Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

103. Memorandum of Discussion at the 274th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 26, 1956¹

Washington, January 26, 1956

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments (NSC Actions Nos. 1419 and 1496; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated December 16, 1955, January 13 and January 24, 1956)²

Mr. Anderson summarized very briefly prior Council action on this problem, and then asked Governor Stassen to introduce his policy recommendations. Meanwhile, copies of the supplementary views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the views of the Secretary of State as set forth in his letter to Governor Stassen, had been handed out by Messrs. Lay and Gleason.³

Governor Stassen stated that his first comment would be his belief that the decision as to the U.S. policy on the control of armaments should be made by the National Security Council at its meeting this morning. Such action was necessary to carry out the intent of NSC Action No. 1419, which Governor Stassen read to the Council. In support of his contention that the time for decision had arrived, Governor Stassen pointed out that public opinion had been prepared for the decision, a UN resolution had requested it,⁴ and the views of other friendly governments on the subject had been thoroughly explored. After praising the work of the eight task groups which had assisted him in the preparation of the recommended policy on disarmament, Governor Stassen indicated his belief that the recommendations he was setting before the Council were the soundest policies which the United States could devise at this time to meet this problem.

Governor Stassen then explained that he believed that this would be the appropriate moment to comment on the remaining differences of view within the departments and agencies as to the wisdom of his recommendations. These differences, he said, were sincerely held, and after he had outlined these, Governor Stassen attempted to answer each objection briefly.

Going on, Governor Stassen said that his policy recommendations had as their foundation stone President Eisenhower’s disarmament proposal at Geneva. He added that unless the USSR opens up, and unless we manage to secure a very large measure of assurance against a Soviet surprise attack, it was better to reach no disarmament agreement whatever. This had been his initial belief, and everything that had happened since he made his first report on disarmament to the NSC last June indicated that it was still a valid proposition.

Turning to the matter of the size of the proposed inspection system, Governor Stassen admitted that it was on a very large scale. On the other hand, he said, he was opposed to half measures in the field of inspection. The Soviet bloc comprised a tremendous area of the world. To make his point Governor Stassen referred to two charts, one indicating strategic distances between the Western Hemisphere and the Soviet bloc, and the other providing statistics on the population, area, borders, major airfields, major rail junctions, and key seaports in the Soviet bloc. These statistics, Governor Stassen believed, justified the need for an inspection force of thirty to forty thousand people.

Thereafter, Governor Stassen said he would summarize the four major propositions which characterized the policy recommendations that he was suggesting the Council adopt. The first proposition was that if President Eisenhower’s Geneva proposal was accepted by the USSR, the United States should agree that, when this aerial inspection was actually in the course of being implemented—that is, roughly, during the first year of its actual operation—the United States would have made modest reductions in its conventional forces if the Russians likewise did so. Such a modest reduction might bring our forces at the end of this first year from their current figure of 2.8 million down to 2.5 million. Meanwhile, the defense budget of the United States might have been reduced by 5%. Governor Stassen added that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were opposed to any reduction of our forces whatever until the inspection system had been thoroughly “proved out”.

The President interrupted to ask Governor Stassen if he understood correctly that the reduction Governor Stassen had suggested was to be accomplished by the end of the first year that the inspection system had been in effect. Governor Stassen replied in the affirmative, provided the inspection planes were actually flying over the Soviet Union by the end of the first year.

Governor Stassen then turned to the second major proposition underlying his policy: If the Soviet Union opens itself up to aerial inspection as well as to external nuclear inspection, the United States would agree at this point in time (perhaps two years after initial acceptance by the USSR of the President’s Geneva proposal) that all future nuclear production would be for peaceful purposes only.

The third major proposition: If the Soviets accepted the President’s Geneva proposal on inspection, the United States would agree to the giving of reciprocal notice in advance of the movement of military forces.

The fourth and last feature of his recommendations, said Governor Stassen, provided escape clauses and counter measures for the United States if the Soviet Union actually violated the agreements on disarmament into which it had entered.

Having thus, as he said, dealt with the positive essentials of his policy recommendations, Governor Stassen said that he would next focus on the negative features—that is, on what the United States would not agree to do if his policy recommendations were adopted. First, no elimination of existing nuclear weapons. Second, no provision for stopping the tests of nuclear weapons. Third, no drastic reduction of armed forces and armaments in the present stage, say, for the period of the next five years. Fourth, no entering into an agreement that could not be effectively inspected and verified, on the ground that it would be better in such a case to have no agreement at all. Fifth, no disarmament agreement of any kind unless the Soviet bloc were “opened up”.

