Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

165. Record of Action of a Special Meeting, Washington, November 21, 1956, 10 a.m.¹

Washington, November 21, 1956, 10 a.m.

ANNEX TO NSC ACTION NO. 1553²

1. The United States should propose that subsequent to December 31, 1957—or as soon as possible thereafter and within one month after the establishment of a satisfactorily functioning inspection system to verify the commitment is accomplished—all future production of fissionable materials:

a. Shall be subject to effective international inspection; and

b. Shall be used or stockpiled exclusively for non-weapons purposes under international supervision.

The inspection system, including appropriate ground, aerial, and scientific components, should be promptly and reciprocally installed and its effective operation in states having significant military potential should be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the United States (and other key states), prior to the taking effect of commitment b. The continuing effectiveness of the inspection system and the continuing adherence of essential states having a significant military potential, shall be a condition for the continuation of the commitment.

2. In studies and negotiations now under way relating to possible extensions of US–UK nuclear weapons cooperation, the United States should give early consideration to the effects upon the UK posture of the UK becoming a party to an agreement based on current U.S. disarmament proposals. The details of any arrangements for possible further assistance to the UK in the nuclear weapons field should be specifically approved by the President prior to any commitment to the UK. At an appropriate time Congress would be requested to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to the extent necessary.

3. The United States to propose that upon implementation of 1 above, agreed, equitable, proportionate transfers of fissionable materials shall be commenced by states possessing nuclear weapons, in successive increments from previous production over to internationally inspected and supervised non-weapons purposes, including stockpiling, either national or international. The agreed transfer rate should provide for the retention in the early phases of such a program of a very substantial nuclear weapons capability on the part of the United States.

4. The United States to express willingness, contingent upon the agreement and implementation of 1 and 3 above, to agree with other nations to limit or to eliminate nuclear and thermonuclear test explosions thereafter, provided an effective inspection system to verify the fulfillment of the commitment has been installed. Pending such agreement the United States should propose that the nuclear powers provide advance notice and permit limited international observation of tests.

5. It is the purpose of the United States, as part of an armaments control system, to seek to assure that the sending of objects into outer space shall be exclusively for peaceful and scientific purposes and that under effective control the production of objects designed for travel in or projection through outer space for military purposes shall be prohibited.

Therefore, the United States to propose that, contingent upon the establishment of effective inspection to verify the fulfillment of the commitment, all states agree to provide for international inspection of and participation in tests of outer space objects.

6. The United States to continue negotiations in accordance with existing policy for the installation of the Eisenhower-type Geneva proposal, to be combined with the Bulganin-type ground control posts as a means of building international confidence and good will and lessening the prospect of war, which would facilitate reduction of armaments.

7. The United States should insist that all agreements be subject to withdrawal upon notice of major violation and to complete or partial suspension for lesser violations, and a permissive procedure shall be included for stating in advance the intent to give notice of withdrawal if the agreement is not respected. This is necessary in order to safeguard against one-sided consequences of violations and to provide for the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as expressed in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.³

8. The United States should propose the progressive development and installation of an inspection and control system which would contribute reciprocally during the stages of its installation to increased safeguards against great surprise attack, and the United States should be willing to begin minor mutual reductions of armament and armed forces during the progressive installation of such an inspection system as a means of beginning such an opening up of the Soviet Union. Such minor reductions shall not in any event be greater than to reach the 2,500,000 force level approved for a first stage in NSC Action No. 1513.⁴ Partial aerial surveillance coupled with ground posts and radar installations, under some circumstances, could fill such a description of a progressive development of an inspection system, but ground posts and radar installations without an aerial component would not be adequate. It is vitally important that there must be effective inspection for every portion of every agreement affecting armaments signed by the United States.

9. If the principal measures of the foregoing courses of action are accepted by the Soviet Union, such of them as appropriate should be applied to China at such time and in such manner as the political problems permit. If application of the essential parts of the agreement to Communist China or other satellites of the USSR with a significant military potential proves infeasible, the United States should reserve the right to refrain from carrying out the commitment. The failure to successfully apply necessary limitations to China within a reasonable time shall be grounds for termination of any limitation on the United States. Care should be used in the time and manner of expressing the foregoing reservation to guard against the injection of Communist China into the negotiations contrary to the U.S. position on the political problems.

1. Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy. Top Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text. A covering memorandum attached to a copy of this record of action indicates that the President, Acting Secretary of State, Stassen, Strauss, and Radford attended this meeting. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File) A memorandum of conference prepared by Goodpaster indicates the time and place of the meeting and that it was also attended by Secretary of Defense Wilson, Bowie, Peaslee, William Jackson, and Goodpaster. (Ibid., DDE Diaries)
2. Regarding NSC Action No. 1553, see footnote 5, Document 141.

3. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter reads in part:

   “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”

4. Document 112.