Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

61. Memorandum of Discussion at the 277th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 27, 1956¹

Washington, February 27, 1956

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1, an oral briefing by Allen Dulles.]

2. Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5501; NSC 5602;² Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Policy in the Event of a Renewal of Aggression in Vietnam”, dated September 16, 1955;³ Memos for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, same subject, dated February 13 and 24, 1956⁴)

Mr. Dillon Anderson began his briefing of the Council by inviting its attention to the Annex to NSC 5602, which contained the NSC Planning Board’s current “Estimate of the Situation”. He commented on the several paragraphs until he reached paragraph 3. As to paragraph 3, respecting the “Chances of General War”, he pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to insert an additional sentence elaborating on the possibility of war occurring as a result of miscalculation on one side or the other.

The President commented that he could not see any essential difference between the sentence which the Planning Board had originally included on this point and the added language recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Radford explained that the Joint Chiefs believed that the danger of war by miscalculation was a consideration which could not be too strongly emphasized. The President then suggested that the JCS sentence be included.

Mr. Anderson continued his briefing of the remaining paragraphs in the Annex and, when he had concluded his briefing of the estimate of the situation, inquired as to whether there were any questions.

The President said he had an observation to make. He said he believed that we were inclined to use the word “neutrality” too loosely, as this estimate of the situation itself demonstrated. He explained that it was erroneous for people to charge that there could be no genuine neutrality in the world between the Communist and the Western nations. He reminded the Council that the United States itself had pursued a policy of genuine neutrality for the first 150 years of its life. In any event the United States, thought the President, must not keep seeking to achieve military as opposed to moral commitments from other nations. Those nations which made military commitments to the United States often made themselves highly vulnerable to Communist attack. The President then very forcefully stated that we should define the term “neutrality” more precisely. It should mean a moral, spiritual and, possibly, a political commitment to our side, but not necessarily a military commitment. Mr. Anderson assured the President that the view he had expressed had been set forth in paragraph 29 of NSC 5602.

Dr. Flemming said that while the Council was still considering the estimate in NSC 5602, he would like to raise a question with respect to the last two sentences in the memorandum which Secretary Wilson had sent to the Council containing the views of the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to NSC 5602. These last two sentences stressed the growing military strength of the Soviet Union, and Dr. Flemming wished to know whether these sentences in point of fact took issue with the Estimate of the Situation in the Annex which the Council had just gone over.

The President replied to Dr. Flemming by stating that the view taken of Soviet strength in Secretary Wilson’s memorandum was generally true. The Soviets, continued the President, were holding their coalition together at the present time by quite different means because they had come to believe that it would be impossible to hold this coalition together solely by military force as in the past. He saw nothing really to challenge in Secretary Wilson’s estimate. Mr. Allen Dulles also stated that these views of Secretary Wilson were in line with the latest coordinated intelligence estimate of Soviet intentions and capabilities.

Mr. Anderson stated that if there were no more questions about the estimative section of NSC 5602, he would turn to the body of the report, dealing with U.S. policy and strategy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. He referred first to the Preamble on page 1, which he indicated was new and was designed by the Planning Board to suggest an affirmative approach to the problem of the Soviet Union rather than a reactive approach. The President said he could see nothing to object to in the Preamble, and that in fact he liked it.

Mr. Anderson then resumed his comments on the successive paragraphs of NSC 5602, pointing out that with respect to paragraph 6 the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended the deletion of the parenthetical phrase “including safeguarded disarmament”. The President commented that this seemed a very important matter, and deletion of the phrase might appear to be deliberate. Governor Stassen expressed the feeling that the phrase should be retained because disarmament was a basic way for the United States to try to reduce the Soviet threat, the more so because we had ruled out war as such a means. Secretary Dulles said he didn’t think it was vital one way or another, but inasmuch as the phrase was already in the paper, it might just as well remain. The President said that the phrase should stay, at least tentatively.

When Mr. Anderson had reached paragraph 7, dealing with the requirements for a flexible combination of military, political, economic, and other actions as a prerequisite of U.S. strategy, Secretary Dulles indicated that he wished to make a point. He said that he had no doubt that we could achieve a certain flexibility in carrying out our military, political, and economic actions; but we desperately needed more flexibility within the Executive Branch to deal with the problem of countering Soviet initiatives. Our procedures and our relations with the Congress were too slow and cumbersome. The President indicated that the point that Secretary Dulles had made could be raised at the appropriate stage in the Council’s consideration of NSC 5602.

