6. National Security Council Report1
NSC 5501
Washington, January 7,
1955.
BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council
REFERENCES
- A.
- NSC 162/2
- B.
- NSC 5422/2
- C.
- NSC 5440/1
- D.
- Memos for NSC from Executive
Secretary, same subject, dated December 20, 1954 and January 3,
1955
- E.
- Memo for NSC from Executive
Secretary, subject: “Summary Statement of Existing Basic National
Security Policy”, dated October 11, 1954
- F.
- NSC Actions Nos. 1251, 1272, 1279,
1286, 1290 and 12932
- G.
- NEE 11–4–54; NIE 11–6–54
The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Attorney General, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman,
Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator,
at the 230th meeting of the Council on January 5, 1955,3 discussed
[Page 25]
the subject on the basis of the reference report
(NSC 5440/1) in the light of the
views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff transmitted by the reference
memorandum of January 3, 1955. The Council adopted the statement of
policy contained in NSC 5440/1, subject
to the changes set forth in NSC Action
No. 1293–b.
The President has this date approved the statement of policy in NSC 5440/1, as amended and adopted by the
Council and enclosed herewith as NSC
5501, and directs its implementation by all appropriate executive
departments and agencies of the U.S. Government. As basic policy, this
paper has not been referred to any single department or agency for
special coordination.
The enclosed statement of policy as adopted and approved, supersedes
NSC 162/2 and NSC 5422/2, and constitutes the basic guide
in the implementation of all other national security policies,
superseding any provisions in such other policies as may be in conflict
with this basic policy.
[Here follows a one-page table of contents.]
[Enclosure]
BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
Section A
Estimate of the Situation
The Soviet-Communist challenge in this era of approaching nuclear
plenty constitutes a grave peril to the United States.
I. Relative Communist Bloc and
Free World Capabilities
- 1.
- Soviet air-atomic capabilities are rapidly increasing. Already
the USSR has the capacity to
inflict widespread devastion on major free world countries
allied to the U.S. and serious damage to the U.S. itself. Over
approximately the next five years the USSR will almost certainly develop the net capability to strike a crippling blow
at the United States.5
- 2.
- At present the U.S. can inflict massive damage on the
Communist bloc by nuclear striking power. Even when the USSR arrives at the point where it
can strike a crippling blow at the U.S., the U.S. will still be
able to inflict equal or greater damage on the USSR, provided that it takes
adequate measures to protect its effective retaliatory
power.
- 3.
- The Soviet guided missile program, over the next few years,
will bring increasingly longer-range missiles into production.
Assuming an intensive effort, the USSR may develop roughly by 1963 (1960 at the
earliest) operational intercontinental ballistic missiles. The
U.S. program for missiles of this type should approximate this
timetable, provided that intensive effort continues. There is no
known defense against such missiles at this time.
- 4.
- Thus a situation is appoaching in which a total war involving
use by both sides of available weapons would bring about such
extensive destruction as to threaten the survival of both
Western civilization and the Soviet system. This situation could
create a condition of mutual deterrence, in which each side
would be strongly inhibited from deliberately initiating general
war or taking actions which it regarded as materially increasing
the risk of general war. In any case, war would remain a
possibility, if only because of the element of miscalculation by
either side or because of a technological break-through by the
Soviets leading them to believe they could destroy the U.S.
without effective retaliation.
- 5.
- The Communist bloc will maintain and further develop
formidable conventional forces, with improved combat
effectiveness and a large increase in submarines. The principal
limitations will be logistic problems and deficiencies in
specialized experience, training and equipment.
- 6.
- The free world can make substantial progress in building
military strength through the continued improvement of NATO forces, the introduction of
West German units, some Japanese rearmament, and the progressive
development of new weapons systems and of production facilities.
Introduction of nuclear weapons into the NATO defense system on the basis
of agreed policy will be of crucial importance. Provided that it has the will to do so,
the free world coalition has the capacity to maintain sufficient
conventional and nuclear military strength and mobility6
to constitute a major deterrent to Communist military aggression
and to maximize the chances of dealing effectively with such
aggression if it should occur.
