ratios of quantities of fissionable materials of comparable analysis to be transferred by each of them, and

b. agree to commence such transfers in agreed quantities at the fixed ratios immediately following the cut-off date for production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

Unless the Soviets insist on a 50-50 ratio, the US will agree on ratios of 55 for the US to 45 for USSR, and whatever figure for the UK may be agreed.

(Note: The quantities to be transferred under this first phase agreement will be such as to leave to each party affected a substantial part of its nuclear weapons capability.)

7. From the effective date of the agreement—

a. The parties not subject to paragraph 6 above agree not to manufacture nuclear weapons; and²

b. Each party agrees not to transfer out of its control any nuclear weapons, or to accept transfer to it of such weapons, except in a situation where their use will be in conformity with paragraph 4.

c. Each party agrees not to transfer out of its control any fissionable material, or to accept transfer to it of such material, except for peaceful purposes.

This provision will not prohibit—

(1) Any of the states possessing nuclear weapons from introducing or maintaining such weapons on the territory of a non-nuclear-weapons state with its consent; or

(2) The preparatory training of forces of non-nuclear-weapons-states in the use of nuclear weapons, or equipping them with means of delivery for such weapons.

8. All parties will agree:

a. to refrain, as of the effective date of the agreement (estimated as July, 1958), from nuclear tests until 12 months thereafter, with the understanding that the U.S. will resume testing immediately upon termination of the 12 months’ period if a satisfactory agreement to the contrary has not been reached in the meantime.

b. to cooperate in setting up during the 12 months’ period, or earlier if mutually agreeable, an effective international inspection arrangement to monitor tests.³

c. if tests are resumed, to give notification in advance of dates and approximate yields of such tests; to provide reciprocal limited access to tests; and to limit the amount of radioactive material to be released into the atmosphere.

Inspection Zones

9. Upon the effective date of the agreement (estimated as July 1958), the parties concerned will promptly install and maintain, in an initial zone or zones specified in the agreement, an aerial and ground inspection system, including appropriate radar and communications equipment to provide safeguards against the potential of surprise attack. Details of the aerial and ground inspection system will be prescribed in an annex to the agreement.

a. The US–Canada–USSR Zone

Initially the U.S. will propose that the zone include the continental U.S., Alaska and, with its consent, Canada, and all Soviet territory.

If the Soviets should reject this proposal, the US will accept a limited initial zone, in order to start an inspection technique. This limited zone will comprise the entire area north of the Arctic Circle (except Sweden and Finland), all of Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, the Soviet territory East of 160 degrees East longitude, and all of the Kamchatka Peninsula and the Kurile Islands. (This proposal is contingent upon the consent of Canada, Denmark, and Norway).

In conducting negotiations for a limited zone, the US will not offer more US territory in exchange for more Soviet territory, in the absence of further governmental decision.

b. Inspection Zone Affecting Western Europe

In view of the interests of our NATO allies and the complexity of the multi-national interests involved, any aerial and ground inspection zone affecting Western Europe should, insofar as possible, be treated separately from the aerial and ground inspection zones dealt with in a above, and will be handled in accordance with paragraph 10. Agreement on an inspection zone in Western Europe is not for the US a precondition for the first phase agreement.

c. Extension of Zone

If the first phase agreement does not provide for inclusion of the entire USSR in the inspection zone or zones, it may contain such provisions for subsequent expansion of the zone or zones as may be agreed in conformity with paragraphs a and b above.

10. Negotiations and arrangements for any aerial and ground inspection zone affecting Western Europe will be handled in a way enabling the West European nations affected to have a full voice in developing the position. Accordingly, the United States will leave to such nations the initiative on the following matters:

a. Any provision as to the creation, extent and location of any such zone, or the types of inspection therein.

b. Any provision restricting states possessing nuclear weapons from locating such weapons within the area of any such zone.

c. Any provision for special reduction in the armaments and armed forces within any such zone.

d. Any provision for reduction in air bases within any such zone.

