227. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Quarles) to the Secretary of State1
Washington, June 5,
1957.
Dear Mr. Dulles: Mr.
Harold Stassen’s paper
regarding a partial disarmament agreement, as revised on May 31,
1957,2 has been reviewed in the Department of Defense
in the light of the decisions taken by the President on May 25,
1957.3 In general, those decisions appear to be
accurately reflected in the revised paper. It is considered, however,
that certain modifications in language and substance are necessary in
order to bring the paper completely into consonance with what we
understand to be the intent underlying the decisions. The comments of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their recommended changes in the revised
paper are attached in the inclosure hereto. I am in
[Page 600]
general agreement with the views of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and recommend that the modifications proposed by
them be incorporated in the paper under consideration.
Attention is particularly invited to paragraphs 14, 15 and 17 of the
paper which appear to suggest possible U.S. agreement to (a) prohibition
against stationing nuclear weapons in an European-Russian zone, (b)
specific reduction of forces and armaments in the zone and (c) a 10%
reduction of air bases on both sides in the zone. It should be recalled
that these elements of the proposal were not discussed specifically in
the meeting on May 25, nor was it indicated that they were integral to
the U.S. position on this subject. In his letter to you dated 17 May
1957,4 the Secretary of Defense stated that “The
provisions for the very substantial reduction of forces and the
prohibition against our stationing of nuclear weapons in the zone would
so reduce the effectiveness of the NATO
forces in the area as to render them incapable of a sustained defense.”
In view of the serious implications of these provisions with respect to
the continued effectiveness of the NATO
forces, the Department of Defense considers that it would not be in the
U.S. interest to suggest them for consideration in the formulation of
the allied position or to imply that they would be acceptable to the
U.S. as part of a first step agreement. Further, it is noted in your
instructions to Mr. Stassen on
May 265 you cautioned against the
U.S. being in a position where we in effect are taking the initiative on
the Continental Zone.
It is noted that Mr. Stassen, in a
meeting on 31 May 1957, presented the Soviet delegate with an
unclassified informal memorandum which outlined the U.S. position
generally as developed in the meeting on May 25. In addition to the
adverse repercussions which have been generated among our NATO allies this action has other
unfortunate aspects. It was the understanding of the Defense
representatives that a revised paper reflecting the May 25 decisions was
to be submitted for final review by the interested U.S. government
agencies before the U.S. position was presented to members of the
Sub-committee in specific detail. Further, although the Allied position
regarding an European-Russian zone has yet to be developed, the paper
presented to Mr. Zorin appears to
prejudge the outcome of the Allied deliberations in this regard. Certain
of the language in the informal paper appears to go beyond the intent of
U.S. policy as recently adopted. For example, in paragraph 12 the
statement is made “this formulation adopts indirectly a Soviet
suggestion of a commitment not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.”
Similarly, in paragraph 13, which deals with nuclear
[Page 601]
tests, the statement is made that “the
U.S. delegate is prepared to favorably consider the acceptance, within a
partial agreement, of the USSR proposal
for a temporary cessation of nuclear tests.” No reference is made to the
U.S. intention to resume testing after a twelve month period in the
absence of any agreement to the contrary by the end of such period.
Paragraph 28 refers to a reduction of armed forces and armaments and a
10% reduction in the number of military air bases in an European-Russian
zone, although the U.S. and Allied position in this regard has not yet
been developed. Finally, although the paper is labeled as an informal
memorandum and not as the official U.S. position, it will be difficult
for the U.S. to disassociate itself from the position set forth therein,
particularly since the paper is an unclassified document and is subject
to publication at the whim of the Soviet delegation.
Sincerely yours,
[Enclosure]
Draft Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary
of Defense (Wilson)6
SUBJECT
REFERENCES
- a. Memo to the SecState from the US Delegation to the UN Subcommittee on Disarmament dated
31 May 1957
- b. Informal memo to the Chairman of the USSR Delegation from the Chairman
of the US Delegation dated 31 May 1957
- c. Memo by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the Secretary of
Defense, dated 22 May 1957, subject: “Disarmament”7
- 1.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed Governor Stassen’s latest partial
reformulation of the U.S. position on limitation of armaments as
submitted to the Secretary of State on 31 May 1957, and furnish
herewith their views on that paper. These views apply also to
Governor Stassen’s
informal memorandum to the Chairman of the USSR Delegation, also dated 31 May
1957.
- 2.
- In general, the latest paper appears to remedy the majority of
the objectionable features contained in the previously proposed
U.S. position, as expressed in Governor Stassen’s memorandum of 9 May
1957.8 Therefore, comments will be
limited to those aspects of the proposed reformulation, where
the previous objections of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as
expressed in reference c, have not been met.
- 3.
- Although the proposed timetable for the first phase or initial
year of fulfillment is less definitive than that indicated in
Governor Stassen’s
memorandum of 9 May 1957, the sequence of events as implied is
still physically impossible to accomplish. Any effective
inspection system is dependent to a considerable degree on the
operation of a communication and radar net which will permit
rapid and unimpeded transmission of vital information to other
observers or home governments. Establishment of minimum
operating conditions could not be obtained in less than 4 to 6
months, and in the Arctic areas this estimate is even more
doubtful because of unfavorable climatic conditions. The proper
placement of key communication and radar facilities is dependent
upon the exchange of blueprints, which is not scheduled to occur
until 3 months after the initiation of the inspection system.