Having thus balanced the negative and positive features of the policies he was proposing, Governor Stassen stressed the great importance to the United States of pressing ahead to get such a disarmament agreement as he was proposing with the Soviet Union. Admittedly no one really knew how the Soviet leaders would react to these disarmament proposals. But in the absence of any disarmament agreement the future looked very bleak indeed, for the prospect was that the U.S. and the USSR would achieve the mutual capacity to annihilate. Every effort should therefore be made to stop or to retard such a development. Efforts in this direction were an essential part of the United States policy of “waging peace”.

Governor Stassen said that he would next like to consider briefly what initial steps could best be taken to carry out the proposed policies on the assumption that they were adopted. The first implementation step would be discussion by the United States of these policies with the United Kingdom, France and Canada. Thereafter there would be a direct message on the subject from the President to Premier Bulganin. Perhaps the next step would be to send a knowledgeable group of the people who had helped prepare these policies to Moscow, where they would spend some time in probing the Soviet reaction to these proposals. Such a group might be headed by individuals like Generals Bedell Smith and Clay.⁵

After these developments would come the first small steps in the direction of disarmament that we wished to take and which we wished the Soviet Union to inch along in. Accordingly, the President’s letter to Bulganin, of which Governor Stassen’s report contained a proposed draft, would suggest the creation in the Soviet bloc of an inspection system. When this was set up, the experiment of “test strips” in each country might be begun. Governor Stassen provided a chart which indicated possible small testing areas in the U.S. and in the USSR. Yet another small step in the direction of disarmament which would be proposed to the Soviets would be the exchange of the initial groups of inspectors whose job it would be to test out how the inspection systems would work in both countries. These comparatively small groups of inspectors might ultimately become the heads of the inspection system if the complete system were finally adopted and put in place.

At this point Governor Stassen called to the Council’s attention the fact that the United Kingdom had recently itself completed a study of the disarmament problem.⁶ He believed that the reasoning of the British on this problem very closely paralleled the thinking in Governor Stassen’s own report. Accordingly, he deduced that the UK could be expected to accept most of our own policy proposals without great difficulty. He added his belief, further, that a policy such as he proposed would carry the overwhelming force of free world opinion with the United States. Finally, he pointed out that acceptance of his policy recommendations would assure that the United States could maintain a maneuverable position—that is, if the situation warranted it, the United States could proceed forward to more farreaching disarmament moves or, on the contrary, could retreat if the situation indicated that the initial steps had proved too farreaching.

Accordingly, Governor Stassen stated that he was now recommending that the National Security Council approve the policy recommendations set forth in Volume V of his report, with four conditions: First, conditional upon agreement by the responsible departments and agencies as to details of implementation; second, upon condition that the approval was for purposes of consultation and negotiation; third, upon the condition that if the Soviets accepted the U.S. position the United States should have one more chance to take a hard look before actually going forward with the policy; and fourth, upon the condition that provision would be made for periodic reconsideration by the United States of the disarmament policies which it was pursuing.

When Governor Stassen completed his remarks, Mr. Anderson called attention to the letter which the Secretary of State had sent to Governor Stassen, giving his critique of Governor Stassen’s proposed policy, and indicated that Secretary Dulles might now wish to elaborate on the points raised in this letter. However, the President interrupted to state that he would first like to put two or three questions to Governor Stassen. He asked first whether the 1922 arms limitation treaty with Japan contained any escape clauses for the United States. Governor Stassen replied in the negative, and the President said that in that case there was nothing that we could really do about the Japanese violations of the treaty engagements. He pointed out, however, his emphatic agreement with Governor Stassen that the United States must certainly do something about disarmament “or else” The President went on to say that his next question to Governor Stassen concerned the timing of the presentation of our proposed disarmament position to Moscow. Was this to be done after the U.S., U.K., France and Canada had all agreed among themselves? Governor Stassen said that the President’s surmise was correct, and that the combined views might be presented to the Soviets some time during the month of February of this year.

