Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

178. Letter From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the President’s Special Assistant (Stassen)¹

Washington, March 20, 1957.

Dear Harold: I regret the delay in furnishing comments on your letter of 20 February 1957² dealing with armaments/manpower ratios. The subject has been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their views are reflected herein.

A basic fault found by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the ratios contained in the attachment to your letter is the inclusion under the heading of Conventional Armaments of components of nuclear weapons delivery systems. From the military point of view, it is necessary to make the distinction between nuclear weapons delivery systems, including all the components, and individual items of conventional equipment. I fully recognize that under present policy, movement in either the nuclear or conventional field of disarmament may be undertaken independently. It is not my desire to restrict the area of your negotiations in this respect. However, in dealing with conventional armaments, all weapons having a nuclear delivery capability should be excluded.

In studying this problem, it is necessary to relate the measures to be taken in limiting manpower and armaments to the progressive installation of a system for inspection and verification. It would seem that in taking the initial step of agreeing to reduce to the level of 2.5 million while concurrently installing the control system, the method of determining allowed levels of armaments should, from the administrative standpoint, be as free of complexity as possible and should, from the military standpoint, be addressed primarily to those weapons systems which would be used in launching a great surprise attack. It was on this basis that my letter to you of 30 October 1956³ was prepared. You will recall that in the enclosure thereto, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that an agreement be sought whereby, in the early phase of a disarmament arrangement, a percentage of atomic capable delivery systems be placed in operational storage under international control during a period when the degree of integrity and good faith of the participating states was being observed. Annex II to DPC Note 113, R–1, of 27 February 1957,⁴ submitted by the Defense Representative on the Special Committee, was an effort to modify this approach to meet the 21 November 1956 decisions of the President.⁵ I urge consideration of this method of taking the first step in a disarmament agreement rather than the computation of numerical ratios of manpower to armaments to determine allowed levels.

With regard to the limitation of conventional armaments, it is recognized that a common yardstick will be necessary to establish the level of armaments to be allowed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a formula generally along the lines of the UK proposal,⁶ and based upon weapons/manpower ratios developed from verified blueprints, might be applicable in the reduction of conventional armaments. They are of the opinion, however, that acceptance of any specific criteria or formula at this time, in advance of agreement as to the general principles involved, particularly the principle of exchanging blueprints as part of a disarmament arrangement, would be unsound from the standpoint of national security. For the same reasons, they feel that it would be untimely to advance or to concur in any specific figures such as you propose in your letter of 20 February 1957.

In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not address themselves to the specific numerical ratios in the schedule attached to your letter of 20 February 1957. However, I am sure you appreciate the military problem involved in such a task, and the varying effects that changes in ratios would have on individual countries with differing strategic requirements. For example, because of our dependence on sea communications, one of our basic objectives must be to control the threat posed by the large Soviet submarine fleet. To this end, it might be to our advantage to obtain as high a charge against manpower for submarines as we reasonably can. On the other hand, in view of our strength in aircraft carriers, we might want the manpower charge per carrier as low as possible. In each case, we can expect the Soviet position to be diametrically opposed. In advancing figures for illustrative purposes or for negotiation, these considerations would have to be taken into account in order to safeguard United States strategic requirements. The Department of Defense finds it impossible to provide militarily meaningful modifications or amendments to the specific ratios proposed in the absence of a blueprint of the Soviet military organization and agreement as to types of weapons to be so limited.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that the approach which you propose, using numerical ratios not based on verified military blueprints, as a basis of measurement in determining allowed levels of conventional armaments does not meet the security requirements of the United States. In view of their statutory responsibilities as principal military advisers to the President, the National Security Council and to me, I believe further Council consideration should be given this matter prior to indicating to the United Kingdom a position of the United States with respect to the acceptability of their proposal in the first phase of a disarmament agreement. This action appears to me to be in keeping with the intent of NSC Action No. 1513 c (5),⁷ dealing with measures for the control of armaments. In the interim, it is suggested that the considerations enumerated herein form the basis of your position with respect to the United Kingdom proposal.⁸

Sincerely yours,

C.E. Wilson

1. Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy. Top Secret.
2. Not found in Department of State files.
3. Document 178.
4. Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.
5. Reference is to the Annex to NSC Action No. 1553, Document 165
6. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/2–1256)
7. Document 112.

8. When Stassen requested clarification of certain points in this letter in telegram 5095 from London, March 22 (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/3–2257), the Department of Defense responded as follows:

   “The views expressed to you in Defense letter of 20 March are to be considered advisory. Defense and JCS recognize that your guidance refers to all armaments and armed forces but wish to make clear that most armaments having a dual conventional nuclear capability are designed primarily for use as nuclear delivery vehicles. Thus they should be treated as part of a nuclear system since, until fissionable material brought under control, capability is of nuclear order rather than conventional. Recognize necessity of exploration of all facets of this problem.” (Telegram 7101 to London, April 8; ibid.)