Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

57. Memorandum by the NSC Planning Board¹

Washington, undated.

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (NSC 5602)²

I. Introduction

1. The Planning Board has reviewed NSC 5501, “Basic National Security Policy”, and has submitted to the National Security Council the draft revision thereof issued February 8, 1956 as NSC 5602.

2. The Planning Board’s general conclusions are that certain significant changes in the estimate of the situation have taken place and that such changes call for the proposed revision. These proposals are all within the framework of the basic strategy described in NSC 5501, which in its essential features is believed by the Planning Board to remain valid.

II. Principal Changes in the Estimate of the Situation

1. The U.S. will acquire by about mid-1956 the capability to mount a decisive strike against the USSR and will maintain a marked net superiority in nuclear striking power from then until some time in 1958 (NSC 5602, Annex, para. 1).

2. The steady growth of Soviet military capabilities has continued, and in important instances, particularly in high-yield nuclear weapons, missile development and delivery systems, more rapidly than was estimated a year ago (NSC 5602, Annex, paras. 1–6 and 22).

3. The growth of Soviet technological capabilities involves a serious short- and long-term challenge, not only in the military area but also in its potential political impact on a world which has in recent years been reassured by the over-all technological predominance of the United States (NSC 5602, Annex, para. 12).

4. In their efforts to lull and divide the free world and expand their area of influence, the Soviets have added new methods and more flexible tactics, involving the use of trade, barter, and technical assistance, and diplomatic moves including the taking of sides in active intra-area controversies. Their newer methods are directed toward the progressive erosion of free world will and cohesion (NSC 5602, Annex, paras. 20 and 23).

5. Increasing U.S. and Soviet nuclear capabilities have produced growing apprehension about the catastrophic nature of general nuclear war (NSC 5602, Annex, para. 15).

6. U.S. alliances are confronted with new and increasing difficulties in some respects. These strains may become more marked, particularly in NATO, where certain countries already evidence (a) greater reluctance to maintain and strengthen military establishments despite increased economic strength, (b) tendencies toward accommodation and disengagement, and (c) more selfish pursuit of national ambitions or rivalries submerged by a sense of common peril and economic weakness (NSC 5602, Annex, para. 24).

7. The underdeveloped areas have become a major target of the new Soviet tactics. Soviet appeals to local aspirations, resentments and fears have been shrewdly combined to foster trends toward neutralism and enhance vulnerability to communist influence (NSC 5602, Annex, paras. 16, 17 and 18).

III. Basic U.S. National Strategy

1. The basic national strategy outlined in NSC 5501 (Section B) remains generally valid and sound for the situation we face.

2. Within this framework, however, the present situation requires additional effort in carrying out certain basic security programs and some significant shifts in emphasis as to others, in pursuing this general strategy.

3. Hence it is recommended that the Council, in reviewing basic national security policy, schedule a further and subsequent review of certain essential elements of national strategy to ensure that they are being carried out with the effectiveness, urgency and resources called for under present world conditions.

IV. Recommendations for Special NSC Review

1. The U.S. Approach to the Underdeveloped Nations

a. Paragraphs 19 to 30 of NSC 5602 restate the importance of the underdeveloped areas and the need for a more flexible U.S. political and economic approach and for broad and adaptable programs of U.S. assistance.

b. The current Communist political, economic and diplomatic offensive, involving widespread offers of technical, developmental and military assistance on a “trade not aid” basis, both bilaterally and through UN agencies, confronts the United States with one of its most serious challenges. Despite substantial assistance programs, the United States has not succeeded to date in developing an affirmative sense of community of interests with the underdeveloped countries. Hence their complex drives for improved conditions and status are effectively exploited by the new Communist offensive.

c. It is recommended that the Council, after submission to the President of the report on the subject now in preparation by the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy,³ give further consideration to basic U.S. policies with respect to the less developed and uncommitted areas.

2. Flexibility and Mobility of U.S. Military Capabilities

a. Policies dealing with the capabilities and use of U.S. military forces required to deter or defeat Communist military aggression in its various forms are treated in paragraphs 9 to 17 of NSC 5602.

b. In particular, NSC 5602, like NSC 5501, emphasizes the need for flexible capabilities to deter or defeat local aggression by selective means which (a) are appropriate to the character and extent of the enemy action, and (b) can be brought to bear speedily and in a way best calculated to avoid the broadening of hostilities into general war. This matter raises the issue of the mobility and deployment of forces and the degree of their dependence on nuclear weapons in such situations.

c. In order to assist the Council in assessing these issues, it is recommended that the Council request the Department of Defense to make a presentation on the capabilities, with or without nuclear weapons, of the U.S. military forces referred to in paragraph 32 and other appropriate paragraphs of NSC 5501, to deal with local aggression in Vietnam, utilizing as appropriate a study transmitted to the Council on September 16, 1955.⁴

3. Maintenance of Technological Superiority

a. The Soviet Union is making rapid strides in weapons systems, in basic science and research and in non-military fields, and is overtaking the United States in the education and training of scientific and technical personnel. The proposed policy to deal with this problem is contained in paragraphs 18 and 49 of NSC 5.602.

b. It is recommended that the Department of Defense, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the National Science Foundation, be requested to make a presentation to the Council on the problem of technological superiority.⁵

4. Disarmament (para. 37 of NSC 5602)

In view of the importance of this issue, it is recommended that intensive efforts be continued on all aspects of the problem of devising a safeguarded system of disarmament.

1. Source: Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5602 Series. Top Secret. Transmitted under cover of a memorandum for the NSC from Gleason, dated February 13. Gleason noted that the Planning Board’s memorandum was being transmitted for the Council’s information, and for their consideration of the recommendations in paragraphs III–3, IV–1–b, –2–c, –3–b, and –4 thereof in connection with the Council’s consideration of NSC 5602, scheduled for February 27.
2. A copy of NSC 5602, “Basic National Security Policy,” a draft revision of NSC 5501, issued on February 8, is in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5602 Series. For the NSC discussion of NSC 5602 on February 27, see Document 61; for text of NSC 5602/1 as approved by the President, see Document 66.
3. Not further identified.
4. Memorandum for the National Security Council from the Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Policy in the Event of a Renewal of Aggression in Vietnam“, dated September 16, 1955. [Footnote in the source text. For text, see vol. i, p. 535. Admiral Radford presented the Defense Department report on U.S. military capabilities to deal with local aggression in Vietnam to the National Security Council on June 7. For text, see Ibid., p. 703.]
5. See footnote 11, Document 62.