Coming to paragraphs 11 and 12, dealing with the policies of the United States to integrate nuclear weapons with other weapons and also with chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons, Mr. Anderson said he would read these paragraphs in their entirety because they were new. Having done so, Mr. Anderson indicated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended a change in the second sentence of paragraph 11. This now read “Nuclear weapons will be used in general war and in military operations short of general war as authorized by the President.” The Joint Chiefs had suggested that the sentence should read as follows: “Nuclear weapons will be used in general war and will be used in military operations short of general war when the effectiveness of the operations of the U.S. forces employed will be enhanced thereby. For such operations, the decision as to specific uses will be made by the President.” Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not, as they usually did, given the reasons behind their proposed change, Mr. Anderson asked Admiral Radford if he would speak to the point.

Admiral Radford said he would be very glad to comment. There seemed, he said, to be a widespread impression that nuclear weapons were designed only for offensive use. In point of fact, however, these weapons affected our defensive strength just as much as our offensive strength. He cited various weapons to illustrate this assertion. Accordingly, continued Admiral Radford, it would make a tremendous difference defensively if our U.S. forces could not use nuclear weapons in order to defend themselves. It was his opinion that nuclear weapons would soon be so thoroughly integrated in the U.S. armed forces that inability to use these weapons would greatly reduce both our defensive and offensive capabilities. Indeed, the idea of some dividing line between use and non-use of these weapons was getting us further and further from the realm of the possible and the actual.

In response to Admiral Radford, the President adverted to the political implications in the use of nuclear weapons. In these peripheral or small wars which we are talking about, the United States might become involved, for example, through the United Nations. If this occurred, the use of nuclear weapons would raise serious political problems in view of the current state of world opinion as to the use of such weapons. While, said the President, he agreed emphatically with Admiral Radford from a strictly military point of view, we could nevertheless not ignore the political factor. He did not say that world opinion was right in its views about the use of nuclear weapons in small wars. It was nevertheless a fact, and the President predicted that it would be some considerable time before the United States reaches a point where it can adopt any military course of action it regards as appropriate without regard for the political repercussions of such a course of action.

Secretary Dulles said that he believed he had an idea which might reconcile the JCS and the Planning Board language in paragraph 11. Could we not, he asked, use a slightly different formula to cover the use of nuclear weapons in general war and in operations short of general war? He said he had no objection to the use of the JCS language with respect to general war, but he preferred the language suggested by the Planning Board with regard to operations short of general war.

The President said that having taken one position in response to Admiral Radford’s views, he was now about to take a quite different position in response to the point raised by Secretary Dulles. He asked that the Council imagine the position of a military commander in the field. His radar informs him that a flock of enemy bombers is on the point of attacking him. What does the military commander do in such a contingency? Does he not use every weapon at hand to defend himself and his forces?

Secretary Dulles responded by insisting that the language proposed by the Joint Chiefs was no more responsive to the situation described by the President than was the language of the Planning Board, inasmuch as the JCS language itself called for approval of specific use of atomic weapons by the President. Secretary Dulles agreed, however, that the United States forces would make use of nuclear weapons if these forces were directly attacked by the enemy. The President thought that this point should be made specific in the statement of policy.

Admiral Radford commented that in the event of an attack on our forces by an enemy using nuclear weapons, such U.S. defensive forces might suffer such severe initial defeat that they would be unable to recover and go on to victory. In such a case you would have to use nuclear weapons for defense. The President stated his agreement with the point made by Admiral Radford.

Secretary Humphrey said that he wished to raise the very important point of the costs of our preparation for war. He said that it was impossible to prepare dual methods of fighting a future war. Accordingly, we have got to use nuclear weapons in the event of a future war. When you talked in a policy [paper] about “maybe you will use them, maybe you won’t”, you were getting into very, very deep water. Secretary Dulles said that it appeared that we must choose between having all the military flexibility we wished and losing all our allies. The automatic employment of nuclear weapons in certain instances would surely cost us our allies. Secretary Dulles said he would freely admit that we must do more to educate our allies on our position, but that a decision now in favor of automatic use of these weapons might actually prove disastrous to the United States.

The President commented that we were now talking chiefly of defensive nuclear weapons. It would be well to remember that current U.S. forces have in every case at least some capability with so-called conventional weapons. What we are seeking now, in connection with paragraph 11, is language which will state that we can use any weapon available to us in the event that our forces are directly attacked by the enemy. Secretary Dulles agreed with the President.

