123. Letter From the President to His
Special Assistant (Stassen)1
Washington, March 10,
1956.
Dear Governor Stassen: In connection with your services as
Deputy Representative of the United States of America on the United
Nations Disarmament Commission, I convey to you the following
instructions, for your guidance at the forthcoming meeting of the
Commission’s Subcommittee in London:
- 1.
- In presenting the United States position and seeking to
advance its interest in securing safeguarded disarmament, you
will act on the basis of the statement of United States policy
on regulation of armaments set forth in the Annex to this
letter, of the detailed position papers now being prepared and
cleared through the President’s Special Committee on Disarmament
Problems, and of subsequent instructions given by the Secretary
of State.
- 2.
- You should keep the Secretary of State currently informed of
the progress of your discussions, both in the Subcommittee and
outside its official sessions. Copies of any documents necessary
for the information or consideration of the United States
Government should be dispatched regularly, by telegram or air
pouch of the American Embassy in London.
- 3.
- In the event issues arise which are not covered by your
instructions, you should make, as appropriate, a reservation of
the United States position, and should communicate immediately
with the Department of State for additional instructions.
- 4.
- The members of your Delegation, having regard to their
official capacities as representatives of the Government of the
United States, should exercise care that the views they express
are those of this Government, rather than the views of
individual Delegation members, or of organizations or groups
with which they may be affiliated. Any differences of opinion
among Delegation members should be resolved in private meetings
of the Delegation.
- 5.
- All relations with the press should be directed by you. If
you, or member of your Delegation authorized by you, should make
any statements to the press, the Department of State should be
advised immediately of the contents of such statements. You
should avail yourself of the advice of the Department of State,
and of the American Ambassador, regarding press relations,
statements, and public information matters generally.
- 6.
- You are authorized to delegate to a senior member of your
Delegation the authority held by you in the event you are
required to be absent or are otherwise unable to exercise the
functions of your position. Work assignments of Delegation
members should be made at your direction.
- 7.
- Upon your arrival at London, you should communicate with
Ambassador Aldrich. As
the accredited diplomatic representative of the United States in
Great Britain, he is available for advice and assistance
regarding any necessary relations with the British Government,
and regarding the work, social obligations, and accommodations
of the Delegation.
- 8.
- You are authorized to sign such statements of findings or
recommendations as may be agreed upon by the Subcommittee,
provided they are within the terms of your instructions.
- 9.
- Upon the completion of the Subcommittee’s meeting, you should
submit an official report covering the work of the Delegation
and the course of the meeting, together with copies of relevant
documents.
- 10.
- I am confident that the United States Delegation, under your
direction, will reflect credit on the United States during this
meeting of the United Nations Subcommittee on Disarmament.2
Sincerely,
Annex
A. U.S. Policy on Regulation of
Armaments
The broad policies of the United States with respect to regulation of
armaments are as follows:
- 1.
- The United States will continue to seek agreement on a
comprehensive disarmament plan, including effective measures
of supervision and control.
- 2.
- The acceptability and character of any international
system for the regulation and reduction of armed forces and
armaments depends primarily on the scope and effectiveness
of the safeguards against violations and evasions, and
especially the inspection system.
- 3.
- The United States should give priority to early agreement
on and implementation of (a) such confidence building
measures as the exchange of military blueprints, mutual
aerial inspection, and the establishment of ground control
posts at strategic centers; and (b) all such measures of
adequately safeguarded disarmament as are feasible and in
accordance with approved U.S. policy.
B. Specific Proposals
Toward these ends, and after consultation with the representatives of
Canada, France and the United Kingdom, the U.S. Representative at
the forthcoming meetings of the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee is
authorized to advance the following proposals.
- 1.
-
Limitation on Use of Weapons
The United States should reaffirm and seek agreement for its
position that there should be no use of nuclear weapons or
any other weapons in any manner inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations.
- 2.
-
Inspection
- a.
- There should be inspection for the purpose of
- (1)
- Providing against great surprise
attack;
- (2)
- Ensuring compliance with such regulations,
restrictions, and reductions of armaments and
armed forces as may be agreed upon;
- (3)
- Providing the necessary basis for successive
steps in achieving a comprehensive system of
disarmament.
- b.
- The system of inspection should be only as
extensive as is necessary to achieve its
objectives.
- c.
- The Soviet Union and the U.S. should immediately
agree:
- (1)
- in pursuance of President Eisenhower’s
proposal, and under procedures to be agreed, to
permit mutual aerial reconnaissance of each
other’s territory; accompanied by
- (2)
- in pursuance of Premier Bulganin’s ground
inspection proposal,4
and under procedures to be agreed, the
establishment in each other’s territory of
inspection teams for large ports, railway
junctions, motor roads and airdromes.
- d.
- The Eisenhower proposal is the place where
a beginning can be made promptly because it would
not require the sovereign decision of many nations,
or raise the problems involved in negotiating
agreements with some 40 to 50 other countries.
However, if the Eisenhower proposal is accepted by the
Soviet Union, the U.S. would be prepared
[Page 358]
to proceed
promptly to negotiate both with other sovereign
states involved and with the Soviet Union, for the
appropriate extension on a reciprocal, equitable
basis of the Eisenhower proposal and the Bulganin control
posts to forces and facilities which the U.S. and
the I.S.S.R. have outside their borders, and to the
forces of other countries.
- e.
- The U.S. position in the forthcoming meetings may
include, as preliminary measures:5
- (1)
- A proposal for an exchange for a test period
of a small number of inspection personnel who
could be used as members of inspection teams if an
inspection agreement is subsequently
concluded.
- (2)
- A proposal for the designation of small
strips of territory in the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
within which the feasibility of inspection systems
would be tested.
- (3)
- A proposal that scientific research should
be continued by each state, with appropriate
consultation between governments, for methods that
would make possible a thoroughly effective
inspection and control of nuclear weapons
material, having as its aim to facilitate the
solution of the problem of comprehensive
disarmament.
- f.
- The U.S. position may include, as part of an air
and ground inspection system, a proposal for advance
notification of projected movements of armed units
through international air or water, or over foreign
soil.6
- 3.
- Control of Nuclear Materials
- a.
- Assuming the satisfactory operation of an air and
ground inspection system the U.S. would be prepared to
work out, with other nations, suitable and safeguarded
arrangements so that future production of fissionable
materials anywhere in the world would no longer be used
to increase the stockpiles of explosive weapons.
- b.
- With this could be combined the U.S. proposal of
December 8, 1953, to begin now and continue to make
joint contributions from existing stockpiles of normal
uranium and fissionable materials to an international
atomic energy agency.
- c.
- Ultimately all production of fissionable materials
anywhere in the world should be devoted exclusively to
peaceful purposes.
- 4.
-
Control of Major
Weapons and Manpower
If the Eisenhower
aerial inspection and blueprint exchange proposal, with
accompanying ground inspection, is accepted, and if such a
system is proven to the satisfaction of the U.S. to be
satisfactorily installed and operating, and assuming the
political situation is reasonably stable, the United States,
with other nations concerned, would be prepared to begin a
gradual reciprocal, safeguarded reduction of armaments,
[Page 359]
armed forces, and
military expenditures. For illustrative purposes, in the
forthcoming session of the Subcomittee, the United States
Representative is authorized to indicate that such
reductions would presuppose, as a basis for measurement and
in a specific manner to be mutually agreed, force levels of
2.5 million men for the U.S., U.S.S.R. and China;
corresponding appropriate levels for the U.K. and France and
others to be determined after consultation with the
representatives of these States.7
