Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

199. Letter From the President’s Special Assistant (Stassen) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington, May 18, 1957.

Dear Charles: Thank you for your thoughtfulness in giving me a copy of your letter of May 17 to Secretary Dulles² regarding my report from London.³ Following up as indicated by Secretary Dulles at his May 17th conference with us,⁴ may I write you certain clarifying comments for your continued consideration.

My report encompassed somewhat more than a tentative reformulation of the United States position on limitation of armaments. It is an estimate, carefully made after thorough study in which the entire United States delegation in London participated, of the kind of a limited first step agreement which could now be negotiated with and accepted by the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the other states with a significant present or potential military capability. It is recommended to be in the interest of the United States to negotiate and accept such a limited first step agreement primarily because it will advance these high priority United States objectives which were set forth and emphasized by Secretary Dulles:

(a) It will prevent the spread of nuclear weapons into the hands of additional states beyond the three. France is ready to decide within the next two months to begin to manufacture nuclear weapons and to test within the next 18 months, if no agreement is reached. If France makes this decision the Federal Republic of Germany will decide to do so, after their elections, and then many additional states will make the same decision; and the Soviet Union will consider itself forced to provide such weapons also to other Communist states, particularly China, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. There would then be a high probability that Israel would acquire them either by their own manufacture or from France, and that Egypt would acquire them from the Soviet Union as a counter. This spreading to multiple hands greatly intensifies the danger of the outbreak of a war, even if the United States and the Soviet Union would both wish to avoid a modern war. The outbreak of a war including the use of nuclear weapons has a high degree of probability of involving the United States and the Soviet Union, with vast devastation on both sides of the world.

(b) As the combined intelligence report indicates,⁵ it would provide major assurance against the possibility of great surprise attack upon the United States, since the staging areas for such an attack would be promptly covered by the initial aerial inspection and radar stations; along the entire Arctic ring, including the Murmansk-Kola Peninsula; deep into Siberia, including Kanchatka; and the Soviet submarine fleet would be controlled and reduced and accurate information would be obtained on all the major submarine bases of the Soviet.

(c) … As you are aware, the reciprocal U.S. territory now has “open skies” with only a few spot exceptions.

(d) . …

Measured against these very important advances in U.S. objectives, and the improved prospect of a lasting peace, the “price” that the U.S. would pay seems to me to be well within reasonable limits. I of course do not suggest that it would not pose some problems for the U.S. But the 2.5 million force level and the sequestering of 15 percent of armaments will leave the U.S. with a tremendous military capability. The safeguarding clause on the right to suspend any of the commitments protects against future uncertainties or violations by others. The one year limited suspension of nuclear testing, beginning approximately July 1958, will not cause any great change in our weapons program, and will help make it possible to secure the abstention of “fourth countries” and to bring multiple nations and world opinion swinging behind U.S. policy. The suggestion of future lower force levels, if the first steps are carried out to the satisfaction of the United States, is conditioned on satisfactory settlements of political issues such as the reunification of Germany, and simply indicates an affirmative willingness to move forward which is in line with the Joint Chiefs paper of 1952.⁶

While there are always problems in maintaining public understanding and public support, I am convinced the U.S. will maintain better public support at home and abroad for adequate defense appropriations over a long period if it shows a willingness to join in some reductions conditioned on such a sound and safeguarded method.

It does seem clear that President Eisenhower’s emphasis of his conviction that agreement in this field would come about with the evolutionary development of the inspection system, and Secretary Dulles’ clear statement on carefully measured steps carefully taken, and your own express conclusion that an agreement must be mutually advantageous to both sides, all point to the advisability of now moving toward the kind of a first step agreement which can be negotiated with and acceptable to the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and other states having a present and potential military significance.

There are many indications that this is the time that we either make a genuine beginning on a safeguarded control of modern armaments, or we enter into the most dangerous and widespread custody and possession of such weapons.

If there are any aspects of the interrelated sections of the recommendations on which you have additional questions, I will be pleased to talk further with you or with the Joint Chiefs.

Sincerely,

Harold E. Stassen⁷

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Project Clean-up, Disarmament. Secret.
2. Document 196.
3. Document 195.
4. See Document 197.
5. The undated combined intelligence report, prepared by Tidwell (CIA), is not printed. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy)
6. Reference may be to the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett, May 20, 1952, printed as an enclosure to Lovett’s letter to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, May 21, 1952, in Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 941.
7. Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature.