Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

102. Letter From the Secretary of State to the President’s Special Assistant (Stassen)¹

Washington, January 26, 1956.

Dear Harold: I have reviewed your January 13 Report on Disarmament.² As I understand it, you are asking that the NSC now adopt those policy recommendations included in Volume V of your report (November 1, 1955) which you suggested should be acted on in your memorandum of December 16, 1955. I would like to supplement the views expressed on your policy recommendations in my letter of December 11, 1955.³

I continue to believe that adoption by the U.S. of the position which you recommend would not be sufficient to maintain for us our leadership in the free world coalition and to secure the essential support of world public opinion. If the U.S. proposals go no further than modest reductions in conventional armaments and forces and do not contemplate even eventual reductions of nuclear weapons stockpiles, I cannot agree with you that they “will attract the overwhelming approval and support of world public opinion for the United States position.” These limited proposals, coupled with the massive inspection system proposed, are likely to persuade many that the U.S. is not seriously interested in disarmament.

In principle, I approve of the positive steps you advocate. I agree that our proposals should include agreement, under safeguards, for:

a. warning against surprise attack;

b. initial reductions in the conventional field;

c. cessation of nuclear production except for peaceful purposes.

I do believe, however, that each of these fields offers further possibilities which should not be foreclosed at this stage and which should be explored more intensively.

1. Warning against Surprise Attack

At the last session of the Council,⁴ the question was raised of the possibility of securing warning against surprise attack with a smaller inspection corps than the thirty-to-forty thousands called for under your proposed inspection system. The report of your Air Task Force suggests that a significant degree of warning against surprise attack could be achieved with less than a thousand inspectors in the Soviet Union.⁵ I think this possibility merits further examination.

2. Nuclear Control

I support your proposal that future production of nuclear material be used for peaceful purposes only. Your idea of putting such material into national stockpiles under international supervision would be a step forward. But I think we should go further and consider a proposal for supervised reciprocal cessation of nuclear output, except that incidental to peaceful uses. The Nuclear Task Force report suggests that such cessation would facilitate control of nuclear material.⁶

Moreover, I think we should explore further the possibilities of eventual reductions of existing stockpiles on a reciprocal basis. The Soviet Union would be far less of a threat to the U.S. if its nuclear capability were sharply reduced, even though nuclear weapons were not entirely eliminated.

I am aware of the technical obstacles to accounting for all past production of nuclear materials. But since our stockpiles are presumably many times larger than those of the USSR, a plan for deposits by both sides from past production, even on a proportionate basis, would appear to serve our interests. The Task Force report would indicate that this measure would be feasible, even though it could not achieve total elimination of such weapons by reason of the unaccounted for residue.

I understand that your report proposes to postpone any decision on the issue of cessation of nuclear tests. In view of the recent U.S. resolution on disarmament,⁷ I do not believe that a review and decision on this problem can be put off.

3. Reduction of Conventional Forces

a. Your proposal for reducing only U.S. and USSR forces appears to be based primarily on control of levels of manpower or forces. I doubt whether this is a suitable basis for restrictions in the conventional field since the Soviets could train and maintain reserves so easily under their system in violation of any agreement. Moreover, I believe that any agreed reduction of armed forces cannot be confined to the U.S. and USSR and must at least include Communist China and, perhaps, the satellites.

b. If any control is to be achieved in the conventional field, I think it must be done in terms of major types of equipment required for the conduct of modern war. Under modern conditions, equipment such as tanks, heavy artillery, aircraft, weapons control systems and naval vessels are essential for an effective fighting force. The control and inspection of this sort of heavy and complex equipment, which requires time and large installations for manufacture, may provide the means for effective restrictions in the conventional field.

If stocks of conventional armaments were brought into balance on both sides at much lower levels, the greater economic potential of the U.S. would be of maximum military significance. Accordingly, I believe we should study the feasibility of major reciprocal reductions of armaments as a means of restricting military forces. The studies which you have requested from the Department of Defense in your letter of January 19⁸ should be useful in this connection.

c. I do not think that your report considers or analyzes the possibilities of selective initial reductions of armaments and especially of delivery systems for nuclear weapons. It would certainly seem that it might be possible to inspect restrictions in or reductions of such items as large aircraft or even long-range guided missiles or submarines, with more limited inspection forces than are contemplated in your proposal. In any event, I still feel that this is an area deserving more thorough analysis and consideration.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 C 133, Disarmament Policy. Top Secret.
2. Document 94.
3. Document 87.
4. There was no discussion of armaments or inspection at the previous meeting of the NSC on January 8. Dulles is presumably referring here to the discussion of inspection at the NSC.
5. The final report of the Task Force on Air Inspection, November 23, 1955, is not printed. (Department of State, Disarmament Files: Lot 58 D 133, Inspection—Task Force)
6. The final report of the Nuclear Task Force, undated, is not printed. (Ibid.)
7. Reference is presumably to the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 914 (X) sponsored by the United States, France, United Kingdom, and Canada and approved on December 16, 1955; see Document 88.
8. Not found in Department of State files.