- 7.
- The stability of the USSR and
its hold over the European satellites are unlikely to be
seriously shaken over the next few years, despite measures which
the U.S. may find it feasible to take to weaken Soviet control.
However, the control system of the USSR will continue to be faced with important
problems (such as discontent in the satellites, agricultural
difficulties, and pressures for satisfying consumer wants), some
of which may be susceptible to a limited degree of exploitation
from outside.
- 8.
- Communist China is likely to continue vigorous and cohesive,
but will face internal problems much greater than those of the
USSR. The Sino-Soviet tie
probably will remain strong for the next few years not only for
ideological reasons but also because it furthers the purposes of
both parties.
- 9.
- In absolute terms, the growth of the U.S. economy should be
greater than that of the USSR;
and U.S. productive capacity in 1959 will still be more than
twice that of the USSR.
Nevertheless, the economic growth of the USSR can be expected to continue
at a rate considerably higher than that of the U.S. or of other
major free world countries. The difference in growth rates will
probably be even greater in the industrial sector, despite some
increased Soviet emphasis on agriculture and consumer goods.
Moreover, the USSR will be
devoting to capital investment, and to uses contributing to war
potential, a much greater proportion of its resources.
- 10.
- Soviet economic progress, in spite of the fact that Soviet
living standards are low compared to those of the U.S., will be
for many peoples with lower living standards an impressive
example, and will probably constitute an important element in
spreading Soviet influence, especially in Asia. Communist China,
if its industrialization continues as expected at a rate
relatively rapid as compared with that of other Asian countries,
will also exert considerable attractive force on Asian peoples,
especially if economic improvement in free Asia is slow or
non-existent.
- 11.
- The existing structure of U.S. alliances can probably be
maintained, and could possibly be extended, particularly in the
Middle East. However, there will be serious strains on these
alliances, especially the ties between the U.S. and its major
allies, resulting from growing fears of atomic war on the part
of the allies, differing attitudes on China, and greater
receptivity by the allies to Soviet overtures. Our allies will
probably be more reluctant than the U.S. to participate in
actions which appear to them to involve appreciable risks of war
in order to prevent further Communist advances in areas which do
not directly involve their vital interests.
- 12.
- Less developed countries will continue to be a major source of
weakness in the position of the free world, owing to such
factors as political instability, economic backwardness, extreme
nationalism, and
[Page 28]
the
colonial issue. The dangers of subversion will be great,
especially in countries under the shadow of Communist power and
subject to direct Communist pressures and intervention. In
Southeast Asia the present situation is extremely precarious.
Failure of the free world to deal more effectively with the
problems of less developed areas will weaken the free world and
benefit international communism, even in countries where actual
Communist take-over is not imminent.
- 13.
- As the lines between the Communist bloc and the Western
coalition have come to be more clearly drawn over the last few
years, a situation has arisen in which any further Communist
territorial gain would have an unfavorable impact within the
free world that might be out of all proportion to the strategic
or economic significance of the territory lost.
II Probable Soviet and Chinese
Communist Intentions and Strategy
- 14.
- The USSR has not modified its
basic hostility toward the non-Communist world, and especially
toward the U.S. as the power center of that world, or its belief
in the ultimate triumph of Communism. The Soviet leaders can be
expected to seek constantly, by every means they find
advantageous, to extend Communist power and to weaken those
forces, especially U.S. power and influence, which they regard
as inexorable enemies of their system. However, they will almost
certainly avoid pursuing their long-term goals in ways which
jeopardize the security of the regime or their control of the
Communist bloc. Soviet objectives can be listed as follows, in
descending order of importance:
- a.
- The security of the regime and of the USSR.
- b.
- Maintaining the Soviet hold on the European
satellites, and keeping China within the Communist
bloc.
- c.
- Elimination of U.S. influence from Eurasia, and the
isolation of the U.S.
- d.
- Expansion of Soviet Communist power throughout
Eurasia.
- e.
- Elimination of the U.S. as a competing power
center.
- f.
- The spread of Communism throughout the world.7
- 15.
