Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

48. Report by the ODM–Defense Working Group¹

Washington, December 20, 1955.

ACHIEVING AND MAINTAINING U.S. AND FREE-WORLD TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY OVER THE U.S.S.R.

I. Origin of the Report

1. This report is submitted pursuant to the National Security Council Planning Board paper, “Review of Key Aspects of Basic National Security Policy,” dated 2 September 1955.² The relevant section is as follows:

“(3) Maintaining U.S. Technologial Superiority

ODM and Defense should prepare recommendatons, based on an analysis of the problems involved, on the policies required if the U.S. is to achieve and maintain future U.S. and Free World technological superiority over the U.S.S.R.”

2. In addition to the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Department of Defense, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the National Science Foundation have participated in the preparation of the report. limited time available has precluded exhaustive study of the complex problems involved. There is obvious need for continuing study and action by all of the great number of Federal Agencies which play a part in furthering U.S. technology.

II. Estimate of the Situation and the Problem

3. Through intensive application of science and technology, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have today achieved weapons and means for their delivery by which each could inflict great devastation upon the other despite existing defenses. The rapidly approaching era of balanced nuclear capability between the two powers will probably establish a mutual deterrence to general war, and possibly though not necessarily to local aggressions, which can be maintained into the future provided neither side achieves by technological “breakthrough” or overall technological superiority a capability which would permit it to attack the other with confidence that its own homeland could not be devastated in retaliation. The U.S., even if it achieved such superiority, would not indulge in preventive war, but no such assurance can be felt about the Soviet Union. Thus the maintenance of technological superiority by the U.S. over the U.S.S.R. could mean the difference between peace and general nuclear war.

4. The relative technological superiority of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. must be first of all considered in terms of continued maintenance of short-run technological superiority by the U.S. Unless the short-run problem in the decisive period which we are approaching is successfully solved, there may be no long run. This involves a selective approach on the crucial new weapons and weapons systems which determine the capability to annihilate or to prevent annihilation. This critical fact has already been recognized by the National Security Council in the unique priorities and organizational programs laid down for both the IRBM and the ICBM.³ Further recognition of this problem is found in NSC treatment of Continental Defense.⁴

5. From incomplete data, it may be estimated that in certain important fields of weaponry the Soviets are now several years in advance of U.S. technology. For example, in terms of service ceiling of interceptor aircraft and the time they require to climb to that ceiling, the U.S.S.R. may be two to four years ahead of the U.S. In long-range ballistic missiles the U.S.S.R. may be leading by two or more years. In the combat range of tanks without refueling, U.S. tanks have only about one-third to one-half the range of Soviet tanks. Much more pertinent comparisons are those between the service ceilings of our radar and interceptor weapons systems compared to the ceilings of Soviet bombers; the comparison between their interceptors and our bombers; and the comparison between the stage of Soviet development in long-range ballistic missiles and our development of defenses against such missiles. Such comparisons are not reassuring from the U.S. point of view. We are relatively well off for the time being in the most important comparison of all—that between the totality of our offensive systems and those of the Soviets—but on the basis of current trends it will take continuous, unrelenting effort on the part of the U.S. to maintain such superiority on into the future.

6. Action on the short-run problem lies primarily within the responsibilities of the Department of Defense, requires adequate funds and other resources and the speeding up of important projects already underway. Thus a basic requirement is the simplification of the decision-making, clearance and coordinating functions within the Department and the assigning of appropriate priorities of effort. The Department of Defense is actively studying at its highest level the ways and means by which its management and operations from research on into production may be drastically speeded up. This study can be of vital importance, particularly if the National Security Council evidences an active interest in it and provides the stimulus of NSC and Presidential support.

7. The problem of achieving and maintaining technological superiority over the long run is deeply rooted in the fundamental dynamics of technology itself and in the factors which give it direction and maintain its creative vigor. Consequently, efforts toward technological superiority should not be focused on weapons systems alone but must broadly reflect superiority:

a. As manifested in the totality of operational weapons available at any given time and the ability to neutralize by defensive or offensive means any technological military threat;

b. As manifested in the development and employment of superior technology for the achievement of peaceful purposes both nationally and in cooperation with other nations;

c. As demonstrated by superior inventiveness and in the development of new knowledge through basic research;

d. As a potential embodied in the development of an adequate number of highly qualified scientists and engineers and in the maintenance of an expanding system of technological institutions and facilities in a vigorous state of health.

8. Although achievement of technological superiority in the short-run is imperative, it is essential that we commence with no further delay actions needed to assure long-range technological superiority.

9. The Soviets are continually expanding their educatonal facilities for the training of scientists and engineers. They are now graduating such persons in considerably greater numbers than the U.S. The best of their graduates are apparently fully the equal of our best, and there is evidence to show that the top administrators of Soviet research and development are first class scientists. Additonally, the Soviets have built up a superior complex for effectively utilizing their scientific and engineering manpower. They have created facilities, research centers, specialized institutes, and administrative policies and procedures, including effective methods for utilizing all possible Free World scientific information, which have enabled a high and increasing rate of technological advance, particularly in military fields. They have also developed a remarkably speedy cycle from research through to the quantity production of finished weapons.

10. Achievement and maintenance of technological superiority, both in the short-run and for an indefinite period of years, thus have become indispensable elements of the U.S. policies to deter general war and help deter local aggression; to maintain Free World leadership; and to provide the stability and progress in world affairs upon which genuine peace may be established. Failure to maintain technological superiority by the U.S. could result in loss of confidence by the Free World in U.S. technology and power; accelerated Soviet expansion geographically and economically; swing of important uncommitted nations into the Soviet orbit; defection of important countries now members of the Free World community; and attack on the U.S. at such time as Soviet military technology may achieve decisive superiority.

11. The scope, complexity and vital importance of the problem of maintaining technological superiority indicate the continuing need to utilize the best in scientific creative talents, both from within and without the government, in reaching for an adequate solution. An example of the value of this broad approach is the report of the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee of ODM.⁵ Further recognition of the scope of the problem would indicate the desirability of the President having a key Advisor who can assist in correlating and energizing the efforts within the Federal Government to analyze and act upon basic aspects of the problem, and who can keep the President informed on progress. The long-run problem reaches from the educational aspect which involves the very fabric of American society, through the efficient use of resources—money, men and facilities—into the complex of applied research, development and production. Thus the individual selected to advise the President with respect to these problems would need to be an exceptionally gifted individual with a broad, practical background in the scientific, educational and administrative fields. Moreover, his organizational relationship to the President and to the National Security Council should be clearly defined and effectively maintained in order that he may in fact provide the leadership in galvanizing all the resources of the government in the crucial contest for technological superiority.

[Here follow 37 pages listing 16 conclusions and recommendations.]

1. Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70, Basic Natonal Security Policy. Secret. Attached to a memorandum from two members of the ODM–Defense working group, John F. Hilliard, Deputy Assistant Director, Manpower, ODM, and Brigadier General Charles H. Bonesteel, III, USA, Defense Member,NSC Planning Board, to the Executive Secretary, NSC, dated December 21. The report was transmitted to the NSC Planning Board, under cover of a memorandum by Lay, dated December 21, for use by the Board in connection with its review of basic national security policy.
2. Not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.
3. See NSC Action Nos. 1433 and 1484, footnote 9, Document 34, and footnote 8, Document 45, respectively.
4. See Document 28.
5. Document 9.