147. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Stassen) to the President1

Major points for consideration with Admiral Strauss with reference to the June 29, 1956 memorandum.2

1. The July 1st target date (Courses of Action III A) should be qualified by adding:—or as soon thereafter as effective inspection can be installed—as in Admiral Strauss’ judgment it will take 18 to 24 months to install the inspection after agreement.

Recommendation: This qualification be accepted, but a target date should be retained for psychological reasons.

2. The U.S. portion of the UN force should be based inside the United States, it should be clear that it could not be used without the express approval of the U.S., and its weapons should be of elementary nuclear type and not the latest thermonuclear design. It should be expected that the Soviet Union and the UK would take similar action. Otherwise people might fear that whoever commands the UN force may become too powerful.

Recommendation: These qualifications be accepted.

3. The NATO force would require the production of elementary nuclear weapons of a type that would not compromise our best weapons designs. This could be done, but it would use more fissionable material than the modern weapons require. The number of weapons assigned to the force should be small. One other method would be to keep the weapons in the custody of a unit of U.S. personnel within the NATO force.

Recommendation: That the number of weapons be small and that if NATO accepts the concept, weapons be built that would not compromise U.S. design of modern weapons.

4. Admiral Strauss has been for the UK suggestion in D since 1949.

5. Admiral Strauss wishes it to be reemphasized that the stopping of tests is inseparable from the agreement on the other nuclear sections and that the July 1, 1957 date be qualified as in Paragraph A.

Recommendation: That this suggestion be accepted.

HES
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Disarmament. Confidential. Attached to the source text is the note by Goodpaster quoted in footnote 1, Document 145.
  2. Document 143.