70. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, March 30, 1956, 3 p.m.1
OTHERS PRESENT
- Admiral Radford
- General Twining
- General Taylor
- Admiral Burke
- Colonel Goodpaster
Admiral Radford began by saying that unless brought under control, a situation may develop in which the Services are involved in increasing public disagreement among themselves. Also, the last four or five months, quite a large number of “split” issues have had to be taken up to Secretary Wilson. There are a number of points in the nature of basic questions on which clarification is needed.
The first is whether we will use atomic weapons in war. There is still reluctance in some quarters to plan on this basis. In actual fact, we are already largely committed as regards our force structure, and will become increasingly so as time goes on.
A second question is that of the roles and missions of the individual Services as applied to guided missiles.
A third question is a desire by the Army to have more control over its reconnaissance.
A fourth is the increasingly aggressive public relations policy of the Services, particularly the Army, but spreading to the others.
Admiral Radford thought that we face so many great and real difficulties, for example, in the Middle East, that we should avoid these distractions.
The President recalled that about a year and one-half ago he had stated some very strong views regarding what he termed “competitive publicity” among the Services. He thought that it was highly harmful to the Nation, and thought that it should be stopped. It is the responsibility of the Service Chiefs to give necessary instructions to public relations officers to accomplish this. It ought to be accepted policy to avoid things that are secret or are likely to give away secrets. Public relations activities, when carried out for the purpose of morale, are understandable, but there should be none of this competitive publicity.
Commenting on roles and missions, the President said he tends to look on the 1500- and 5000-mile missiles as being in the same class operationally. He thought it would be most harmful to have public [Page 281] quarreling over the responsibility for employment of such missiles. He has accepted the recommendation of the scientists that we proceed for the present with the development of four missiles, in order to make sure that all possibilities are explored. He feels that Secretary Wilson should put plenary powers in the hands of one man in the missiles field, and that one man should “do the talking.” He recognizes that there is an extremely difficult problem of coordinating air defense missiles with fighter aircraft.
With regard to this question of using atomic weapons, he said that the subject is one which calls for great care in discussion. He was clear in his own mind that in any war with the Soviets we would use them. Also, as soon as air defense atomic weapons are projected, he would certainly use them against any aircraft attacking the United States.
The President next discussed the fundamental reasons why needs of our economy must always be considered. It is the nature of our Government that everyone, except for a thin layer at the top, is working, knowingly or unknowingly, to damage our economy—the reason being that they see the need for more and more resources for their own Service or agency, and the valuable results that can be achieved through added effort in their own particular element. Unless there is someone who brings all of these together, the net effect is to create burdens which could sap the strength of our economic system. Similarly, there are great pressures on the military program from every particular element, and the catalytic factor provided by the Press and Congress might make it explode. In working for permanent security, we must give due consideration to the right “take” from the economy—one which will permit the economy to remain viable and strong.
The President is not expecting the Chiefs to abandon their basic convictions or conclusions about security needs. He is expecting that activities will be conducted on a spartan basis, and with awareness of the essentiality of a sound economy to true security. He referred to the adverse effects of fluctuations which would result from attempting too much for a short period, and then having to cut back deeply. He stressed the need for each Chief to subordinate his position as a champion of a particular Service to his position as one of the overall national military advisors. He would like to see them seek to be the first to suggest places where the program can be cut—particularly on a basis of one Service giving up a function if another Service would perform it.
The President said he must look to the Chiefs to work out ideas on specific problems. People sometimes try to depend too much on the President’s own military background and experience. Conclusions on specific problems should be developed by the Chiefs.
[Page 282]The President referred to a great mistake made by a former President. He took a decision in a matter of military policy and then invited individual Chiefs to debate that decision. On any major question, there is always a multitude of factors which could give the basis for dissent. However, decision is often mandatory, and after it is taken, successful results can be achieved if all then pull together.
The President said that whenever a matter is up for consideration he wanted the Chiefs to understand that any of them who wished could always come along with Admiral Radford to see him. In fact, his door is open to them at any time.
There was then discussion on a few random points. The President thought that if military needs were of the order of 36-1/2 billion as a “level off” figure, it is possible that could be attained without damage to the economy. He said he had had a visit from Mr. Baruch, who told him that he has changed his views on East-West trade, and would now open up wide for trade to expose how little the Soviets have to offer.2 The President said that if difficulties were to arise requiring U.S. forces in the Middle East, he would plan to draw troops from Europe, since such commitment would in fact be for the protection of the oil supplies to Western Europe. General Taylor said troops could be brought in faster from the U.S. The President thought it was not desirable to deploy the central reserve as long as the USSR is not involved. General Taylor mentioned a plan to rotate a division from Germany to Libya for annual training.
Admiral Radford mentioned that Air Chief Marshal Dickson3 will be here next week, and the President said he would be happy to see him.
The President then discussed some of his ideas concerning the Middle East—the need of building up Saud, and of developing a “package” which we could take to the British for agreement. The idea would be to balance off actions everywhere except to leave pressure on the area selected—perhaps Egypt. There was discussion of the necessity of joining the Baghdad Pact,4 and the need for giving some [Page 283] assurance to Israel in that connection—and also of the danger that, with such assurance, Israel might take actions which would lead to their being attacked, thus committing the United States.
Colonel, CE, US Army
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Top Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on April 2. Another memorandum of this conversation, drafted by Burke on April 2, is in Naval Historical Center, Burke Papers, Originator File.↩
- See Document 68.↩
- Sir William Dickson, British Marshal of the Royal Air Force and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.↩
- The Pact of Mutual Cooperation between Turkey and Iraq, signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955, generally known as the Baghdad Pact. For text, see United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 233, p. 199. The Pact was adhered to by the United Kingdom on April 5, by Pakistan on September 23, and by Iran on November 3. Documentation on U.S. policy with respect to the Baghdad Pact is scheduled for publication in volume XII.↩