The President said that his third question concerned the strip testing areas. While these experimental tests were to be undertaken, the President asked whether he was correct in his understanding that even if they were successful the United States would not agree even to Governor Stassen’s “modest reductions” of conventional forces until such time as the entire over-all inspection system was actually being implemented. The President asked whether this would not be quite a considerable period of time, perhaps as much as two years. Governor Stassen said that the President’s understanding of his position was accurate. The President then called on the Secretary of State to give to the Council his reaction to Governor Stassen’s proposals.

Secretary Dulles began by stating that of course it was much easier to be critical than to be positive in commenting on this extremely difficult subject. While Governor Stassen and his people had certainly done an excellent job, he still had questions about the validity of their proposals.

In the first place, Governor Stassen’s plan did not contemplate any appreciable reductions in armed forces and armaments until this vast and complicated inspection system had been accepted by the Soviets, installed, and in actual operation. Accordingly, Secretary Dulles said that he could predict that the USSR would never, never agree to any inspection system of such a character and magnitude. Perhaps Governor Stassen was right in contending that nothing less than such an inspection system was any good, but we should understand clearly that in seeking such a system we are seeking something that can never be realized.

Secretary Dulles went on to say that the Council had never been presented with a really adequate study of a less elaborate inspection system nor a study of the possibility of more farreaching reduction in the level of armaments. While, admittedly, we cannot control and verify the quantity of nuclear weapons which the Soviets might have hidden away, could we not, nevertheless, inspect and control the means of delivery of such nuclear weapons, namely, such things as long-range bombers and missiles? This, of course, said Secretary Dulles, was a judgment more in the military than in the political sphere, although it did seem clear to him that securing the control and reduction of long-range bombers, missiles, submarines, and the like, would clearly be in the interests of U.S. security. Moreover, it would be possible to inspect and control these means of delivery with a much smaller and less complicated system of inspection and verification than one which would require thirty to forty thousand people. Indeed, perhaps as few as a thousand inspectors in the Soviet Union would be sufficient to prevent a Soviet surprise attack on the United States.

In addition, with respect to the so-called modest reduction of forces contemplated in Governor Stassen’s proposal, Secretary Dulles felt obliged to state that it was completely unrealistic for the Governor to choose precisely the most difficult field of inspection and control, namely, the field of ground forces. In this field the Soviet totalitarian system provided Russia with the greatest advantages over the United States, namely, the ability quickly and quietly to secure a very rapid expansion in the number of such forces. Historically, indeed, reduction of military manpower had always proved the hardest nut to crack in all past disarmament schemes. Yet Governor Stassen had picked this very nut as the one to try to crack.

Secretary Dulles then explained his second major point of criticism of Governor Stassen’s proposals. He was sure that, from the standpoint of world opinion, there would be widespread doubt as to whether Governor Stassen’s disarmament program could be regarded as genuine, sincere, or adequate. It simply did not attempt to reach what the people of the world regarded as the heart of the problem. It would not be looked upon as an honest U.S. effort to reduce the level of armaments and to mitigate the horrors of atomic war. In summary, said Secretary Dulles, while it was not within his particular capacity to make this judgment, it seemed very questionable to him that the security of the United States could not be significantly advanced by a much less sweeping inspection program than that presented by Governor Stassen—such as inspection and control of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons. However, concluded Secretary Dulles, he would defer on this point to the expert views of the military.

When Secretary Dulles had concluded his statement, Governor Stassen asked the President’s permission to reply to the points raised. He first indicated that the policy he was proposing was of such nature that it would be possible for the United States to move in the direction recommended by the Secretary of State if we finally decide that we should do so. In short, we could reduce the magnitude and rigor of our requirements for inspection if it proved wise to do so.

Governor Stassen then said that he and his task groups had very thoroughly considered all the points in criticism which the Secretary of State had raised. Neither he nor the task groups felt that we could add to the future security of the United States by any disarmament agreement unless such an agreement made a surprise attack by the USSR impossible. This called for a very thorough and elaborate inspection system. Anything less than this in the way of an inspection system would merely create a false impression of our security.

Governor Stassen went on to say that of course Secretary Dulles might well prove correct in his conviction that the Soviet Union would never agree to an inspection system such as the proposed policy demanded. If this proved to be the fact, Governor Stassen said that his people felt that it was better to have no agreement at all rather than to achieve one which put the United States under a ceiling but permitted the Soviet Union to remain outside it. Nor, continued Governor Stassen, did he and his task groups believe that if the Soviets were sincere in this search for an arms limitation agreement they would not agree to an inspection system of the size and character that he was proposing. This was not unreasonable when one considered the length and breadth of the Soviet bloc.