- The Chinese Communist regime remains bitterly hostile to the
U.S., and ostensibly committed to the conquest of Formosa. It
will attempt to expand its power on the mainland of Asia and to
expel U.S. power and influence therefrom. In pursuit of this
end, it probably will place primary emphasis on penetration and
support of subversion in neighboring countries.
- 16.
- Provided that the U.S. and free world have at all times an
adequate military posture and the necessary determination, it
appears unlikely that, within the next five years, the USSR or Communist China will
deliberately initiate war, or engage in overt military
aggression if in its judgment such aggression would involve
appreciable risk of war with the U.S.8 They will try to avoid courses of
action which in their judgment will clearly involve such risk.
However, they probably would not be deterred by the risk of
general war from taking military counter-action against Western
actions considered to be an imminent threat to their security.
Moveover, general war might occur as the climax of a series of
actions and counter-actions which neither side originally
intended to lead to that result.
- 17.
- The emergence of increased flexibility in the conduct of
Soviet foreign policy since the death of Stalin has introduced a
significant new factor in the situation. The Soviet leaders have
almost certainly regarded their “peace offensive” as their most
effective present tactic for dividing the free world and
isolating the U.S. from its allies. A principal aim has been to
prevent the rearmament of West Germany in association with the
Western Powers. If the Paris agreements are ratified, the
Soviets may revert to a more uncompromising and menacing
posture. On the other hand, the “soft” line may further be
motivated by domestic preoccupation and fear of general war, and
the Soviets may, therefore, desire an extended period of reduced
tensions, without sacrificing their basic security interests.
Even should that be the case, Soviet policy will mainly seek
tacit understanding not to resort to force to change the present
territorial division between the Communist bloc and the free
world. In any event, whatever Soviet concessions are made will,
for some time, almost certainly be confined to relatively minor
issues. Although it appears very unlikely, the Soviet leaders
might be led by the fear of nuclear destruction to accept an
effective system of armaments control, with whatever changes
would thereby be required in their present practices and
concepts.9
- 18.
- Whenever the Soviet “soft” line is dominant, our allies will
be eager to explore it seriously, and will probably wish, in
seeking a basis of “coexistence”, to go to further lengths than
the U.S. will find prudent.
[Page 30]
Even if the USSR offers no real concessions, these tendencies
will probably persist, supported by large segments of public
opinion. It will be a major task, therefore, to maintain the
necessary unity and resolution in the free world coalition
whenever and wherever the Soviets press their “peace
offensive”.
- 19.
- Despite the talk of “coexistence”, the Communist powers will
continue strenuous efforts to weaken and disrupt free-world
strength and unity and to expand the area of their control,
principally by subversion (including the support of
insurrection), while avoiding involvement of the main sources of
Communist power. This strategy will probably present the free
world with its most serious challenge and greatest danger in the
next few years.
- 20.
- Attainment by the USSR of the
capacity to inflict crippling damage on the U.S. almost
certainly would not tempt the Soviets to initiate general war,
unless they believed that they could neutralize, or by initial
surprise could destroy, U.S. retaliatory power before it could
be used. They will continue to be extremely reluctant to
precipitate a contest in which the USSR would be likely to be subjected even to
limited nuclear attack. After attaining atomic plenty, however,
the Communist powers probably will increase the pace of their
attempts at progressive local expansion, supported by force or
threat of force, provided they estimate that such action can
succeed and will not provoke U.S. counteraction involving
appreciable risk of general war.10
Section B
Outline of U.S. National Strategy
- 21.
- The basic objective of U.S. national
security policy is to preserve the security of the United
States, and its fundamental values and institutions.
- 22.
- The basic threat to U.S. security is
posed by the hostile policies and power, including growing
nuclear power, of the Soviet-Communist bloc, with its
international Communist apparatus.
- 23.
- The basic problem confronting the U.S.
is how, without undermining fundamental U.S. values and
institutions or seriously weakening the U.S. economy, to meet
and ultimately to diminish this threat to U.S. security.
- 24.
In meeting this threat, the U.S. must choose between two
main lines of policy, aimed respectively at:
- a.
