58. Supplementary Notes on the Legislative Leadership Meeting, White House, Washington, February 14, 1956, 9:30–11:21 a.m.1

[Here follows discussion of an unrelated subject.]

Missile Development—Rep. Arends commented that it appeared that the Democrats would try for the rest of the session to build up criticism of the missile program.2

The President did not know of any way to avoid criticism in a political year. He wanted to point out, however, that there was no certain knowledge that the Soviets were able to develop yet a warhead sufficiently light to be carried on a missile. It was important too to remember that there already existed more certain methods of delivering weapons to the saturation point than through the use of missiles. But he did not want to belittle the importance of missiles for there was obviously a large psychological factor among our allies to be considered in regard to the Russian potential for shooting even a 1500-mile missile.

The President stated that the United States is rushing missile development, that the budget contains a request for $1.2 billion. He noted the suggestion for setting up a separate agency, but said that he would use instead the experience of all the agencies. He did see a need for a good man to be located in the Department of Defense to see to the coordination of a lot of this.

[Page 197]

The President recalled that our experts had originally believed that the quickest intercontinental missile to be had was of the “flight” type rather than the ballistics type, though of course it would be more vulnerable to destruction than the ballistics type.

Mr. Reuben Robertson recalled that in the economizing of 1.948, work on the missile was cut out entirely, that the Defense Department funds were sharply reduced and that air research funds were cut from $185 million to $145 million.

The President stated that he had been coming down from Columbia at that time to consult, and when he was told that the expenditure program was going to be reduced below a certain point, he just couldn’t have any further part in it.

The Vice President was certain that the missile program was on a starvation diet until this Administration came along, but he was not proposing to play politics with this unless forced into the subject by the opposition.

Mr. Quarles said that missiles were starved until Korea when money became available, and Mr. Keller3 came in to “beef up” the program of those missiles that were nearly ready for production. The strategic missiles were not “beefed up” until the 1953 study4 by Dr. Von Neumann and others. Since then, this Administration has pumped money in as fast as it can be used, as even Trevor Gardner has admitted.

The President noted again that as far as Russia is concerned, all that is known is that they have propelled something a given distance. How far along they are with warhead and guidance systems is not known.

Ironically, the President said, he thought he would be hard pressed to justify putting so much money into missiles, only to find that newcomers appear and charge him with not doing enough.

Mr. Quarles branded as inaccurate and very dangerous the concept of an “ultimate weapon.” As for the talk about the Russians having the intermediate range missile, they already had the IL-28’s which are more effective than missiles and cannot adequately be defended against. We know that and the Russians know it, he said.

Mr. Quarles emphasized that the Russians will still be deterred by our power to strike an effective blow whether with missiles or otherwise.

The President commented on the vast number of missiles needed to make an effective attack on many cities—allowing for some being defective. Inability to pinpoint would require large numbers and the [Page 198] world would be a shambles before an atomic war was over. War up to now has been a contest, he said; but with nuclear missiles, it is no longer a contest, it is complete destruction.

The President said he did want to get guided missiles as quickly as possible for the sake of our friends. But in the meantime we have a deterrent power—which we’ve got to have for the sake of civilization. That’s why he talked disarmament so much, he said.

Mr. Robertson noted that the “business as usual” charge just wasn’t true. He pointed out that 25,000 people, of whom 10,000 are scientists, are working on the program, and more than 50,000 hours of overtime are being worked which is said to be the maximum for a program of long duration. Mr. Quarles added that overtime had been authorized even before the President’s “highest priority” determination, and that unlimited overtime is now authorized.

Mr. Robertson said Mr. Trevor Gardner’s concern was not with ballistic missiles, for which he said himself he couldn’t use any more money; he was concerned rather with the broad area of air research and development.

The President remarked that he had just been reminded of a talk he had had with Sec. Talbott who had been keen for appointing Gardner. His file also held a note about several Senators (Knowland included) cautioning against it. The President said he finally had told them to go ahead if they insisted but they would have to hold themselves responsible if it proved to be a mistake.

LAM
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Legislative Meetings. Confidential. Drafted by Minnich. Copies were sent to Ann Whitman. The meeting was attended by the President and Vice President Nixon, Senators Knowland and Bridges, Representatives Martin, Halleck, Leo Allen, and Arends, Attorney General Brownell, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robertson, Quarles, Sherman Adams, Persons, Hagerty, Harlow, Seaton, Goodpaster, Gerald Morgan, and I. Jack Martin, The time of the meeting and the list of participants is from the President’s Appointment Book. (Ibid.,Eisenhower Records)
  2. On February 8, during a news conference, Eisenhower responded to charges that had been made that week by two Democratic Senators that the United States was lagging seriously behind the Soviet Union in the production and development of guided missiles. Eisenhower noted that “as of now this thing is being researched and developed as rapidly as it can be done in this country, so far as my experts and my people in the Defense Department tell me.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956, p. 236)
  3. Kaufman T. Keller, former Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Director of Guided Missiles, 1954.
  4. Not further identified.