As to the reaction of world opinion, Governor Stassen expressed the conviction that the United States could “sell” to the world the kind of program he was proposing if we went at it in the right way. There were a great many people in the world who would be glad to see the United States proposing to maintain agreed levels of armed strength rather than agreed levels of armed weakness. He also felt that assurance against surprise attack was more important than an agreement with the Soviet Union on any particular level of armaments. If, however, experience proved it desirable in subsequent months, the United States could ease up in its demands on the Soviet Union and could do this without any notable strain on public opinion.

When Governor Stassen had thus completed his rebuttal, the President said that he agreed with Governor Stassen that the size of the proposed inspection system would never in itself be the cause for acceptance or rejection by the USSR of these disarmament proposals as a whole. Then the President went on to describe the objective of the United States in proceeding with proposals for disarmament. In essence, said the President, we are trying to lead the world back from the brink of disaster. He, for one, could not overemphasize the satisfaction he felt in the labors of Governor Stassen and his task groups. On the other hand, he could not but share the pessimism of the Secretary of State on the Soviet reaction to Governor Stassen’s proposed position. Continuing, the President said that he was at least sure of one thing. At Geneva we had said that if the U.S. and the USSR could both take some steps in the direction of disarmament, the result would be to create an atmosphere of confidence which might prove to have extraordinary results. As things now stand, and in the absence of a disarmament agreement, the United States is piling up armaments which it well knows will never provide for its ultimate safety. We are piling up these armaments because we do not know what else to do to provide for our security. Hence the problem of disarmament requires the continued and most earnest consideration of us all. There should be no defeatist attitude toward the solution of the problem. We have simply got to find something that will work in this field. The Soviets cannot be wholly out of their minds. They must realize, as we do, the seriousness of the situation.

Secretary Humphrey insisted that the United States could never get into a situation in which limits would be placed on its nuclear capabilities and on the means of delivery if the Soviets were not thus limited. Our nuclear capability was our one great advantage over the Soviet Union. We cannot place limits on that capability and at the same time allow the Soviet Union limitless conventional forces. If they did so, Soviet military manpower would overrun Western Europe. The President pointed out that we could stop the Soviets from overrunning Europe by resorting to the use of nuclear weapons, although, of course, this would kill millions of people. Moreover, we might have to give up our bases in Europe, and that was a hell of a problem.

Secretary Dulles, turning to Secretary Humphrey, said that perhaps the latter was right, and that it wasn’t enough to eliminate nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, our industrial and productive capacity has been in the past and may well continue to be the decisive factor in a military victory, provided this productive capacity can be protected from destruction. To this point Secretary Humphrey replied by asking whether our productive capacity would continue to prove decisive if the Soviets managed to overrun Western Europe. The industrial potential of Western Europe added to the Soviet bloc would come pretty close to equalling the productive capacity of the United States.

Governor Stassen commented that in his view a disarmament agreement which was based on agreed levels of military weakness rather than strength would mean a deterioration in the total U.S. security position for the reasons that Secretary Humphrey pointed out. Indeed, said Secretary Humphrey, it would be fatal.

Secretary Dulles stated his belief that the United States in facing this problem must hold to a position which in the first place would enable us to use atomic weapons in a war which the Soviets started without using atomic weapons and, in the second place, to a position which will assure that we and our allies stick together. In short, we cannot find ourselves in a position (and we seem to be approaching this position at the present time) where our allies will not permit us to have recourse to nuclear weapons except to retaliate for their use by the Soviets.

. . . . . .

Governor Stassen said that he would gladly admit the need for bringing world public opinion along in support of his proposed disarmament position. He believed that this was possible, and that the peoples of the world could be convinced that the proposed policy represented a genuine effort to promote world peace and not merely a design to enhance the national security of the United States.

The President said that of course the heart of the problem was this: We are trying to bargain in good faith with a fellow whose good faith we have every reason to doubt. As long as dictatorships continue to expand they do not collapse. This, said the President, was proved in history by Rome, by Genghis Khan, by Napoleon, and by other examples. The foregoing empires only failed when they built walls around their borders, physical or otherwise. Moreover, there was no way of telling how long this Soviet expansionism will continue by other than by military means. We had given Governor Stassen a pretty good “going over” at this meeting, and it was now time to provide him with some useful guidance. How were we going to give Governor Stassen’s proposals some real appeal, both to our own people and to the people of the world? As the Secretary of State had written in his letter to Governor Stassen, it was essential that our disarmament proposals “maintain for us our leadership in the free world coalition and …⁷ secure the essential support of world public opinion.” This language, said the President, pointed out the enormous importance of the psychological and public relations aspect of the disarmament proposal.