Secretary Robertson said he wished to refer to the point earlier made by Secretary Humphrey with respect to the impossibility of preparing to fight two kinds of wars. He added that the Defense Department felt a very great need for Council guidance as to the manner in which preparation for future war should be made. Secretary Robertson then referred to the footnote at the bottom of page 6 of NSC 5602, in which the State Department proposed an additional paragraph to be inserted after paragraph 12 and to read as follows: “If time permits, the United States should consult appropriate allies, including NATO, before the final decision to use nuclear and chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons is made by the President.”⁵ In addition to the qualification proposed by the State Department, “if time permits,” Secretary Robertson suggested the qualification “and if an attack on U.S. forces is not involved”. The President said he thought very well of Secretary Robertson’s proposal.

Secretary Dulles said he would like to pursue the discussion a little further. Suppose we turned our attention to the situation in Berlin. What happens if the Soviets impose a new blockade on Berlin? As the Council knew, it was agreed U.S. policy in this contingency to attempt to push through such a blockade. [remainder of paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

At this point the President suggested that the Council suspend action in paragraphs 11 and 12 until such time as it should receive the new paper of the Joint Chiefs of Staff dealing with these problems.⁶ Governor Stassen said he supported the position taken by Secretary Dulles, as opposed to the position taken by Secretary Humphrey. Secretary Dulles added a warning of the terrible repercussions which we would experience if we had recourse to the use of nuclear weapons against the colored peoples of Asia.

Admiral Strauss asked permission to speak at this point. He said he would simply like to add, for the information of the Council, that we have at present no radiological weapons and, as far as he knew, no requirement for them.

Dr. Flemming said he would like to refer once again to the memorandum sent to the Council by Secretary Wilson together with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As he understood Secretary Wilson’s position in this memorandum, the Secretary had concluded that the policy set forth in NSC 5602 did not represent the kind of policy the United States required in the face of the existing situation. Was the issue which the Council had been discussing, with respect to paragraph 11, an illustration of what the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had in mind when they said that we should have a more incisive and specific policy statement than that contained in NSC 5602? Secretary Robertson replied that this was precisely the type of problem about which the Defense Department believed there was need for much clearer delineation of U.S. policy.

At this point Secretary Dulles again suggested that the best solution for the problem raised in paragraph 11 would be for the Council provisionally to adopt the language suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the use of weapons in general war, and the language proposed by the Planning Board with respect to the use of nuclear weapons in operations short of general war. We should also add, said Secretary Dulles, words to indicate that these concepts needed further elaboration and that we should have a study of them by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In response to this suggestion, the President again stated that Council action on paragraphs 11 and 12 of NSC 5602 should be held in abeyance pending receipt of this study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There was no need, thought the President, for immediate Council action on NSC 5602.

Mr. Dillon Anderson then undertook to explain to the National Security Council the origin and development of the ideas and language in paragraph 11. He pointed out that a high level committee had been set up in the Department of Defense which was called the “NSC 5501 Committee”. This Defense Department committee had initially decided on appropriate language to cover the problem of the use of nuclear weapons. They had thereafter sent this language to the Planning Board for its consideration, and this language had been adopted with some few changes by the Planning Board. Mr. Anderson indicated, however, that the Planning Board had had no knowledge of the special JCS study of this problem to which reference had been made in the course of the discussion. He wondered whether this problem should not be added to the other major problems set forth in the covering memorandum by the Planning Board to NSC 5602, which problems the Planning Board felt should be the subject of further study and consideration by the National Security Council.

The President then observed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have reported the contents of their study of the use of nuclear weapons prior to the time when the Planning Board had reached its decision as to appropriate language for paragraph 11. In other words, said the President, turning to Mr. Anderson, you and the Planning Board were under the impression that paragraphs 11 and 12, as agreed upon by the Planning Board, were acceptable to the Department of Defense and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Anderson nodded agreement, but Admiral Radford insisted that the JCS recommendation as to the language which the Planning Board should use for paragraph 11 was the same language which they were now proposing as a substitute for the existing Planning Board language. In point of fact, the Planning Board had not accepted the original JCS suggestions and had changed them in the course of its deliberations. Mr. Anderson agreed that this was correct, but pointed out that the Defense member and the JCS adviser of the NSC Planning Board had agreed to accept the revision made by the Planning Board in the language originally sent by the Joint Chiefs for inclusion in paragraph 11.

Dr. Flemming said he wished to raise a question with respect to paragraph 12, regarding chemical, bacteriological, and radiological weapons in general war. He asked whether he was correct in believing that our previous policy had been that we would have recourse to such weapons only in retaliation against their use by an enemy. Did the present language of paragraph 12 thus amount to a change in policy respecting the use of such weapons? The President commented that the chief purpose of paragraph 12 was to encourage research and development in these weapons fields. Mr. Anderson added that previous policy respecting the use of these weapons called for their use only in retaliation. Accordingly Dr. Flemming’s surmise was correct, and the present paragraph 12 constituted a change in our policy.

