75. Memorandum of a Luncheon Conversation Among the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury (Humphrey), and the Secretary of Defense (Wilson), Washington, April 19, 19561
I said to Secretaries Humphrey and Wilson that from a political standpoint, I judged that the Soviet Union was now sufficiently committed to policies of non-violence so that I doubted that we would see from their side any repetition of the attack on South Korea. The spot of greatest possible danger of a military character from the Soviet Union was Iran. As regards Communist China, I felt that the risk was greater than from Soviet Russia and that we could not assume that fighting might not break out in any one of the three danger spots—Taiwan, Vietnam or Korea. Of these perhaps the one chiefly requiring local strength was Vietnam because there were no important targets in that area for our retaliatory power and because the Chinese Communists might act through the Vietminh.
In the case of Korea, and to a considerable extent in the case of Taiwan, I felt that the deterrent of our striking power was very considerable and that the need for local forces was primarily psychological.
I expressed the thought that military planning could take account of some of the political changes resulting from the Soviet “new look”.