77. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, May 14, 1956, 3:45 p.m.1

OTHERS PRESENT

  • Admiral Radford
  • Colonel Goodpaster

The President told Admiral Radford about the report he had just had from Dr. Killian and Dr. Fisk.2 He said he regarded the problem as [Page 302] primarily one of making the right decisions. It was not a matter involving tremendous new outlays of funds, but an organizational question. He indicated agreement to the thought that there should be a Task Force approach, working on whole “systems”. Gradually, through such a process, it would be possible to concentrate attention on the truly critical elements and activities in the military sphere. In that sense the matter is one of extending the “new look”. He knew that Admiral Radford favored a more centralized type of approach to many of these problems, and certainly felt that would be necessary. The President said he had about reached the conclusion that some reorientation of the whole organization ought to be made sometime next year. It would involve strengthening the position of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of JCS, reducing the services to a more operational, less policy role. Later, he spoke of making the Chiefs of Staff in effect assistants to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs—i.e., giving him the power to select and to reassign them. The Chiefs would then have the duty of implementing policy within their own service— not of developing over-all policy.

The President went on to say that he wants to put in his State of the Union message next January a very clear and direct statement as to the types of military establishment we should be maintaining, reflecting concentration on critical items as indicated above. Although this would not be put forward until January, it must be worked out very thoroughly ahead of time. He also said that he is thinking of asking for a new type of oath to be taken by all military and civilian officials who serve in the Pentagon—that on termination of their duty they will disclose nothing which the Department of Defense determines to be security information. He also said that he is planning to lay down stricter rules with regard to possible statements by retired officers on matters of governmental policy.

Admiral Radford said there is a considerable problem arising through people getting into “difficulties” in testimony before Congress—and that in some cases these difficulties arise because of lack of wholehearted support for the Administration position. He also said it is proving very difficult to get unanimity on major plans. He cited the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, in which the question has arisen whether atomic weapons would be used in “small wars”. If there is any planning on the basis that they would not, the way is then left open for a building up of service requirements. The President said he was inclined to feel that we would not get involved in a “small war” extending beyond a few Marine battalions or Army units. If it grew to anything like Korea proportions, the action would become one for use of atomic weapons. Participation in small wars, in his opinion, is primarily a matter for Navy and Air. Our job will be to support, but not to engage our main forces which must be kept clear for larger scale [Page 303] hostilities. Admiral Radford said, for example, that if there were trouble in Vietnam, we would certainly not move in with large Army forces. The task for the Army would be to “beef up” the MAAGs with Army personnel who could serve as advisors to indigenous ground forces. In addition, we would no doubt bring in Honest John, artillery and missile units to provide support.

Admiral Radford then discussed a proposal (which it appeared he had received from State) involving holding a ship loaded with military equipment ready to give to Egypt if aggressed upon, and a “stock pile” of F–86s (from Italy) to Israel if attacked. He was concerned that such an arrangement would leak out. He said he would like very much to discuss the whole matter with State (there are some significant military questions involved) before any decision in principle was taken. The President said it would be quite all right to talk to State, since his whole idea had been that, if the matter could be worked out in agreement, it would be okay with him.

Admiral Radford raised the question as to the Field Marshal3 continuing at shape. The President discussed the possibility that the Standing Group might say the whole higher command should be changed at the time General Norstad takes over.

G

Colonel, CE, US Army
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on May 14.
  2. Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.
  3. Field Marshal Lord Montgomery, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.