Governor Stassen interrupted to point out that as the Attorney General had earlier suggested, we could go further in the direction of reductions in armaments if it proved upon trial that the present proposal was inadequate in this respect in meeting the expectations of world public opinion.

Referring to the previous discussion of surprise attack, the President expressed complete assurance that if the danger of surprise could be eliminated no one would attack. He also said he was sure that the proposed aerial inspection plan would prove quite effective with respect to the inspection and control of Soviet ground forces. Accordingly, we could probably eliminate the danger of Soviet surprise attack if we had in addition the kind of ground inspection that the Russians had been talking about.

At this point Secretary Wilson asked if he might speak for the Defense Department. He indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had gone over Governor Stassen’s proposed policies with great care. The Chiefs and the Defense Department agreed that the U.S. security position would worsen in the future if nothing is done. Accordingly, no one should think that the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have failed to realize the great significance of Governor Stassen’s proposed policy. As to the problem of selling this policy to the Soviets, Secretary Wilson said that we should take a second look at the proposed complicated inspection system. Such a second look might reveal that adequate inspection might be accomplished with many fewer than thirty or forty thousand inspectors, provided that the inspectors who were in the Soviet Union had complete freedom of movement. Governor Stassen replied that perhaps this might be so, but that any inspection system would require a very elaborate communications plan, and to carry out that communications plan in itself required the presence of many thousands of people.

The President said we had reached the point where a decision should be made as to what the Council did next. Mr. Anderson, however, pointed out that Admiral Radford had not yet been heard from.

Admiral Radford began by stating his regret that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had felt themselves obliged to take a rather negative position regarding Governor Stassen’s proposals. The Chiefs had done so, however, because their study of the proposed disarmament policy had fortified their conviction that we are dealing with a people who had no intention whatever of keeping any agreement if they can get out of it to their advantage. Admiral Radford cited various historical instances in the period 1945 to 1950 to back up his contention, and went on to state that the sole reason why the atmosphere for negotiation on disarmament was at the present time relatively favorable was because our own military strength vis-à-vis the Russians had developed so greatly in recent years.

As to the matter of world public opinion on disarmament, Admiral Radford commented that difficult as it was to assess such opinion, he believed that the attitude of world public opinion would be based on who people think has the greater total power, not on what people think you are going to do with that power.

Thereafter, Admiral Radford called attention to a number of the specific JCS comments on Governor Stassen’s disarmament proposals, and especially emphasized the misgivings felt by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the adequacy of the inspection system proposed by Governor Stassen. He pointed out that the decisions of the National Security Council with respect to disarmament would constitute the most important decisions that will be made in the lifetime of those around the table, and specifically referred to the proposed new approach to the solution of the disarmament problem which had been presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their memorandum to the Secretary of Defense dated January 25, 1956, and which had been handed out at the beginning of the meeting. He concluded his comments by restating the sincere feeling of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that once we make disarmament proposals to the Soviets along the lines indicated by Governor Stassen, we would no longer have the freedom to withdraw from a situation that might prove to be manifestly contrary to our national interests. This would be so because of the intensity of allied pressures upon us. In illustration of this point Admiral Radford cited the pressures brought on us by our allies to hew to the letter of our armistice agreement with the Communists in Korea despite the fact that the Communists were violating this agreement and that the security of our forces there was accordingly jeopardized.

When Admiral Radford had concluded his remarks, Secretary Wilson said that he wished to add a thought or two to these remarks. He felt it might be worth while for the Council to stand off and take a slightly different approach. He believed that in our present thinking we were inclined to exaggerate the importance of the inspection system. It was much more important to determine what we would do if the parties to a disarmament agreement violated its terms. Secretary Wilson felt it would be useful to make a careful analysis of all the earlier attempts in history to reach effective arms limitation agreements. It would also be useful to study the agreement made when the U.S. recognized the Soviet Union in 1937⁸ and why the Soviets had violated this agreement. From such studies as these we might be able to figure out the basis on which we could work with people like the Soviets. At least this is what we should seek to develop in furtherance of a solution to our problem. In support of his argument Secretary Wilson cited his own prior experience, as head of General Motors, in meeting sit-down strikes. The leadership of the unions in those days had been at least half Communist. To these leaders the end invariably justified the means. While Secretary Wilson had always thought it best to treat these leaders as though they were honorable men, he was always very cautious in what he had specifically agreed to with them.