If the European nations affected propose the adoption of any such provisions, the US will then decide on what position to take with regard to them.

Reductions of Armed Forces and Armaments

11. To provide for initial reductions of armed forces and armaments:

a. Three months after the effective date of the agreement, the US, USSR and other parties concerned will provide each other with inventories of fixed military installations and numbers and locations of military forces and major designated armaments (including nuclear weapons delivery capabilities but excluding nuclear weapons) located within an agreed inspection zone or zones.

b. Within one year from the effective date of the agreement, the US and USSR will each: (1) reduce its military forces to 2.5 million; (2) deposit, in internationally supervised storage depots within its own territory, the specific quantities of designated types of armaments, substantial in amount, significant in kind, and of post-World War II manufacture (or naval vessels of types in active service), to be mutually agreed upon and set forth in the agreement.

c. Parties other than the USSR and the US will make reductions of forces and deposits of armaments or accept ceilings for their forces and armaments as appropriate to specific situations, as set forth in the agreement.

Missiles

12. The parties will agree that within three months after the effective date of the agreement they will cooperate in the establishment of a technical committee to study the design of an inspection system which would make it possible to assure that the sending of objects through outer space should be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes.

Control Organization

13. The Armaments Regulation Organization to administer the disarmament system will be established under the aegis of the Security Council, and will operate through a Board of Control on which the affirmative vote of the US and such other parties as may be agreed will be essential for significant decisions.

14. In addition to other rights and responsibilities, the Board of Control will have authority—

a. To establish a system for the advance notification by parties of any intended major movement of armed forces over foreign soil or over international waters or through international air space, and

b. To establish a system for regulating the export and import of armaments, to take effect upon the exchange of military inventories.

Second Phase Agreements

15. The first phase agreement should not spell out in detail any later phase reductions.

The US will, however, indicate its interest in further reductions of armaments and armed forces, on a basis to be agreed, as a second phase, taking into account progress towards solution of major political issues and satisfactory progress in fulfillment of the agreement. In that connection, the US—

a. may discuss, without commitment, the possibility of reductions in a second phase, if first phase reductions are carried through successfully, to not less than 2 million men;

b. may express hope that further reductions in armaments and armed forces might be negotiated, if second phase reductions are carried through successfully; provided that no floor below 1.5 million men is discussed.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Cutler. Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the source text. On June 8, however, Stelle sent Howe a draft paper, dated June 7, entitled “US Position on Disarmament.” His covering memorandum, June 8, stated the paper had been written in S/P in response to a request from Cutler; incorporated the substance of a previous draft and AEC and Defense comments; had been coordinated with Murphy, IO, EUR, and S/AE; and would be discussed at an interagency meeting that afternoon. (Department of State, Central Files, 600.0012/6–757) Cutler had informed Dulles on June 7 that Eisenhower wanted “a complete, clarified revision of the policy guidance on Disarmament, agreed to by the interested agencies to reflect the work done in Washington earlier this week,” and that the President had suggested its title be “Tentative List of Proposals for Discussion with Western Allies.” (Memorandum from Cutler to Dulles, June 7; ibid.) No record of the interagency meeting mentioned in Stelle’s memorandum has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files. Cutler sent the revised guidance to the President on June 8, adding a list of unresolved questions which related to the addition of a subtitle and subparagraphs 11–b and 11-d. (Memorandum from Cutler to Eisenhower, June 8; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cutler) Eisenhower discussed the paper with Cutler on June 11; see infra. The text printed here reflects changes made in the paper during this conversation.
2. Regarding the subsequent deletion of this subparagraph, see Document 242.
3. This subparagraph was revised and inserted in this position paper to conform to the changes approved by Eisenhower in his meeting with Cutler on June 12; see infra. The version agreed to at the June 8 meeting reads: “to cooperate in setting up during the 12 months’ period an effective international inspection arrangement to monitor tests.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Administration Series, Cutler)