Secretary Dulles then asked the President whether Council action on paragraphs 11 and 12 was to be held in suspense. The President indicated that paragraph 12 was OK as written, but that Council action on paragraph 11 would be suspended pending further study and report to the Council by the Department of Defense.⁷

Mr. Anderson then moved on and called the Council’s attention to paragraph 13. He explained that the Joint Chiefs of Staff desired to add language to this paragraph which would delineate the roles of the Army and the Navy in a future war. So far as he could ascertain, Mr. Anderson said, he believed the Planning Board entertained no objection to the additions proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The President said that of course this raised a problem. When you inserted language such as was proposed by the Joint Chiefs in this paragraph, the paragraph became almost a military directive and carried with it the assumption that you had the military capabilities called for by the directive. The President said that he believed that in a future nuclear war the chief task of the U.S. ground forces would be to preserve order in the United States. God only knew what the Navy would be doing in a nuclear attack. The President indicated that he was opposed to adding language which was suggestive of a military directive.

Secretary Humphrey expressed very great concern over the proposed new language. He inquired whether the National Security Council was not now trying to avoid so far as possible all duplication in war planning and all duplication for expenditures to meet a future war. It seemed to him that the Council was at long last reaching the point of decision as to the use of nuclear weapons in a future war. He went on to point out how greatly those who sat around this table had changed their views on this subject over the last two years. Acceptance of the proposed JCS additions might readily involve several billions of dollars in additional appropriations for the Army and Navy and this drastically upset the balance that we were now attaining between our economic well-being and our military preparedness. Accordingly, paragraph 13 and the problems it raised represented to Secretary Humphrey “the whole ball of wax” and “the real meat of the coconut”.

Admiral Radford pointed out that the language describing the missions of the Army and the Navy was a quotation from a letter written by the President to the Secretary of Defense last January.⁸ He added that all the interested bodies and groups among the military were interested in getting such language in our basic policy paper as a means of protecting their appropriations. Secretary Humphrey said he agreed heartily with Admiral Radford that what was proposed by the Army and the Navy constituted appropriations language.

Secretary Robertson said he would like to comment on the charge of too much specificity in the proposed language for paragraph 13. He said that the additional language proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, detailed as it was, was presented on the assumption that the policy set forth in NSC 5602 would be satisfactory. If the Council were to adopt a quite different policy, as Secretary Wilson suggested in his memorandum, less detail would be required.

Secretary Dulles commented that the additional language proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for paragraph 13, as to the missions of the Army and the Navy, was designed simply to involve the NSC in a decision as to the missions of the different branches of the armed forces, and might very well be used as a basis for asking much larger appropriations.

Dr. Flemming said he wanted to emphasize and underline what Secretary Humphrey had said with regard to the necessity for a decision on the use of nuclear weapons. This issue, he added, had very great implications for our mobilization base. He added, however, that he did not agree with Secretary Wilson’s idea that a new and more incisive policy paper should be developed. We should instead attempt to make NSC 5602 more incisive and satisfactory. Admiral Radford stated that what the Joint Chiefs of Staff had in mind was a new policy paper to replace NSC 5602.

The President then turned to Admiral Radford and said that if the suggestions of the Army and the Navy were accepted, we would be writing into paragraph 13 exactly what we expected the Army and Navy to be doing at the outbreak and initial stages of a future war. He again stressed that he did not believe that language suitable for war plans was likewise suitable for basic national security policy, and the language proposed by the Army and Navy seemed to him language suited to a war plan. A basic policy paper is not a war plan.

After Mr. Anderson had pointed out that the present text of paragraph 13 was almost identical with the corresponding paragraph in NSC 5501, General Taylor inquired whether the Council would like to have him state the reason why the Army had recommended, and he had supported, the inclusion of language describing the mission of U.S. ground forces. He had supported this language, said General Taylor, because approximately 40% of our ground forces would be fighting for their lives abroad while the air atomic war was going on. He believed that due recognition should be given to this fact, and said that in all probability the Chief of Naval Operations felt similarly about the role of the U.S. Navy.

The President replied by pointing out that our air atomic capability constituted in the first instance the great deterrent to war. Accordingly, it was in a quite different category from the problem of where our ground forces and our ships were to be deployed in the event of war. If we start now specifying precisely what our Army and Navy are going to do, we’ll never stop.

