Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

122. Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Robertson) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, March 1, 1956.

Dear Mr. Secretary: In response to the President’s request and my conversation with you on the morning of the 28th,² I have reviewed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff the subject of proposing or acceding to overall force reductions by the U.S., USSR and China to a level of 2.5 million men each. We have taken into account in our review the existing national security policy and made an objective analysis of the situation which we would face militarily in the event we agreed to a reduction in the forces which we now have and which were designed to support our basic national policy. … It has been our conclusion that our basic national security policy is sound and cannot be supported by a lower level of armed forces than that which we now maintain in the absence of resolution of the outstanding issues between the Free World and the Communist bloc.

Our thinking with respect to proposing reductions in the hope of gaining a psychological advantage is necessarily conditioned by past experience with Communist negotiators. The Communists have not been deterred in their campaigns by rejection at Geneva of proposals to reunify Germany nor have they been badly handicapped in the Far East by their violations of the Korean Armistice. It is our belief that we must expect the Communists to reject any proposal not to their advantage, regardless of the psychological impact. Conversely, we must expect them to construe each concession to public opinion we may make as an indication of weakness to be further exploited.

With particular reference to the propaganda aspect of proposing reductions, we are primarily concerned that our allies would regard such a move as evidence that tensions had been eased, and the necessity for their efforts to achieve an effective defense posture was less compelling. The neutral nations might be unimpressed by a proposal which calls for a combined reduction of about 4 million men in the Sino-Soviet bloc as compared to a reduction of 400,000 men on the part of the United States. Lastly, we believe that the proposal of any figure, even a freeze, might work to our great future disadvantage, even though rejected, by being remembered as a United States offer while the qualifications and conditions attached to the offer were forgotten.

While discussing the subject with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we had before us the Chief’s study on the force levels requested by Harold on the 19th of January.³ In response to that request, the Joint Chiefs had examined the impact on the security requirements of the United States of reductions in present levels.

In this study, the Chiefs demonstrate that the size and composition of our forces is not keyed to Soviet or Chinese manpower levels. Instead we have built a military establishment designed to have the capability of deterring aggression, providing a reasonable degree of protection to our people, and fulfilling our international commitments. We firmly believe that if the pressures applied by our allies for reduction of our forces cannot be withstood, we must maintain our deterrent and protective capabilities as primary obligations to the American people, and accept the reduction in our overseas commitments. A further military reason for adopting this view is that under imposed manpower ceilings, it becomes more important than even to obtain the maximum combat potential within the allowed level. In this respect, deployed forces are wasteful of manpower because of the numbers of men which must be diverted from combat to support duties.

Briefly, considering the strategic factors which influence, to a large extent, the size and composition of our overseas military deployments, the most important are the geographic positions of the United States and the USSR in relation to our allies overseas. The Communist bloc has common frontiers with our allies in both Europe and Asia. At the present time, no Western-oriented nation or combination of nations in Eurasia has the military capability to ensure its own security without assistance from the United States. …

It is our conviction that peace in Europe is the direct result of Soviet realization that World War III will eventuate if they aggress. The presence of our forces in Europe is tangible evidence both to our allies and to the Soviets that we will not surrender Europe short of war. We believe that a large part of the cohesion of NATO must be attributed to this demonstrated will of the United States to live up to its commitments.

We now have deployed in Europe almost 500,000 of our total of 2.9 million men. In terms of ability to apply military pressure on the Soviet bloc, their capability is limited to the relatively few who would take part in an atomic offensive. However, the presence of these atomic forces in Europe is extremely important to the overall U.S. war plans, and there is grave doubt as to whether we could retain the right to station them there if we should withdraw other forces which contribute to the defensive posture being built in Western Europe. Thus a reduction in this area would have extremely undesirable effects both militarily and politically.

For entirely different reasons, we face an equally difficult situation in attempting to effect reductions in our forces in the Far East. There the United States must depend on its own forces to accomplish the tasks required to support national policy. We must maintain in the area sufficient forces to defeat aggression locally or to carry the war to the aggressor in sufficient strength to make aggression unprofitable.

