108. Letter From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Secretary of State1

Dear Foster: Herewith the two suggestions concerning a reply by the President to Bulganin’s speech2 which we talked about on the telephone.3

There are two other points concerning the speech of which I am sure you have thought:

  • first, the letter should be well-tempered and should make it clear that we never despair, that the door is always open;
  • secondly, it should contain a brief, but devastating rebuttal to his contention that the Soviets have reduced their military activities and we have increased ours.

I believe that the Bulganin letter was largely motivated by apprehension as to what the “Open Sky” plan would do to them in the cold war. Now he has provided us with an ideal opportunity to wrap the “Open Sky” plan right around his neck, in full view of the public.

The trick is to do it sweetly and without giving him a chance to say that we want “open sky” before there is any disarmament or “open sky” with never any disarmament.

Faithfully yours,

Cabot L.
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[Enclosure]

Draft Letter From President Eisenhower to Chairman Bulganin4

Your proposal would, it seems to me, inescapably narrow the impact of the true spirit of the United Nations Charter. It now applies equally to all of the 76 Members. Your proposal would narrow them to two—or, if you include France and the United Kingdom, to four. Americans believe that the small nations have proven that they make a vital contribution to world peace and that it is not wise or just to put them in an inferior category.

You point out that “the United States of America, like many other states, after the creation of the United Nations became a party to a large number of both bilateral and multilateral treaties and agreements”. But these agreements were in no sense a substitution for the ideals of the Charter. Regional agreements, such as those to which the United States is a party, are in amplification of the Charter’s aims. Agreements which fortify the aims of the Charter or which provide for its application in special circumstances are—you must surely recognize—at the opposite extreme from your proposal which would put two or four powers in a separate category from the rest of the world as regards the basic spirit of the Charter itself.

I agree heartily with your statement that “the U.N. Charter itself cannot be sufficiently effective if the two greatest powers in the world—the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.—do not harmonize their relations”.

But, as I said before, this must be by deeds. Frankly, Marshal Bulganin, we have had a plethora of words. If all we needed to keep the peace were words, it would have been guaranteed long ago. The time has come to do something concrete.

That is why I proposed the Open Sky plan for photographing each other’s military installations. The very simplicity and concreteness of this plan is what has commended it to the mass of men and women throughout the world and makes them eager to see it put into effect.

The objection which you make to it seems to me to be neither important nor well-founded. You ask the question:

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“What would the military leaders of your country do if it were reported to them that the aerophotography showed that your neighbor had more airfields?”

And then you answer your own question as follows:

“To be sure, they would order an immediate increase in the number of their own airfields”.

Let me note in passing that in the United States the military leaders do not determine questions of this kind because here we have civilian control of the military. The establishment of airfields and the voting of appropriations therefor are matters within the jurisdiction of the Congress.

But the real fallacy in your comment on the Open Sky plan is that it seeks to magnify a wholly secondary aspect of the plan, and ignores the main purpose of it.

The main purpose of this plan is to convert air power into peace power. This would make it impossible for either of us to make a major surprise attack on the other. It would virtually eliminate the danger of aggression, and that is certainly more important than the mere number of airfields. Elimination of the danger of surprise attack is a matter of transcending importance. It would eliminate fear, which in turn would eliminate tension, which in turn would make possible far-reaching disarmament in addition to the disarmament measures which we are prepared to undertake now.

I realize that you have so far responded negatively to this idea. But I do not despair. I remember that initially your government did not endorse the Atoms for Peace plan. Yet you finally joined it. I therefore bring up again the “Open Sky” plan and urge you once again to join me in deeds which will make a reality of all the words to which your nation and mine have already subscribed.

  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, President’s Correspondence with Bulganin. Secret; Personal.
  2. No speech by Bulganin on disarmament at that time has been found. Lodge may be referring to Bulganin’s letter to Eisenhower, February 1, printed in Department of State Bulletin, March 26, 1956, pp. 515–518.
  3. No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.
  4. The source text bears the heading, Memorandum to Secretary Dulles from H. C. Lodge, Jr.