Secretary Dulles said that it seemed to him that paragraph 13 was dealing primarily with the problem of how you fight a war. These two ideas were separate and distinct, and should not be combined in a single paragraph. The President then indicated that the Council should go on to the next paragraph, and that he was not at the moment inclined toward inclusion of the additional language suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for paragraph 13. Before the Council moved on, Secretary Dulles secured agreement to certain changes in the language of the footnote on page 6.

Mr. Anderson then went on with his briefing, and invited the Council’s attention to paragraph 14, which dealt with the problem of U.S. military forces required to meet or to deter local Communist aggression. He pointed out that in the Planning Board’s covering memorandum a recommendaton had been made that the Department of Defense make a special presentation on the subject of our capabilities to deter or prevent such aggression in Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had concurred in this recommendation.

When Mr. Anderson had finished reading paragraph 14, Secretary Robertson commented that the Defense Department felt very much about paragraph 14 as they had felt about paragraph 11, which seemed to be looking at peripheral and general war together.

The President said that he again found himself a little puzzled about the use and implication of the words “peripheral war”. He reminded the Council that when his Administration had first come into office, back in January of 1953, our big complaint was the Korean war, which we were obliged to fight with handcuffs on. Under the circumstances, we could not win such a war, and that left us no option but to end the war. Then the President said that the point that he was trying to make was that in the future these peripheral wars must not be permitted to drag out. We must now plan to fight peripheral wars on the same basis as we would fight a general war. After all, there was no good reason for drawing distinctions between peripheral and general wars. Had we not made up our minds that if the Communists renewed their aggression against Korea we would go “all out” to meet it?

Secretary Dulles put to the President the question of what we would do if the Vietminh undertook to attack South Vietnam. Would we proceed to drop atomic bombs on Peking? The President replied that we might not drop bombs on Peking, but just as quickly as the Communists intervened against South Vietnam we would certainly bomb the bases in China which were supporting the aggression.

Secretary Humphrey said that this discussion again pointed to the necessity that the National Security Council reach a unanimous decision on what kind of a war the United States was going to be prepared to fight if it occurred. Mr. Allen Dulles said that in a kind of a way a peripheral war was now going on in Laos. The President said, however, that the kind of war we were talking about was one in which the United States was intervening. Secretary Dulles pointed out that by the terms of the SEATO treaty the United States was committed to protect the territorial integrity of Laos.

Mr. Anderson again pointed out the Planning Board recommendation that the Department of Defense should produce a full study and presentation of the problem of local aggression to the National Security Council. Admiral Radford commented that the Planning Board recommendation was all right with him, though he doubted that it would be very productive. Secretary Humphrey said with considerable warmth that it was simply not possible for the United States to fight just little wars. If we get into any war at all we must go in with the determination to clean the whole mess up. Admiral Radford added that at any rate we could not let such little wars drag on.

Governor Stassen reminded the Council of his view that if the free world came to believe that the United States was only capable of fighting with nuclear weapons, we would lose much of our free world support. Admiral Radford took issue with this view, and pointed out that the Council adopted two years ago a policy of building up the nuclear capabilities of our armed forces and, moreover, he predicted that the use of these nuclear weapons would become accepted throughout the world just as soon as people could lay their hands upon them. The President concluded the discussion by calling for agreement on the Planning Board’s recommendation for a study and presentation to the Council of the local aggression problem.

Dr. Flemming asked if the Council would go back for a moment to paragraph 13. He believed that it would be useful to change the introductory phrase “As part of its military forces the United States must develop and maintain its effective nuclear retaliatory power, etc., etc.” to “As a deterrent to war the United States must etc., etc.”. The President agreed that Dr. Flemming’s phraseology was an improvement.

The Council then moved on to consider paragraph 16. After certain word changes were agreed upon, Secretary Robertson said he felt it was his duty to mention that the policy laid down in this paragraph was going to cost the United States a very great deal of money. Indeed, some $450 million was earmarked next year for NATO. The President remarked, with some chagrin, that when our divisions were originally sent to Germany they were sent there on the assumption that they would remain only until the French and the Germans could take up the slack. Now we are not only going to provide new weapons and spare parts to our NATO allies, but we must plan to keep our American divisions in Germany too.

Secretary Humphrey said that Secretary Robertson’s comment on costs impelled him to say that every time the military found a place where they felt they needed to spend more money, they must also find another place where they could make equivalent savings. There was not much doubt that Congress would face us with a tax reduction in the near future. We were desperately trying to find funds to launch a great roads program. We were simply not going to be able to get any more money out of Congress.

