Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

175. Memorandum of Discussion at the 315th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, March 6, 1957¹

Washington, March 6, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments (Annex to NSC Action No. 1553; NSC Actions Nos. 1419 and 1513 and the Annex thereto)²

Prior to the opening of the Council meeting, Governor Stassen asked the undersigned to distribute to key members of the National Security Council a lengthy document entitled “Briefing Book—Disarmament—March 5, 1957” (a copy of this document is filed in the minutes of the meeting).³

After a brief introduction by Mr. Cutler, Governor Stassen indicated that he was prepared now to report to the National Security Council on the preparations which he had made for the forthcoming London meeting of the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. He emphasized that these preparations, which he would now present to the Council, had previously been gone over with the Secretary of State.

Governor Stassen then referred to a series of basic decisions made by the President on November 21, 1956 (NSC Action No. 1553 and Annex thereto). These, he informed the Council, formed the policy basis for his forthcoming negotiations. He pointed out that since this date there had been extensive meetings of the staff of the interdepartmental committee as well as of special task groups. Governor Stassen requested that during his formal presentation members of his staff might come into the Cabinet Room to assist in the presentation. At its conclusion, these staff members would be invited to leave, so that there would be no problem respecting Council discussion.

Governor Stassen proceeded to brief the Council along the lines of an outline, a copy of which is included in the minutes of the meeting. For his description of a possible program for the progressive installation of an inspection and control system to safeguard the United States against surprise attack, Governor Stassen called on Colonel Willis. The latter set forth the current concept for a “Progressive Installation of Aerial Inspection”, with particular reference to the capabilities of the Soviet Union for an attack against the United States.

At the conclusion of Colonel Willis’ brief statement, Governor Stassen called on Mr. Tidwell, of CIA,⁴ for a discussion of the Soviet guided missiles program. Mr. Tidwell stated that the information which he had presented came from a National Intelligence Estimate on the subject now being compiled.⁵

Mr. Tidwell’s comments were followed by a brief statement on Soviet submarine capabilities and the presentation of the concept for a progressive installation of inspection, including both the aerial and ground elements.

After further comments and elucidation by Governor Stassen, Mr. Peaslee was invited to discuss briefly the contents of Tab H of the “Briefing Book—Disarmament” referred to above. Tab H was entitled “Draft of Provisions for a Disarmament Treaty and Statute of Armaments Regulation Organization”. At the conclusion of Mr. Peaslee’s remarks, Governor Stassen’s staff members were invited to leave, and Governor Stassen closed his formal statement with some remarks on plans for the departure of the delegation to the London meeting. He then said that the subject was open for general discussion.

Secretary Dulles observed that it was, of course, very important that we should all have a clear idea of where we wanted to go in the forthcoming negotiations. He said he believed that Governor Stassen would be the first person to agree that such a presentation as Governor Stassen had just provided was merely an illustrative exposition. There was certainly no reason to think that the Soviets would accept the general plans that Governor Stassen had described, because they would believe that his approach to a progressive installation of an inspection system would be too favorable to the United States. So, while Governor Stassen’s plan was interesting and useful, it was not at all likely to eventuate in the near future as a reality.

As far as the actual negotiations at London were concerned, Secretary Dulles said it was his understanding that the U.S. delegation would limit itself to the presentation before the Subcommittee of disarmament proposals which had been approved by the National Security Council and the President. While certain other matters related thereto have been explored by Governor Stassen and his interdepartmental committee, Secretary Dulles stated that there would be no formal presentation of these other matters at the London meeting unless they likewise had been approved by the Council and the President in the meantime. Secretary Dulles stated that this applied particularly to the matters presented and discussed by Mr. Peaslee (Draft of Provisions for a Disarmament Treaty and Statute of Armaments Regulation Organization). In short, this material would not be used in London without prior consultation back in Washington. Secretary Dulles pointed out that he had only seen this particular material yesterday, and he further believed that it was not desirable for the NSC to make a decision at this time on the matters presented by Mr. Peaslee. Secretary Dulles expressed special concern over the problem of Communist China in the general context of a disarmament proposal.

Governor Stassen pointed out that the matters discussed by Mr. Peaslee had been developed by a joint departmental group. They had not, however, been approved at the top level in the several responsible agencies. Secretary Dulles said that of course staff people could not commit the Department of State, and so he presumed that they could not commit the Department of Defense. The State Department needed more time to study these matters, and Secretary Dulles repeated his previously expressed view on the light in which material presented by Mr. Peaslee should be handled, including the reminder that the Tab H material went beyond any NSC decisions taken to date.

Admiral Strauss said that apropos of the Secretary of State’s point, he would like to call attention to the statement in Tab E of the “Briefing Book”—that is, the proposal contained therein that “all future production of fissionable materials shall be used exclusively for national or international non-weapons purposes under international supervision, beginning one month after the establishment of an effective inspection system to verify the commitment.” What precisely did the term “establishment” mean? Here was an area in which the definitions of words became very important. Did “establishment” merely mean the creation, or did it mean the actual installation and effective operation, of an inspection system? Governor Stassen replied by saying that the matter which occasioned Admiral Strauss’ anxiety had been handled on page 2 of Tab H by language which specifically safeguarded the U.S. national interest. Indeed, this was an example of the very meticulous work which his lawyers had done.

Governor Stassen also expressed his agreement with the proposition that no commitments could be made on behalf of the United States at the London meeting on any matter not covered by the aforementioned NSC Actions setting forth our disarmament policies, unless these other matters had received the approval of the President and the Secretary of State.

Mr. Cutler expressed his understanding that Governor Stassen’s report was merely an explanatory report, and that none of the papers in the “Briefing Book” were to be considered binding on the U.S. Government, and that no commitments and no action was expected by the National Security Council at the present meeting.