Referring to the objections to his proposals entertained by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Governor Stassen said he would merely assure the Joint Chiefs that they could modify the stand he proposed in the direction that the Joint Chiefs wanted, just as one could move from the position proposed by himself in the direction desired by the Secretary of State. Maneuverability toward less drastic or more drastic disarmament was a feature of the position that he had taken. He also assured Secretary Wilson that he and his task groups had thoroughly reviewed the history of the problem of disarmament. This review had reinforced Governor Stassen’s conviction of the vital necessity of two things: First, an adequate system of inspection and verification, and second, legal measures of recourse in the event of violation of the agreement. History showed that previous disarmament plans had lacked these two vital elements.

The President said that we must now try to think of the next useful step, particularly to meet the problem posed by our allies and by world public opinion with respect to disarmament. Could we have something of Governor Stassen’s policy proposals worked up in the form of a speech or a statement by the President which would provide a kind of test of the reaction of our allies and of world public opinion? As for the objections of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Governor Stassen’s proposed policy, continued the President, he could well have been a party to them and written them himself. Nevertheless, he believed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were looking ahead too far into the future. What we are really trying to do at present is to secure some slight easing of the world situation without damaging our own national security. Even the Joint Chiefs of Staff would probably agree that we ought to try everything that will mitigate world tensions, provided this can be done without exposing our security. There were all sorts of possibilities if we once succeeded in creating a little atmosphere of confidence. After all, Khrushchev himself had remarked only the other day that the President and other high officials of the United States were genuine in their search for peace. Amidst some laughter, Secretary Dulles commented that Khrushchev’s endorsement had not included himself or Admiral Radford. The President said that the fact of the matter was that Khrushchev’s remarks constituted another Soviet shift. Indeed, they shifted from day to day. So, said the President, he would suggest that if we put forward a disarmament proposal with a frank purpose, he thought we would have taken such a forward step that subsequently we might actually succeed in going a good deal further than now seems possible. In any case, he said, he was anxious to see what reception our proposals might have in the Soviet Union and in the world.

Secretary Dulles said that he was very much inclined to agree with the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the unlikelihood of achieving any genuine international agreement with people such as the Soviets. Accordingly, he did not have any great hopes of moving very far in the direction of real arms limitation and control. Therefore, anything we do do in this area should be of such a character as to ensure the good will and support of our allies. We certainly must not end up in a situation where we have neither a viable disarmament agreement nor any allies. The desideratum is to recognize the fact that disarmament proposals are probably an operation in public relations rather than actual disarmament proposals. Until we can achieve good faith on the part of the Russians, he didn’t really think that we could get disarmament. Nevertheless, we must seem to strive for it or else we shall be isolated in the world. While indeed we may fall between two stools, the best way to test the situation would be, as the President suggested, to prepare a Presidential speech or statement. Such a speech or statement should strongly emphasize our desire for world peace. We should strive to get such a speech or statement into such shape that it will have a resounding impact throughout the world and establish our high prestige among the nations of the free world.

To these remarks Governor Stassen replied by stating his own judgment that the best propaganda or public relations approach would come from simply advancing disarmament proposals that we are genuinely prepared to see carried out. He called at this point for the Council to give conditional approval to the disarmament proposals which he had submitted. Thereafter the proposed speech or statement could be drafted and referred back to the Council for its approval.

The President stated that he did not wish the Council to give a conditional approval to Governor Stassen’s proposals at this meeting. What he had in mind, rather, was to see what we could present publicly of the proposed disarmament policy. He warned that he did not wish us to get too deeply committed by any public statement or speech. He again expressed great confidence in Governor Stassen and his staff, but it was essential, he said, to avoid any false step. The next move for Governor Stassen was to develop this speech or statement and to see whether, in the first instance, Governor Stassen could “sell” the speech to the President.

Governor Stassen said that he understood this to mean that the President would make the speech here in the United States after he had sent his letter to Premier Bulganin. Would it also be possible to discuss his proposed disarmament policy with the British? The President agreed that this could be done, only disclosure of our proposed positions to the British should be done step by step, so that not all of the position was revealed to the British at one time.