Admiral Radford said that these observations reminded him that he ought to mention the recent visit of the Italian Chief of Staff. General Mancinelli had informed him in effect that unless the United States provided support for the Italian armed forces at the rate of about $250 million a year, the Italian Government would have to reduce the levels of its armed forces.⁹ Admiral Radford had replied that the United States would be glad to provide new weapons for the Italian Army if Italy itself would supply the necessary spare parts. Mancinelli had replied that Italy could not possibly do this. Accordingly, Admiral Radford charged that the Italians not only expect us to give them new weapons; they also want our financial help to support the existing force levels. It was tantamount to blackmail. Secretary Humphrey expressed emphatic agreement with this judgment, and warned that we were everywhere going to be faced with the proposition that either we help support the armed forces of our allies or else they would quit being allies.

At this point the President intervened to ask the question whether the United States must face national bankruptcy and the prospect of a totalitarian control as the only means left to deal with an implacable enemy. This was why, he said, he kept telling our Chiefs of Staff all the time that they must behave as statesmen as well as military leaders. They must somehow strike an appropriate balance between the military needs of the nation and our resources under our free enterprise economy.

Mr. Anderson went on to comment on paragraph 18, which was new and dealt with the necessity for a dynamic research and development program for military application. When he had completed his explanation, the President commented that he presumed that the words “increasing efforts” meant that the policy was recommending more money for military research and development. This might be well and good, but the President wanted to know whether the Defense Department had done all it could for research and development within the limits of existing funds. Perhaps it was doing this now. It was certainly not doing so a few years back. In short, the question he wished to put was, can we not increase the effectiveness as well as the scale of spending on our research and development program?

Secretary Robertson said that $1.6 billion was a lot of money to be set aside for basic research alone. When you added to this military pay and other things, the total rose from $1.6 billion to $5.4 billion. The President went on to say that he simply wondered how much money we were talking about in this paragraph. He was quite sure that simply adding more money to this program would not necessarily encourage the people involved in it to do their best work. Secretary Robertson admitted that he had found some support for the President’s argument in his recent tour of the various installations where our guided missiles programs were being carried out. In most of these places the provision of additional funds would not have accelerated the completion of the missiles programs.

The President then said that in any event (looking at Director Hughes) he would like to get the people from the research and development program together some time and find out where they are spending their money and at what point in carrying out the R&D program technical supervision and coordination had their first impact. Director Hughes answered that the Bureau of the Budget had already tried to follow out the President’s suggestion with Dr. Waterman’s group,¹⁰ but the results so far had not been very productive. Mr. Andersonsuggested that the President might wish to add this problem to the other areas in which the Planning Board had recommended further detailed study.

With respect to the last sentence of paragraph 18, which called for the speeding up of the means whereby important scientific discoveries could be translated into a flow of new weapons, Secretary Robertson pointed out that a full-fledged study was being carried forward by the Department of Defense as this problem related to manned aircraft.

Mr. Anderson next drew the Council’s attention to paragragh 24, which called on the United States to encourage a high level of international trade within the free world and to take the lead in this process by reducing further “its own tariffs and other trade restrictions over the next few years”. The Treasury and ODM members of the Planning Board had recommended the addition of the phrase “with due regard to national security and total national advantage”.

The President expressed surprise at this split of views, and said that if we did not consider national security and total national advantage already, we should certainly now move to do so. He looked on the whole problem of reducing trade restrictions and tariffs in terms of our national security and total national advantage. Accordingly, it was agreed to accept the additional phraseology proposed by the ODM and Treasury members of the Planning Board.

Mr. Anderson then went on to paragraph 25. Admiral Radford raised a question with respect to paragraph 25–b, which indicated that the United States might find it expedient to continue economic assistance to certain European countries (e.g., Spain, Yugoslavia, Turkey), etc., etc. Admiral Radford wanted to know whether the specification of these three countries meant that we would not furnish such economic assistance to any other European countries. Mr. Anderson explained that this paragraph had been inserted because of the virtual cessation of U.S. economic aid to European countries, and the Planning Board’s view that in certain exceptional circumstances it might be desirable to continue such economic aid.

The President expressed some doubt as to the wisdom of specifying only these three countries. If it was expedient to assist these countries, it might be expedient to assist others. Secretary Dulles commented that we were already committed to economic assistance in the case of Spain and Turkey, and that we were in addition giving a lot of Public Law 480¹¹ assistance to Yugoslavia. The President then directed the deletion of subparagraph 25–b.