- Destroying the power of the Soviet-Communist bloc;
or
- b.
- Modifying the policies of the Soviet-Communist
bloc along lines more compatible with U.S. security
interests.
Either policy would include action to
disrupt or neutralize the international Communist apparatus
in the free world.
- 25.
- The U.S. and its allies have no foreseeable prospect of
stopping the growth of Soviet nuclear capabilities and of
reducing Soviet armed strength—the core of Communist power—or of
significantly reducing other basic Communist military strength,
except by mutually acceptable agreements with the Soviets or by
large-scale military action. The initiation by the U.S. of such
action for this purpose is not an acceptable course either to
the U.S. or its major allies.
- 26.
- Hence, U.S policies must be designed to affect the conduct of
the Communist regimes, especially that of the USSR, in ways that further U.S.
security interests and to encourage tendencies that lead them to
abandon expansionist policies. In pursuing this general
strategy, our effort should be directed to:
- a.
- Deterring further Communist aggression, and preventing
the occurrence of total war so far as compatible with
U.S. security.
- b.
- Maintaining and developing in the free world the
mutuality of interest and common purpose, and the
necessary will, strength and stability, to face the
Soviet-Communist threat and to provide constructive and
attractive alternatives to Communism, which sustain the
hope and confidence of free peoples.
- c.
- Supplementing a and b above by other actions designed
to foster changes in the character and policies of the
Soviet-Communist bloc regimes:
- (1)
- By influencing them and their peoples toward
the choice of those alternative lines of action
which, while in their national interests, do not
conflict with the security interests of the U.S.;
and
- (2)
- By exploiting differences between such
regimes, and their other vulnerabilities, in ways
consistent with this general strategy.
- 27.
- To carry out effectively this general strategy will require a
flexible combination of military, political, economic,
propaganda, and covert actions which enables the full exercise
of U.S. initiative. These actions must be so coordinated as to
reinforce one another. Programs for the general strategy between
now and the time when the USSR
has greatly increased nuclear power should be developed as a
matter of urgency.
- 28.
- Provided that it is resolutely pursued, this general strategy
offers the best hope of bringing about at least a prolonged
period of armed truce, and ultimately a peaceful resolution of
the Soviet bloc-free
[Page 32]
world conflict and a peaceful and orderly world environment.
Failure resolutely to pursue this gerneral strategy could,
within a relatively short span of years, place the U.S. in great
jeopardy.
Section C
Elements of National Strategy
I. Military Problem
- 29.
- A central aim of U.S. policy must be to deter the Communists
from use of their military power, remaining prepared to fight
general war should one be forced upon the U.S. This stress on
deterrence is dictated by the disastrous character of total
nuclear war, the possibility of local conflicts developing into
total war, and the serious effect of further Communist
aggression. Hence the Communist rulers must be convinced that
aggression will not serve their interests: that it will not
pay.
- 30.
- If this purpose is to be achieved, the U.S. and its allies in
the aggregate will have to have, for an indefinite period,
military forces with sufficient strength, flexibility and
mobility to enable them to deal swiftly and severely with
Communist overt aggression in its various forms and to cope
successfully with general war should it develop. In addition,
the U.S. and its major allies must show that they are united in
their determination to use military force against such
aggression.
- 31.
- As part of its military forces, the U.S. must develop and
maintain its effective nuclear-air retaliatory power, and must
keep that power secure from neutralization or from a Soviet
knockout blow, even by surprise. The U.S. must also continue
accelerated military and non-military programs for continental
defense. So long as the Soviets are uncertain of their ability
to neutralize the U.S. nuclear-air retaliatory power, there is
little reason to expect them to initiate general war or actions
which they believe would carry appreciable risk of general war,
and thereby endanger the regime and the security of the USSR.
- 32.
- The United States must also have other ready forces, which,
together with those of its allies, must be sufficient (a) to
help deter any resort to local aggression, or (b) to punish
swiftly and severely any such local aggression, in a manner and
on a scale best calculated to avoid the hostilities broadening
into total nuclear war. Such ready forces will be in addition to
those assigned to NATO; they
must be properly balanced, sufficiently versatile, suitably
deployed, highly mobile, and equipped as appropriate with atomic
capability, to perform these tasks; and must also, along with
those assigned to NATO, be
capable of discharging initial tasks in the event of general
war.
