Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

143. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Stassen) to the President¹

Washington, June 29, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Report Pursuant to NSC Action 1553²

I. The Situation

A. The Soviet Union’s May 14 announcement of intention to reduce its armed force levels by 1,200,000 men and to carry out corresponding reductions in conventional armaments, restated in the June 6th letter of Chairman Bulganin to President Eisenhower,³ together with other factors—such as the missile development—the Soviet expansion of economic activities in the uncommitted and free areas of the world—their Siberian new industries program—and also the U.S. current successful series of tests at Eniwetok—the trend of our Western Allies to reduce their force levels—combine to indicate that it is timely and mandatory for the U.S. to add to and to revise, in an adequate and far reaching manner, the U.S. policy on the questions relating to disarmament.

B. The developments in the past year since the President’s effective leadership at the Summit Conference at Geneva, point to less danger of early deliberate major war, provided the U.S. maintains a powerful and alert striking force. However, there would appear to be increased dangers to future U.S. security in two forms which are relatively unmet, and which require U.S. decisions on policies and courses of action. These two relatively unmet dangers are as follows:

1. Weapons Development

Within a matter of months other nations will be deciding to build nuclear weapons of their own, and once they have so decided it will be difficult to reverse their decisions. Many nations have the capacity to marshall the necessary assets, to use either their own or other scientists and engineers under contract, and to build elementary nuclear weapons within three years from the time of decision. If this is done thermonuclear bombs could be fabricated within another two or three years thereafter. Furthermore, the USSR, UK and U.S. within a matter of three to ten years are quite certain to build missiles capable of traveling through outer space with reasonable accuracy for thousands of miles with thermonuclear warheads.

Thus, under current trends, a relatively near future situation in which fifteen or twenty nations have nuclear bombs and both sides of the world have intercontinental missiles must be contemplated. Under these circumstances the potential for igniting a world war will be magnified, and U.S. future security will be seriously impaired.

2. Soviet Economic-Political Offensive

A major shift in the Soviet Union to special economic action, coupled with subversive and political moves, if not successfully countered, could lead to a communist takeover of significant uncommitted or free areas and this would pose a major threat to the longer term security of the U.S.

The recent developments in Egypt and Iceland⁴ are vivid examples of an early stage of this new Soviet offensive. Indonesia is apparently an intense target for a similar effort. Afghanistan presents another pattern of Soviet economic moves with political objectives.

C. Some of the important relative facts which bear upon these unmet dangers are as follows:

1. It is known that preliminary discussions have been held within the Cabinet of France on whether or not to begin to build nuclear weapons. A decision by one government would place increased pressure on other governments. The expansion of nuclear weapons capability among free nations would almost certainly lead to the establishment of a nuclear weapons capability by Communist China. Germany and Japan would then not be far behind in their decision, and if necessary either one could work through a third country to carry out the development.

2. The USSR and the U.S. would both suffer a vast net loss through a major war, and both can anticipate economic progress under conditions of peace. There is a mutual national interest to be served by preventing war, even though very little other mutual interest exists.

3. The U.S. is currently running approximately an annual 1.6 billion dollar adverse balance in international payments reflected in increased foreign ownership of U.S. assets and increased potential foreign demand on U.S. gold. Such an imbalance was needed to some extent after the war to restore a basis for payment and trade, but it can not be permitted to continue for the next four or five years without an important weakening of the basic financial and economic strength of the U.S.

4. Cooperation with the U.S. in the immediate postwar period meant assistance in rebuilding war torn economies. From 1950 to date, when the military threat was uppermost, cooperation with the U.S. meant greater security. Now, with the advent of thermonuclear weapons and the shift of the Soviet to economic warfare, cooperation with the U.S. means an extra heavy defense burden to carry semi-obsolete arms, extreme restrictions on trade with the communist one-third of the world, and no special trade or payments benefits not available to all nations. Thus an economic and political deal with the USSR by a third nation, made contrary to U.S. interests, currently results, generally speaking, only in economic advantages and no penalties to such a third nation.

5. Access to the U.S. market is one of the most important economic privileges in the world.

6. The new five year plan of the Soviet Union places great stress on the further expansion of communist industrial capacity.