The Council moved on to consider paragraph 27, which dealt with United States programs to promote sound development in the less developed nations. Mr. Anderson pointed out that there was a split in paragraph 27, occasioned by the proposal of the Treasury, ODM and Budget members of the Planning Board to insert the phrase that despite such assistance as we might be required to provide less developed nations, “over the long run the total lever of U.S. economic assistance world-wide should be reduced as rapidly as is consistent with U.S. security interests.” Mr. Anderson suggested that Director Hughes might wish to speak to this point.

Mr. Hughes pointed out that the proposed language had existed in NSC 5501. If now this language were to be omitted, it would look as though we had changed our policy on reducing the total level of U.S. economic assistance, and he believed it was still our policy objective to do so. Accordingly, he favored inserting the bracketed phrase.

Secretary Dulles said that in point of fact we were asking Congress for an extra $100 million this year for assistance to less developed nations. If we were going to be logical, therefore, we should introduce the word “increased” along with the word “reduced” in the sentence in question.

Secretary Humphrey said that it was his emphatic view that over the long run the United States should get out of the field of providing economic assistance to foreign nations. This was not the kind of a burden that the people of the United States would be willing to bear indefinitely, and it should be our objective to get out as rapidly as we could. If Congress once got the idea that the burden of foreign aid was regarded by the Executive Branch as permanent, we would certainly be in hot water.

Secretary Dulles said he believed the use of the term “permanent” was very dangerous. Our real objective is to provide for the security of the United States, and to that end it was an illusion to imagine that we can reduce the level of our foreign assistance expenditures in the near future. The President agreed that, particularly in view of the new Soviet tactics, the inclusion of this phraseology might lend itself to illusions. However, he said, he would not object to including this proposed language if to it were added the thought that it would not be possible to reduce the total level of U.S. economic assistance for a long time to come. After further discussion, the President suggested new language to meet the point. We should say in effect that the level of U.S. economic assistance should attain but not exceed a total level consistent with U.S. security interests. If language to this effect were included, the language proposed by the Treasury, ODM and Budget should be deleted.

Proceeding to a consideration of paragraph 27–b, on U.S. foreign economic programs, Mr. Anderson pointed out that this subparagraph was new. After Mr. Anderson had read the language, the President commented that here again, as in the military field, the Soviets have every opportunity to play us for suckers. We must be careful not to be drawn into matching every Soviet offer of assistance to foreign nations.

Secretary Humphrey commented that paragraph 27 raised terrific questions. Our economic assistance to underdeveloped nations was rendered on a government-to-government basis. As a result, our policy was actually achieving nothing but the building up of little imitations of the Soviet Union throughout the underdeveloped areas of the world. If we continued this policy it would mark the end of all hope for setting up free individual enterprise in any of these countries. This result would be a far cry from our own idea of the kind of world we wanted to see.

The President, in response to Secretary Humphrey, stated that he could see no good reason why the present paragraph should not contain language designed to encourage the investment of private capital in the programs for building up the underdeveloped countries. To develop private enterprise in these areas had always been a part of our foreign policy. Mr. Anderson agreed to insert language to meet the President’s point.

Secretary Robertson pointed out that many of our allies have begun to think that nations who professed a policy of neutrality were more successful than actual allies of the United States in securing U.S. economic assistance. He believed that Admiral Radford might wish to speak further on this subject. Admiral Radford elaborated on this point and cited various examples, notably Pakistan. Secretary Humphrey added the comment that in Latin America it was often argued that the only way to extract money from the United States was to plead the danger of Communism. The President commented that the sad fact was that we did not have enough allies really determined to maintain their freedom to a point where they were willing to see the United States spend its money in the really critical areas.

Governor Stassen pointed out his view that regional arrangements for economic assistance were the best way to counter the new Soviet tactics. He felt that it was a mistake that the present paper contained nothing by way of support for the idea of extending U.S. aid on a regional rather than an individual country basis.

Mr. Anderson then pointed out that the problem of aid to underdeveloped countries was yet another area for which the Planning Board was recommending special study in its covering memorandum. The President inquired if this was not a subject on which Joe Dodge was also working. When it had been pointed out that this was indeed the case, the President suggested that the Council not act on the subject until these additional studies had been completed.

Moving on to paragraph 30, which dealt with the problem of nationalist and reform movements in colonial areas in Asia and Africa, Mr. Anderson invited attention to the ODM proposal that the “extension of the trusteeship principle in appropriate circumstances with strategic safeguards may offer a defensible and acceptable alternative to strictly colonial control.” The President asked Dr. Flemming what precisely the ODM Planning Board member had in mind in proposing this language. In turn, Dr. Flemming asked Mr. Anderson what Dr. Elliott had had in mind. Mr. Anderson explained. Secretary Dulles then commented that the area of possible use of the trusteeship principle was too meager to deserve being singled out in this fashion. Dr. Flemming agreed to drop the proposal.