- 33.
- Such a policy is predicated upon the support and cooperation
of appropriate major allies and certain other free world
countries, in furnishing bases for U.S. military power,
especially strategic air, and in providing their share of
military forces. To succeed, the basic strategy and policy of
the U.S. must be believed by our appropriate major allies
generally to serve their security as well as ours. Thus, it is
important for the United States to take the necessary steps to
convince them that such is the case, to strengthen the
collective defense system, and to utilize, where appropriate,
the possibilities of collective action through the UN. In
addition, the United States should continue to provide military
and other assistance to dependable allied nations where such
assistance is necessary to enable them to make their appropriate
contributions to collective military power.
- 34.
- The ability to apply force selectively and flexibly will
become increasingly important in maintaining the morale and will
of the free world to resist aggression. As the fear of nuclear
war grows, the United States and its allies must never allow
themselves to get into the position where they must choose
between (a) not responding to local aggression and (b) applying
force in a way which our own people or our allies would consider
entails undue risk of nuclear devastation. However, the United
States cannot afford to preclude itself from using nuclear
weapons even in a local situation, if such use will bring the
aggression to a swift and positive cessation, and if, on a
balance of political and military consideration, such use will
best advance U.S. security interests. In the last analysis, if
confronted by the choice of (a) acquiescing in Communist
aggression or (b) taking measures risking either general war or
loss of allied support, the United States must be prepared to
take these risks if necessary for its security.
- 35.
- The United States and its allies must reject the concept of
preventive war or acts intended to provoke war. Hence, the
United States should attempt to make clear, by word or conduct,
that it is not our intention to provoke war. At the same time
the United States and its major allies must make clear their
determination to oppose aggression despite risk of general war,
and the United States must make clear its determination to
prevail if general war eventuates.
II Strengthening the Free
World
- 36.
- The United States should place more stress than heretofore on
building the strength and cohesion of the free world, and take
adequate actions for the purpose of (a) creating cohesion within
and among all the free nations, remedying their weaknesses, and
steadily improving the relative position of the free world; and
(b) destroying the effectiveness of the Communist apparatus in
the free world. Success
[Page 34]
in these endeavors will depend heavily on the degree to which
the U.S. and its major allies can attain agreement on basic
objectives and actions to achieve them.
- 37.
- Direct action against the Communist apparatus must rest
largely with the local governments concerned, although the U.S.
should be able to help significantly, chiefly through covert
means. In countries vulnerable to subversion, the U.S. should,
as one of its objectives, assist in the development of adequate
internal security forces. In case of an imminent or actual
Communist seizure of control, the U.S. should take all feasible
political, economic, and covert measures to thwart it, and, it
appropriate, should take military action, if required to cope
with the situation.
- 38.
- Recognizing that the Soviet bloc is at present stressing and
effectively utilizing subversive forces and techniques, the US.
should strengthen its effort against such forces and techniques
by developing and employing in a well-coordinated manner all
means at its disposal appropriate to this purpose, specifically
including covert operations and other pertinent political
information, economic, and military programs and activities.
[1 sentence (22 words) not
declassified]
- 39.
- The existence of conditions in the free world which the
Communists can exploit makes it very difficult for the free
world to overcome its divisions, fears, and weaknesses. In many
cases, the U.S. faces the choice of (a) taking timely action to
help remedy such conditions, or of (b) allowing the situation to
deteriorate with the prospect of later trying to prevent
Communist gains by more costly and less certain measures, or
even military action. The ability of the free world, over the
long pull, to meet the challenge and competition of the
Communist world will depend in large measure on the capacity to
demonstrate progress toward meeting the basic needs and
aspirations of its peoples.
- 40.