II. The Concept

A. An adequate U.S. policy should have the following characteristics:

1. Decrease the danger of a future nuclear war.

2. Maintain maximum feasible U.S. security currently and in the foreseeable future.

3. Reflect a moral leadership in keeping with the traditions and principles of the United States.

4. Establish a constructive U.S. initiative which will appeal to the people of the U.S., and also to the people of the mutual defense free nations, the uncommitted areas, and even the communist territory.

5. Facilitate necessary U.S. unilateral decisions, and encourage free world cohesion, even if no agreement is reached with the Soviet Union.

6. If the Soviet Union does agree to the U.S. proposals, the result must be a sound and reliable system of armament control.

7. Enhance the prospects of a desirable solution of the difficult political issues such as China, Germany, and the Near East.

8. Provide a favorable opportunity for the U.S. and the free world to succeed in the long range economic competition and in the political rivalry, notwithstanding the anticipated subversive element in Soviet activities.

9. Maximize the prospects for acceptance by the Soviet Union of a sound agreement with effective inspection, to provide against the possibility of great surprise attack and to reciprocally reduce the levels of armaments, armed forces and military expenditures.

10. Facilitate favorable development of any tendencies for liberalization within communist societies and increased independence of satellite governments.

B. If these characteristics are to be fulfilled, it would seem that U.S. policy should include the following:

1. Greater reliance by the U.S. and the free world on the power of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons in a form that does not include multiple “fourth nation” manufacture and possession of such weapons.

2. Maintenance of U.S. nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and delivery capacity in a manner so dispersed as to foreclose their elimination by any conceivable attack, whether delivered by surprise or otherwise.

3. Decrease the total amount of manpower and of resources devoted by the free world to military purposes, especially through the more rapid phaseout of semi-obsolete armaments and the accelerated organization of highly mobile units with large firepower and small numbers of manpower.

4. Maintain a non-nuclear deterrent force in the U.S. only in relation to probable requirements versus small nations which have neither nuclear weapons nor mass manpower.

5. Establish appropriate graduated economic penalties for potential use versus nations that take action seriously adverse to U.S. and free world interests in the comprehensive competition with Communism. Maintain appropriate incentives of aid or trade or credit, or a combination of these, for nations which do cooperate.

6. Reduce the very large overseas dollar expenditures for U.S. military purposes.

7. Increase U.S. private acquisition and development of essential raw material resources abroad.

8. Make an extensive informational effort for improved worldwide understanding of these U.S. policies and objectives, with emphasis on the mutual interest in peace and progress.

9. Take feasible measures, covert and overt, to remove the super-secret nature of the communist areas of the world.

10. Improve civilian defense, with particular attention to dual purpose, peace and war, survival installations such as underground municipal parking centers, major street underpasses, and subsurface levels of new buildings. Establish an effective arrangement for internal security forces to function in the eventuality of a surprise attack.

III. The Courses of Action

The following courses of action do not constitute one inseparable package. Some, however, are inseparable from others. Thus the stopping of tests of nuclear weapons is inseparable from the control over future production of fissionable materials under effective inspection. Furthermore, U.S. willingness to implement the entire package is considered to be essential for effective U.S. leadership adequate to the circumstances.

A. The U.S. should propose an agreement by all states that after July 1, 1957, all production of fissionable materials shall be subject to effective international inspection, and thereafter all such future production shall be used or stockpiled exclusively for non-weapons purposes under international supervision. The installation of the inspection system to be reciprocally instituted promptly and to be completed prior to July 1, 1957.

B. The U.S. should express willingness to join with the states which now have nuclear weapons (U.S., USSR, UK) to each provide to the United Nations a small force equipped with nuclear weapons (such as one squadron each) and to maintain such force under the United Nations flag at United Nations bases for operation under the Security Council in accordance with Sections 43, 44 and 45 of the United Nations Charter.⁵ Such forces could also be used in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly “Uniting for Peace” Resolution of 1950.⁶

C. The U.S. to consult with other NATO members toward the establishment of a small elite NATO force equipped with nuclear weapons, consisting of volunteer personnel from all NATO members, supported by financial contributions from all members, and functioning under the direct command of SHAPE. (This will help to maintain the spirit of NATO and will be a factor encouraging further integration of Europe.)