The exchange of blueprints for the area subject to aerial
inspection should be accomplished at the outset of the
agreement. After this exchange of blueprints, if a progressive
installation phase of 4 to 6 months followed, it would allow (1)
the minimum communication facilities to achieve limited
operational status, (2) the establishment of support bases for
aerial inspection, and (3) the development of control and
identification procedures for aerial overflights. At this point,
initial verification of reductions of armaments and forces could
begin.
- 4.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff are still concerned with the
European-Russian zonal arrangements as implied in paragraphs 6,
7, 8, 14, 15, and 17. If the NATO Allies (and other affected non-NATO states) have a full voice in
the development of any European-Russian zonal arrangement there
would be no immediate unfavourable political reaction by NATO members. However, there is
opportunity for irreparable harm to the NATO alliance if the zonal arrangement did not
function effectively. If this happened, the NATO alliance will have sacrificed
a presently strong military deterrent now in place on the
European continent for a transient false sense of security, and
the NATO alliance will have
presented the Soviet Union with the opportunity for piecemeal
aggression in Europe. In summary, if the European-Russian zonal
arrangement works out well no harm may be done to the Western
world, specifically NATO. If
the zonal arrangement does not work out properly, irreparable
damage is done to NATO,
psychologically and
[Page 603]
militarily. This risk is considered so serious that all
proposals relating to the European-Russian zone should be kept
separate and distinct from the other proposals relating to and
essential to the success of any partial disarmament agreement.
The other proposals should not be in any way dependent upon
arriving at a successful arrangement for the European-Russian
zone.
- 5.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that once a moratorium on
nuclear testing as set forth in paragraph 18 of reference a has
been agreed to, it would be psychologically impossible for the
United States to resume such testing at the end of twelve
months, in the absence of agreement to the contrary. Such a
moratorium tends to perpetuate itself once it is entered upon.
The only escape from this moratorium would be provided by
irrefutable evidence that the Soviet Union was not observing it.
Therefore, provisions for obtaining such irrefutable evidence
through an effective inspection system must be agreed to prior
to any suspension of testing.
- 6.
- Recommended changes to and detailed comments on individual
paragraphs of reference a are as follows:
- a.
Paragraph 3 (b), line 1. Delete first “such”.
Reason: To remove the
connotation that the armed attack referred to would
necessarily be of the same type specified in
paragraph 3 (a), i.e., include the use of nuclear
weapons.
- b.
Paragraph 5. Delete first sentence of last
subparagraph.
Reason: Any discussions of
minimum levels of fissionable materials involve the
inherent danger of disclosure of the size of U.S.
and UK stockpiles,
without any assurance that an indication of the size
of that of the USSR
will be disclosed. The desirable “saving clause” for
the UK is provided
for in the second sentence which indicates the
reservation of intention to maintain a very
substantial nuclear weapons capability.
- c.
Paragraph 6, line 3. Insert after “aerial” the
words “and ground”.
Reason: To adhere to the basic
principle that the aerial and ground inspection
components of the inspection system are
inseparable.
Paragraph 6, line 4. Insert after “system” the words,
including appropriate radar and communication
equipment, to provide adequate safeguards against
the potential of great surprise attack,”.
Reason: To insure that the
radar and communication components are included in
the inspection system.
Paragraph 6 continued, line 1. Insert after “aerial”
the words “and ground”.
Reason: To specify that the
aerial and ground components of the inspection
system are inseparable.
Paragraph 6 continued, line 4. Add“, and will include
steps to expand by subsequent stages if the Soviets
do not accept complete inspection of all of the
USSR as an
initial step.”
Reason: To provide for the
orderly expansion of the inspection
system.
- d.
Paragraph 7 and 8. Delete.
Reason: Their provisions have
been incorporated into paragraph 6.
- e.
Paragraph 9 (c), line 4. Delete “post”. Change to
read “World War II or subsequent”.
Reason: Limited construction
funds available to the U.S. Navy since the end of
World War II have resulted in little construction of
new ships. On the other hand, the Soviet Navy has
out-built all the combined navies of the world since
World War II. This would react to the disadvantage
of the United States if storage of ships were
limited to post-World War II
construction.
- f.
Paragraph 14. Delete.
Reason: It is naive to assume
that the United States could make a unilateral
decision for maintaining nuclear weapons in the
European-Russian zone once NATO had decided otherwise. However, if
for political reasons it must be left in the
agreement, it should be made quite clear with
respect to this paragraph as well as paragraph 2,
that prohibition of U.S. nuclear weapons within the
European-Russian zone is militarily unacceptable
since it would jeopardize the security of NATO.
- g.
Paragraph 16, line 3. Insert after “aerial”, the
words “and ground”. Delete last sentence.
Reason: To specify that aerial
and ground inspection components of the inspection
system are inseparable.
- h.
Paragraph 26, line 3. Delete “keeping with the
foregoing outline and consistent with the studies
of” and insert “consultation with interested
agencies including the Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and”
Reason: The Secretary of
Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will have the
primary responsibility for developing an effective
and sound inspection system.
- 7.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the contents of
references a and b should be revised to reflect the foregoing
views.