- Two of the basic problems in the economic field are: (a)
industrialized areas require further economic growth and
expanded trade; and (b) the less developed areas seek to develop
and modernize their economies and must also maintain a
substantial volume of exports of primary products. It should be
within the capacity of the free world, with U.S. initiative and
leadership, to turn these two problems into mutually supporting
assets for the promotion of appropriate economic strength and
growth.
- 41.
- A necessary condition for such strength and growth is a high
level of international trade within the free world. In order to
foster this, the U.S. (a) should continue to press strongly for
a general reduction of trade barriers; (b) must take the lead by
reducing further its own tariff level over the next few years;
and (c) should also support sound moves to widen the
convertibility of currencies.
- 42.
- The dangers to free world stability are particularly acute in
the less developed areas. The task of speeding up their economic
growth, providing adequate dietary conditions, and promoting
stability presents a multitude of problems, political and social
as well as economic. For example, it calls for some changes in
traditional habits and attitudes and for greatly expanded
training in administrative and technical skills. In any case,
new capital investment is a prerequisite to growth. Local
capital will have to be supplemented by the provision of capital
from abroad. In addition to external public and private
investment and IBRD loans, substantial financing from U.S.
public funds (including the Export-Import Bank) will be
necessary, in some cases over an extended period, to help
achieve the economic progress essential to U.S.
interests.
- 43.
- In order to promote conditions of sound development in less
developed areas the United States should be prepared to use
economic means available to it where (a) such action serves U.S.
objectives, (b) such development cannot be financed by local or
other foreign capital, and (c) such assistance will be
effectively used. The total level of U.S. economic assistance
worldwide should, however, be reduced as rapidly as is
consistent with U.S. security interests.
- 44.
- U.S. financial assistance alone cannot produce satisfactory
economic growth in less developed areas, and external assistance
should be used in a way to promote and not decrease local
incentives and self-help. In addition to the provision of
financial assistance, the United States should train indigenous
leaders, develop skills, and provide competent advisers. U.S.
information, cultural, education and exchange programs should
also be strengthened.
- 45.
- U.S. political policies must be adapted to conditions
prevailing in each less developed area. The U.S. should not
exert pressure to make active allies of those not so included.
The U.S. should provide assistance on the basis of the
willingness and ability of countries to strengthen and defend
their independence against Communist expansion rather than on
their formal alignment with the U.S. As far as possible, the
U.S. should attempt to work with rather than against those
forces, such as constructive nationalist and reform movements,
which are likely to remain powerful over a long period.
- 46.
- Where disputes and tensions between free nations threaten to
impair free world strength and cohesion, the U.S. should exert
its best efforts to help settle them or at least moderate their
effects. In addition to efforts to settle specific current
controversies, the U.S. should develop long-term policies to
deal with deep-seated problems (such as those involved in the
evolution of colonial peoples).
[Page 36]
III. Political Strategy Against
the Communist Bloc
- 47.
- The U.S. should develop a political strategy against the
Communist bloc designed (a) to reduce the likelihood of
aggression, (b) to influence, in ways favorable to U.S. and free
world interests, decisions and developments within the Communist
bloc, such as toward greater emphasis on internal problems, and
(c) to foster long-run trends which might lead to basic changes
in the outlook or character of Communist regimes.
- 48.
- In pursuing this strategy, the U.S. should seek (a) to
convince the Communist regimes that alternatives exist to their
present policies which would be acceptable to the U.S. and which
they might come to consider compatible with their basic security
interests, (b) to give to the Communist regimes a clear
conception of the true U.S. and free world purposes and
uncompromising determination to resist Communist aggressive
moves, and (c) to exploit, in ways consistent with this
strategy, differences within the Soviet system or between the
USSR and other members of
the Communist bloc.
- 49.
- The U.S. should be ready to negotiate with the USSR whenever it clearly appears
that U.S. security interests will be served thereby.
- 50.
- In applying this strategy to Communist China, the U.S. must
take account of non-recognition of the regime and the regime’s
recent and continuing aggressive policies. However, the U.S.
should be ready to participate in talks including Communist
China on specific subjects on an ad hoc basis, where the general
objectives mentioned in connection with negotiations with the
USSR would be served
thereby.
IV. Domestic Strength
- 51.