D. The U.S. should negotiate an arrangement with the UK to assure a reasonable UK posture of nuclear weapons prior to July 1, 1957, contingent on UK support for the courses of action herein, and contingent on the acceptance of the relevant proposals by the USSR.

E. The U.S. to propose that all states possessing nuclear weapons on July 1, 1957 negotiate an agreement for equitable reciprocal transfer of fissionable materials in successive increments, from previous production, over to supervised peaceful purposes, thereby reversing the trend toward larger stockpiles of fissionable materials devoted to weapons purposes. A very substantial nuclear weapons capability would always be maintained by the United States (and by the USSR and UK) in the foreseeable and conceivable future.

F. The U.S. to express willingness to agree with other nations not to test nuclear or thermonuclear explosions after July 1, 1957, and to permit an effective inspection system to verify the fulfillment of the commitment.

G. The U.S. to propose that all states agree that any research or development activity directed toward sending objects through outer space or traveling in outer space shall be devoted exclusively to peaceful and scientific purposes, and shall be open to international participation on a reciprocal basis. Further provide that no outer space tests or long or medium range missile tests will be conducted without appropriate international participation and that an effective inspection system be installed to verify the fulfillment of the commitment.

H. The U.S. to continue negotiations in accordance with existing policy for the installation of the Eisenhower type aerial inspection system, to be combined with the Bulganin type ground control posts and with financial inspectors, for an effective method of providing against the possibility of great surprise attack, and to verify agreed reductions of armaments, armed forces, and military expenditures on a gradual and safeguarded basis.

I. The U.S. to insist that all agreements be subject to withdrawal upon a one year written notice, and to be subject to suspension or partial suspension in such a manner as to safeguard against one-sided consequences of violations.

J. The U.S. should be willing to favorably consider the progressive development of an inspection and control system which would contribute to providing against great surprise attack, if the system could be safeguarded against providing a false sense of security, even though at the outset it was not adequate for a permanent arms control system. Partial aerial surveillance coupled with ground posts and radar installations, under some circumstances, could fill such a description.

K. The U.S. should consult with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to ascertain whether an agreed course of action could be developed toward the limitations of both indigenous and foreign troops and armaments in all of Germany under effective inspection as a part of a move toward the reunification and freedom of all of Germany.

L. If the principal measures of the foregoing courses of action are accepted by the Soviet Union, the United States should consider the application of such of them as appropriate to China.

M. Early consideration to be given, through appropriate channels of the U.S. Government, of the related questions of courses of action in the economic, military, political and psychological areas involved within the overall concept expressed in Part II.

Harold E. Stassen

1. Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy. Top Secret. Attached to the source text is a covering memorandum from Stassen to the NSC, June 29, indicating that the memorandum to the President was prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 1553 after consultation with the eight task force groups, preliminary discussions with members of the NSC, and a discussion session with the NSC Planning Board and the President’s Special Committee on Disarmament Problems. Stassen also suggested that the NSC should be prepared to discuss the recommendations in his memorandum to the President anytime after July 12, as the President might determine. The NSC did not discuss the memorandum until its meeting of November 21. See the Annex to NSC Action No. 1553, Document 165.
2. Regarding NSC Action No. 1553, see footnote 5, Document 141.
3. For the Soviet statement on the reduction of force levels on May 14, and Bulganin’s letter to Eisenhower, June 6, see Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. I, pp. 630–639 and 643–645, and Department of State Bulletin, August 20, 1956, pp. 300–305.
4. Presumably reference is to the increased trade between Egypt and the Soviet bloc nations, the conspicuous Soviet presence during the June 1956 celebrations in Egypt over the final removal of British troops from the Suez Canal, the fall of a coalition government in Iceland, the call for revision of the U.S.–Iceland agreement of 1951 by the Icelandic Parliament, and the leftist gains in the Icelandic parliamentary elections.
5. Articles 43, 44 and 45 of the U.N. Charter discussed the procedures for the collective use of armed force to maintain international peace and security.
6. Regarding the Uniting for Peace Resolution, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. II, pp. 303–370.