107. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Robertson) to the Secretary of State 1

SUBJECT

  • International Atomic Energy Agency

Your memorandum on the above subject dated January 20, 1956,2 incloses a proposed United States position on the statute for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and suggests an early meeting to decide if the proposed position should be recommended to the President.

I have recently requested the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military implications of the proposed IAEA statute and the suggested United States position relative thereto as set forth in the working paper. I should like to have the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject before presenting recommendations to the President. Pending receipt of the Chiefs’ views, however, I shall be glad to discuss the matter with you as early as we can find a time which is mutually convenient.

In advance of a discussion of the proposed United States position it may be useful for me to express the Department’s general views regarding inspection and controls as related to peaceful applications. As long as the proposed inspection scheme does not, in fact, exercise or pretend to exercise restraint over military applications of nuclear energy, it would appear that a considerable degree of flexibility in the system could be accepted. If, however, the system is expected to exercise some degree of control over military applications, it should be a thoroughly effective and dependable system and should be adequately described by the statute itself. For example, to presume to prevent the development of nuclear weapon capabilities, but to fail to provide the authority and means for so doing would be highly misleading. If, as may be anticipated, no serious diversions are discovered under a “spot inspection” system such as authorized by the proposed statute, it could be assumed, quite erroneously, that a similar system would be adequate for the control of military applications within the major nations.

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It seems clear that an inspection system designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weaponry in “have not” countries must infringe to a considerable degree on sovereign rights. Also, a system which would insure that the “have” countries do not convert the by-products of peaceful uses into weapons would certainly meet with great practical difficulty however desirable the idea may be from the political standpoint. I question seriously whether such a proposition, which would necessarily involve international supervision over many industrial plants in this country, would be ratified by the United States Congress, I foresee that an attempt to introduce these broader areas into the forthcoming discussions and subsequent negotiations will lead to a long postponement of the establishment of the Agency.

It seems to me that it would be in keeping with the spirit of the President’s address of December 8, 1953, and United States policy as stated in NSC 5507/23 to forego the more ambitious plans for the IAEA as suggested in the working paper and to establish the Agency initially on a very modest basis. If the Agency operates successfully in a limited area its functions could be extended to include the other features suggested as we move toward the objectives of disarmament as set forth in current studies.

With these thoughts in mind, I have the following comments relative to the three questions raised in your memorandum:

a.
I do not feel that the United States should try to establish the IAEA as a control organ to prevent the emergence of new atomic weapons capabilities in member nations.
b.
The statute as now drafted appears reasonably satisfactory and appropriate for initiation of the twelve-nation discussions. On receipt of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff relative to the military implications of the statute I may suggest some specific changes. Initially, it would appear that the inspection authority prescribed in Paragraph D, Article XIII, is somewhat vague and might well be stated as a definite requirement rather than as an authorization. In other words, whatever the inspection measures may be they should be mandatory and uniformly applied to all recipient nations rather than permissive as now stated by the statute.
c.
With respect to the scope and nature of the United States commitments to the IAEA, I believe they should include:
(1)
An agreement to contribute to the pool of fissionable materials to the same extent as any other country.
(2)
The continuation and expansion of educational and training courses in the peaceful application field, and the furnishing of all information in that field which is not classified nor contrary to laws and regulations concerning patent rights.
(3)
The use of United States facilities for processing and reprocessing nuclear fuels in the absence of or pending the establishment of such facilities by the IAEA.
(4)
The arrangement of essential contacts with United States laboratories and industries to assist member states in the development and construction of peaceful use projects.

Pending the establishment and functioning of the IAEA, I believe it would be in keeping with national policy and to our best interests to continue vigorously with an assistance program through bilateral and regional agreements, such agreements to be transferred ultimately to the supervision of the IAEA if agreeable to the states concerned.

Reuben B. Robertson, Jr.
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 398.1901/2–356. Secret.
  2. Not found in Department of State files.
  3. Document 14.