At this point Mr. Anderson indicated that it was quarter to twelve, and that the Council might wish now to adjourn and complete its consideration of NSC 5602 at its next meeting on Thursday, March 1. The Council agreed with this suggestion, but Secretary Dulles stated that he might not be able to be present at the meeting next Thursday, and wished to say a few words about the problem of flexibility which he had mentioned earlier in the morning’s discussion. The President indicated that Secretary Dulles should proceed.

Secretary Dulles said that, at least in those sections of the paper which had been covered this morning, there had not been adequate recognition of the need for greater administrative flexibility on the part of the United States in countering the current Soviet economic offensive. When we devised programs of economic assistance under the existing arrangements, we had to explain every single last item to the Congress on every expenditure which we proposed to make. This would be absurd in the case of military planning, which was permitted great flexibility, and we needed similar flexibility in the cold war.

Director Hughes indicated that the Bureau of the Budget was giving this matter of administrative flexibility the most intensive study. Both the Bureau of the Budget and Mr. Dodge were strongly in favor of trying to secure the required flexibility.

Secretary Dulles said that he was glad to hear this, but still believed that the problem required special mention in NSC 5602. With this view the President expressed agreement. Thereupon Secretary Dulles said he would like just to outline a kind of example of what he had in mind. Suppose, for instance, the United States went to the Czechoslovakian Government and said in effect that Czechoslovakia needed a lot of cotton. We would be glad to give this cotton to Czechoslovakia, together with butter, meats, fats, and other foods of which we had large surpluses. We would then propose some kind of a deal by which in return for these commodities Czechoslovakia was to provide us with war goods or other things. Any such proposal as this to Czechoslovakia would simply “raise hell” in the Soviet satellite countries. The Soviets, said Secretary Dulles, are grievously exploiting the satellites. Why can’t we exploit this fact, just as the Soviets are exploiting our allies and the neutral nations? Secretary Dulles pointed out that this, of course, was just an off-the-cuff suggestion and that it had not been staffed. But if the United States were to decide to make such moves as this, they would have to be made quickly if they were to be effective. Under the existing lack of flexibility we simply could not move quickly enough.

The President inquired whether he could not put some such suggestion as that made by Secretary Dulles in the next message he was to send down to the Congress. Director Hughes added that it would be next to impossible to get the Congress to agree to any such proposal as that outlined by Secretary Dulles.

The President said that of course the trouble was that the Congress believed that any and all U.S. trade with the Soviet bloc was wrong and bad. On the contrary, the President said, what he wanted to set in motion was centrifugal forces rather than centripetal forces in the Soviet bloc. U.S. trade with the bloc might eventually prove to be such a centrifugal force.

Secretary Dulles closed the discussion by stating that his plan was only an illustration of the kind of flexibility that the President might need in the future in dealing with the new Soviet tactics.

Thereafter the Council adjourned, with the understanding that it would consider the remainder of NSC 5602 at its next meeting.

Note: Council action resulting from the above discussion is incorporated in the action on the same subject contained in the memorandum on the 278th NSC meeting.¹²

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on February 28.
2. NSC 5602 is not printed, but see NSC 5602/1, Document 66.
3. For text, see vol. I, p. 535.
4. See footnote 1, Document 57, and footnote 1, supra, respectively.
5. In a memorandum to Secretary Dulles, dated February 24, Bowie recommended that the final clause of this sentence should be redrafted to read: “before any final decision to use nuclear or chemical, bacteriological, or radiological weapons is made by the President. (Underlining to indicate changes.)” The underlined words are printed in italics. (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 487, S/P Chron. TS)
6. Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.
7. See footnote 9, Document 62.
8. Reference is to Eisenhower’s letter to Wilson, dated January 5, in which the President wrote in part: “Other essential tasks during the initial period following a possible future attack would require the Navy to clear the ocean lanes, and the Army to do its part in meeting critical land situations.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956, p. 4 ) The Joint Chiefs repeated this sentence verbatim in paragraph 1–c of the enclosure, not printed, attached to the memorandum to Secretary Wilson, supra.
9. No record of Radford’s meeting with General Giuseppe Mancinelli, Italian Chief of Staff, has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.
10. Dr. Alan T. Waterman, Director of the National Science Foundation and Member of the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific Research and Development.
11. Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. (68 Stat. 454)
12. See the NSC memorandum of discussion, infra.