Secretary Dulles referred to a point earlier made by Governor Stassen, that certain matters not covered by approved NSC policy might be the subject of discussion by Governor Stassen at London with our allies. Secretary Dulles believed that if this course of action were followed, it must be pursued with great caution in order to avoid any possibility of appearing to make any U.S. commitment to our allies. If such views are advanced and discussed, the discussion must be explicitly made on a purely personal basis unless, again, we here back home provide approval in advance.

The President expressed his agreement with the point made by Secretary Dulles. Paraphrasing Secretary Dulles’ remarks, he stated that in effect the Secretary had stated that all such proposals were to be presented at London on a purely personal basis by Governor Stassen and his associates. They were not to be presented on any other basis without the approval of Governor Stassen’s chief.

Secretary Dulles said he had one other important matter to comment on. This bore on the Executive Branch’s relations with the Senate. Up to this time our disarmament projects have not been taken very seriously in the U.S. Senate. None of the Senators think that disarmament will come to anything, and they are relatively indifferent to what we say. If, however, there should be forthcoming any indication that the Soviets might really be willing to come some distance toward meeting our disarmament position, we should have to lay the groundwork as to the possible wording of a treaty before the Senate. The Senate would obviously wish to be associated in the preparation and development of so significant a treaty.

The President commented that the Senate should be made aware that they are welcome to participate in such deliberations now if they wished to go. Secretary Dulles replied that this matter had been discussed by him only yesterday, and he didn’t believe that any of the Senators were ready to go now. The President agreed that it was unlikely.

Secretary Wilson said he had some general thoughts to lay before the meeting. He said that of course he understood the vital need to protect the United States from being outwitted by the Soviets in the development of a disarmament program. He also knew that it was the purpose and objective of the United States to “cool off” the armaments race. Nevertheless, he believed in the desirability of what he called “a look at the books”. It might be highly advantageous if the powerful countries of the world were to make a clear statement of their existing armaments prior to the inspection process. If such matters were handled in good faith, the whole world would gain by it. In short, we might make a little more progress toward our objective if both sides tried to do something more than gain an advantage the one over the other.

The President observed that he had supposed that Secretary Wilson’s “look at the books” was the essential idea in his earlier proposal for an exchange of blueprints.

Secretary Wilson said that he had also another point, relating to the possibility of reducing the level of U.S. armed forces to 2.5 million. He said he believed that we were going to be compelled to reduce to that level anyway because of budgetary considerations and in terms of our ability to finance our level of forces and at the same time to do the other things we needed to do in the area of national defense. Accordingly, if we had to go down to the 2.5 million level anyhow, could not this fact be made the basis for some kind of advantageous deal with the Soviet Union?

Governor Stassen pointed out that he and his associates had had firmly in mind over the last two years that the prospects for a workable disarmament agreement with the Soviet Union were very thin indeed. The only reason that we do not think such an agreement is wholly impossible is our belief that it is in the mutual interest of the United States and of the Soviet Union not to become involved in a ten-year armaments race. It is this belief which has caused us to continue our patient probings in the effort to change the course of armaments development in the world.

Secretary Wilson said that of course we were already in an armaments race with the Soviet Union. The only hopeful sign was that both our people and the people of the Soviet Union were tired of bearing the weight of developing armaments.

Secretary Humphrey referred to Secretary Wilson’s earlier point about the reduction of the level of U.S. forces to 2.5 million. He said he thought that this was an important and useful suggestion. After all, the Council knew that we were going to have to reduce the level of our armed forces very quickly as well as very substantially. If we have got to make this reduction in any case, we might at least plan to do it in such a way as to derive maximum benefit from the reduction in terms of world public opinion.

The National Security Council:⁶

a. Noted the statement by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament of the approved U.S. policy on control of armaments in the Annex to NSC Action No. 1553 and relevant previous NSC Actions Nos. 1419 and 1513 and the Annex thereto.

b. Noted and discussed the presentation by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament on the proposed U.S. position at the forthcoming London meeting of the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission; with the understanding that the example of a progressive installation of an inspection system and the working paper on draft provisions for a treaty and statute were for illustrative and planning purposes and were not submitted as proposals for action by the Council or approval by the President at this time.

c. Noted the President’s statement that:

(1) The U.S. position at the forthcoming UN Disarmament Subcommittee meeting should be based solely upon the approved policy referred to in a above.

(2) Modifications or additions to the above-mentioned approved policy should be submitted in advance for consideration by the National Security Council and approval by the President.

(3) When the illustrative example of the inspection system and excerpts from the working paper on draft provisions presented at this NSC meeting are used in discussions with any other nation, such use should Be on a restricted working-paper and personal basis which would make clear that (a) neither of them represented official proposals, positions or commitments of the U.S. Government and (b) they would have to be referred to governments for specific authority, if the discussions indicated that progress were probable.

(4) Appropriate members of the U.S. Senate should be advised of the negotiations in advance of the UN Disarmament Subcommittee meeting and that there would be further consultation as to Senate representation on the delegation at such time as negotiations indicate any real possibility of progress on this subject.

Note: The above actions, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State and the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament.

[Here follow agenda items 2 and 3.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on March 7.
2. For NSC Action No. 1553, see footnote 5, Document 141. The Annex is printed as Document 165. Regarding NSC Action No. 1419, see footnote 8, Document 45. For NSC Action No. 1513 and its Annex, see Document 112.
3. Neither the briefing book nor the minutes have been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.
4. William A. Tidwell, Office of the Assistant Director, Office of Research and Reports, CIA.
5. NIE 11–5–57, “Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field”, dated March 12, not printed. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)
6. Paragraphs a–c and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1676, approved by the President on March 8. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)