U.S. strategic, political and economic interests in the Far East are not shared in full by our European allies. We can expect little or no support from them if our interests in Asia are challenged. We must therefore maintain unilaterally the capability to protect our interests or be prepared to surrender them. Reduction of our forces in the Far East would impair our existing capability to defend our interests, and thus would radically affect the military situation in this area.

Despite the fact that our manpower levels are not determined by the levels maintained by the Communist bloc, we realize that we must consider the effect of reciprocal reductions. From the military point of view, it is simply a question as to the level at which reduction ceases to be advantageous to the United States and begins to work in favor of the USSR. Our national security policy has been directed toward maintaining our forces at that minimum level. Therefore, reduction to the 3 million level by the USSR and China would favor the United States, since this is our present level and that which gives us those capabilities which we feel are essential to our security.

Any general reduction in force levels below the approximately 3 million level would operate to improve the relative military power position of the Sino-Soviet bloc for a number of reasons. The primary military factor is that any reduction from this level would be at the expense of capabilities which have demonstrated their value in deterring Soviet aggression. Secondly, to accomplish their missions our forces must be deployed at great distances, requiring large numbers of supporting forces to maintain lines of communications, whereas the Soviets, with the advantage of interior lines, can concentrate their manpower in combat forces. Thirdly, the Communists can exert close control on a bloc-wide basis over satellite forces which would represent the balance of power after reductions to arbitrary levels had been agreed. Our allies, on the other hand, because of differing national interests, must necessarily take as their firmest position that which is unanimously acceptable. Thus we are seldom in a position to make an effective, rapid response to a Communist move.

It has been the foregoing considerations which have led us to the firm conclusion that it would be incompatible with the security interests of the United States to propose, or commit ourselves to accept, reductions in our forces prior to an easing of existing tensions and a demonstration over a reasonable period of the adequacy of the inspection and reporting system. In his proposal to the Soviets at Geneva, the President stated: “The United States is ready to proceed in the study and testing of a reliable system of inspections and reporting, and when that system is proved, then to reduce armaments with all others to the extent that the system will provide assured results.” We feel strongly that negotiations on force levels in advance of the proving of the system will lead to a commitment to reduce to an arbitrarily determined level rather than that level which the system itself may indicate is compatible with security.

For these reasons, the Department of Defense opposes Harold’s proposed change, of which I assume you have a copy, for the position of the U.S. Delegate to the Subcommittee Meetings of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. I am attaching to this letter our proposal for a U.S. position on this subject.

Sincerely,

Reuben

[Enclosure]

It is the authorized U.S. position that in connection with the forthcoming disarmament negotiations, the U.S. cannot at this time agree to negotiate a reduction of the total levels of U.S. armed forces based upon the criterion of manpower. Once the reliability of the Eisenhower aerial inspection and blueprint exchange proposal together with the accompanying ground inspection system has been tested and proved, the United States can then determine the extent to which the system will provide assured results. Once this determination has been made the United States will then be in a position actively to seek an agreement as to force levels which will be consistent with our security requirements. Negotiations on force levels prior to this determination would give support to the unwarranted assumption on the part of our allies that world conditions permit a relaxation of their efforts to achieve an adequate defense posture.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/3–156. Secret. In a letter to Eisenhower, March 1, Robertson wrote:

   “Pursuant to our telephone conversation of Tuesday [February 28] morning, I have conducted with the Joint Chiefs of Staff an objective analysis of the views on force levels previously expressed by the Department of Defense, with particular respect to the discussions on this subject in the forthcoming Subcommittee meetings. As suggested by you, I have forwarded to Mr. Dulles the results of our review.

   “It occurs to me that you might be interested in seeing our conclusions prior to our meeting, which Admiral Radford and I have requested the Joint Chiefs to attend this afternoon. I am therefore enclosing a copy of my letter to Mr. Dulles. A copy is also being furnished to Mr. Stassen.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File)

2. No record of this conversation has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.
3. Neither the JCS study on force levels nor Stassen’s request of January 19 has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.