224. Editorial Note
On June 4, President Eisenhower sent Secretary Dulles a draft response to British Prime Minister Macmillan’s June 3 letter. Regarding Macmillan’s letter, see Document 219. Eisenhower wrote that his reply was “Subject to such editing or minor change as you may deem desirable,” but added: “If you think it better not to send even a tentative reply, please hold this up until evening when I will talk to you, but I am anxious that Harold know as quickly as possible that we did try to act in the spirit of our agreements at Bermuda.” (Memorandum from Eisenhower to Dulles; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series) Regarding Eisenhower’s meeting with Macmillan in Bermuda, see Document 179.
Dulles apparently had reservations about sending Eisenhower’s version, for he called on the President from 6:05 to 6:57 p.m. (Eisenhower Library, President’s Daily Appointments, 1957) The text of the letter was sent to London at 7:59 p.m. in telegram 8483, June 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6–457) The next day, Ambassador Whitney telephoned Dulles from London at 12:12 p.m. to suggest further changes. (Memorandum of a telephone conversation, June 5; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations) Dulles reported to Eisenhower at 12:37 p.m. that Whitney had “suggested changing the words astonished and chagrined” in the first sentence of Eisenhower’s reply. Eisenhower commented that he did “not mind toning it down as long as” Macmillan knew “we can’t forget what was said in Bermuda.” (Memorandum of a telephone conversation; ibid., White House Telephone Conversations) Dulles spoke with Whitney again at 1:08 p.m., presumably to authorize the alterations. (Memorandum of a telephone conversation; ibid., General Telephone Conversations)
Dulles then telephoned Macmillan:
“The Sec said the Pres wanted him to tell him he was disturbed by his message and sent a reply which M will get from Jock but he (the Sec) wanted to say he talked with Stassen and he is instructed to try to get the paper back or to make clear it is not a definitive or authorized statement of our position. It was an indiscretion to put the paper in the hands of the Russians. They will use it and put our friends in a position where if they did not come along the Russians would have a document to use. … It took us by surprise and we are doing all possible. The Sec said he thinks M will find the aspects of that memo of which he complains were in fact cleared with Sandys when he was here. M said it is so big he thinks we ought to deal with it at a higher level. The Sec thinks possibly so. The Sec mentioned passing over it on the theory it was just talk and it did not make much difference what was talked about. M said wait to see what the Russians do. The Sec said they may take advantage of our withdrawing the paper to [Page 597] blow it up and that will show they are in the propaganda game. The Sec said to treat it confidentially. It happened in the face of guidance not to let it happen. It was a mistake. They exchanged a few amenities.” (Memorandum of a telephone conversation, June 5, 1:14 p.m.; ibid. Ellipsis in the source text.)
Whitney handed the President’s message, infra, to Macmillan at 6:45 p.m. (London time), June 5. He reported that the Prime Minister “expressed great pleasure in conversation he just had with Secretary regarding this matter.” (Telegram 6742 from London, June 5; Department of State, Central Files, 711–EI/6–557)