With respect to the proposed letter to Premier Bulganin, Secretary Dulles said that he desired to reserve his position. Such a letter might indeed prove the best way to handle the matter, but Secretary Dulles was not yet sure. Governor Stassen said that in the meantime, pending a decision, he would try to refine and improve the draft letter.

At this point Secretary Wilson said to the President that he wanted him to understand the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their conviction that we must guard against being trapped by the Soviet Union. Despite their somewhat negative reaction, Secretary Wilson said that the Chiefs of Staff were not being “parochial”. To prove this point, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had changed their previous language, to the effect that any disarmament plan must “enhance” the security of the United States, to the current language that it “must not diminish” the security of the United States. This, said Secretary Wilson, showed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were trying hard. Secretary Wilson closed by repeating his view that the inspection system should not be such a preoccupation that it led us to neglect the more important problem of what we should do if the Soviets violated a disarmament agreement into which they had entered.

At this point Admiral Radford asked permission to state to the Council some views which he entertained as a result of his recent trip. He pointed out that when he came back this time he felt that as far as the United States was concerned our situation in the world was not as good as it had been a year ago. There was very widespread lack of understanding of United States policy. Much of this misunderstanding, thought Admiral Radford, derived from the manner in which news of our policy was handled by the American press. There was very inadequate coverage in foreign newspapers of speeches by the President and the leading members of the Administration, because our press people here sent out to foreign countries only brief summaries of the content of these speeches and, moreover, these summaries often had a “leftist slant”. To add to the problem, American newspaper columnists who were opposed to the policies of this Administration managed to secure very complete coverage in the foreign press. He had in mind the views of Marquis Childs, Walter Lippmann, Drew Pearson, and others. Admiral Radford confessed that he did not know the answer to the problem he was raising, but in any event we should not kid ourselves as to our ability to guide world opinion, in view of the manifest fact that our own U.S. press is destroying that ability. In illustration of his point, Admiral Radford cited the case of Thailand, which was getting ready, in Admiral Radford’s view, to move from a pro-American to to a neutralist or a pro-Chinese Communist position. …

The President said that on the other side of the picture he could cite examples of public opinion polls which, after Geneva, showed a very strong shift in the direction of the belief that the United States was genuinely seeking peace. Admiral Radford replied that while this might be so, it was his experience that there was still great confusion abroad as to what the United States actually stood for.

The National Security Council:⁹

a. Noted and discussed the recommendations in the reports by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament circulated by the reference memoranda of December 16, 1955 and January 13, 1956, in the light of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (reference memorandum of January 24, 1956,¹⁰ and supplementary memorandum of January 25, 1956 circulated at the meeting) and the views of the Secretary of State (letter to Mr. Stassen of January 26, 1956 circulated at the meeting).

b. Noted the President’s authorization that the recommendations by the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament might be used for the purposes of:

(1) Preparation of a draft of a speech to be delivered by a responsible spokesman for the Administration which would enable the President and the Council to assess the probable effect thereof upon world opinion, Allied governments and Soviet leaders.

(2) Refinement and improvement of the draft letter to Premier Bulganin, enclosed with the reference memorandum of January 13, subject to future decision as to the form, substance, and desirability of sending such a letter.

(3) Preliminary consulation with the British, avoiding full disclosure of the proposed U.S. position in its entirety but exploring, step by step but without commitment, the specific items in the proposed U.S. position which are considered immediately desirable.

Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament.

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on January 27.
2. Regarding NSC Action Nos. 1419 and 1496, see footnote 8, Document 45, and footnote 6, Document 90, respectively. Memoranda from Lay to the NSC, December 16, 1955, January 13 and 24, 1956, are not printed. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Disarmament Policy)
3. For the JCS supplementary views, January 25, see Document 101. For Dulles’ letter to Stassen, January 26, see supra.
4. See Document 88.
5. General Lucius D. Clay, former Commander in Chief, U.S. forces in Europe and Military Governor, U.S. Zone, Germany.
6. Not found in Department of State files.
7. Ellipsis in the source text.
8. The United States recognized the Soviet Union in 1933.
9. Paragraphs a–b and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1510, approved by the President on February 1. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC Actions)
10. This memorandum transmitted the January 20 memorandum of the JCS to Wilson, Document 95.