- Sound U.S. Economy
- a.
- A strong, healthy and expanding U.S. economy is
essential to the security and stability of the free
world. The level of expenditures for national security
programs must take into full account the danger to the
U.S. and its allies resulting from impairment, through
inflation or the undermining of incentives, of the basic
soundness of the U.S. economy or of the continuing
expansion of the U.S. economy under a free enterprise
system.
- b.
- The Federal Government should continue to make a
determined effort to bring its total annual expenditures
and its total annual revenues into balance, or into
substantial balance; and should maintain overall credit
and fiscal policies designed to assist in stabilizing
the economy.
- c.
- Nevertheless, the U.S. must continue to meet the
necessary costs of the programs essential for its
security.
- d.
- All Federal expenditures, especially those not
essential for the national security, should be held to a
necessary minimum. Every effort should be made to
eliminate waste, duplication, and unnecessary overhead
in the Federal Government.
- e.
- The United States should also seek (1) to maintain a
higher and expanding rate of economic activity at
relatively stable price levels, and (2) to maximize the
economic potential of private enterprise by minimizing
governmental controls and regulations and by encouraging
private enterprise to develop natural and technological
resources (e.g., nuclear power).
- 52.
Internal Security
Internal security measures should be adequate to meet the
threat to U.S. security of covert attack by the Soviet bloc
on the United States by means of sabotage, subversion,
espionage, and particularly the clandestine introduction and
detonation of nuclear weapons.
- 53.
Civil Defense
An essential ingredient of our domestic strength is an
improved and strengthened civil defense program which seeks
to minimize damage from nuclear attack by both preventive
and ameliorative measures.
- 54.
- Support by U.S. Citizens
- a.
- No national strategy to meet the Soviet threat can be
successful without the support of the American people.
During a time of increasing Soviet atomic power, the
determination of U.S. citizens to face the risks
involved in carrying out such national strategy will be
of increasing importance. Continuing efforts should be
made to inform the American people of the demands on
their spiritual and material resources necessary to
ensure U.S. security during a period of armed truce,
which may either continue for many years or be broken by
an atomic war.
- b.
- Eternal vigilance is necessary in carrying out the
national strategy, to prevent the intimidation of free
criticism. Necessary protective measures should not be
used to destroy national unity, which must be based on
freedom and not on fear.
V. Other National Security
Measures
- 55.
- Mobilization Base
- a.
- Essential to the strong security posture required by
the national strategy is a mobilization base adequate to
maintain military readiness and to provide the basis for
successful prosecution of general war, based on (1) an
approved military plan, (2) allowance for estimated bomb
damage, and (3) a determination as to U.S. provision of
allied material requirements.
- b.
- The U.S. should continue to seek to achieve as quickly
as feasible minimum stockpile objectives for materials
the shortage of which would affect critically essential
security programs. The stockpiling program should not
normally be used to help stabilize international markets
for exports of less developed countries; exceptions
being
[Page 38]
made only
on a case-by-case basis where there would be clear net
advantage to the U.S.11
- 56.
Intelligence
The United States should develop and maintain an intelligence
system capable of:
- a.
- Collecting and analyzing indications of hostile
intentions that would give maximum prior warning of
possible aggression or subversion in any area of the
world.
- b.
- Accurately evaluating the capabilities of foreign
countries, friendly and neutral as well as enemy, to
undertake military, political, economic and
subversive courses of action affecting U.S.
security.
- c.
- Forecasting potential foreign developments having
a bearing on U.S. national security.
- 57.
Manpower
The United States should develop an adequate manpower program
designed to:
- a.
- Expand scientific and technical training.
- b.
- Provide an equitable military training
system.
- c.
- Strike a feasible balance between the needs of an
expanding peacetime economy and defense
requirements.
- d.
- Provide for an appropriate distribution of
services and skills in the event of national
emergency.
- 58.
Research and Development
The United States should conduct and foster scientific
research and development so as to ensure superiority in
quantity and quality of weapons system, with attendant
continuing review of the level and composition of forces and
of the industrial base required for adequate defense and for
successful prosecution of general war.
