Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

43. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• U.S. and Soviet Missiles

The Problem

1. In Action No. 1433 the National Security Council on September 8, 1955, “requested the Department of State to report to the Council, not later than December 1, 1955, on the foreign policy implications of a demonstration by the USSR that it had developed an intercontinental or a 1500-mile ballistic missile prior to the U.S. and an estimate of the extent to which U.S. achievement of a 1500-mile missile would counter the implications of a Soviet achievement of an ICBM or a 1500-mile missile.”

Discussion

2. The problem, as thus posed, calls for an evaluation of four alternative contingencies:

(a) the Soviets achieve a medium-range missile ahead of the U.S.;

(b) the U.S. and the Soviets simultaneously achieve a medium-range missile;

(c) the Soviets achieve an ICBM before the U.S. achieves a medium-range missile;

(d) the U.S. achieves a medium-range missile at the same time as the Soviets achieve an ICBM.

I. Effect of a 1500-mile Missile

A. Prior Soviet Achievement

3. The Soviet leaders will wish to avoid general war, at least so long as they believe that this might involve heavy nuclear attacks upon the U.S.S.R. They would, even after developing a 1500-mile missile, not take actions which they expected greatly to increase the risk of general war. Their view of the risks that would attach to specific Bloc actions might be altered, however, since they might expect U.S. leaders to be moved to caution by the view that prior Soviet development of a medium-range missile had somewhat worsened the relative U.S. power position. The Communists might thus embark on a somewhat more aggressive policy, which could increase the danger of war through miscalculation.

4. The first reaction on the part of free-world countries to prior Soviet development of a medium-range missile would probably be dismay at this evidence that the U.S.S.R. was capable of more rapid technological progress than the U.S. Present confidence in U.S. strength, which rests on a contrary assumption, would be impaired.

5. As time went on, increasing consideration would also be given to the potential effect of these missiles on Western Europe and Japan in the event of war. While most Japanese and Europeans already consider that their countries would be devastated in a war, this belief would be powerfully strengthened by Soviet possession of a megaton missile against which there was no defense and whose launching sites were practically invulnerable to attack. The fact that the West did not also have a weapon against which there was no defense, but would be relying on aircraft delivery against which some defense is possible could, at the same time, reduce confidence in the Western deterrent to Soviet attack.

6. Because of this increased fear of the consequences of war and reduced confidence in U.S. strength, groups which have been advocating a policy of greater independence from the U.S. would be encouraged, and many persons who have been tending in this direction would find rationalization at hand to warrant a more explicit shift. Some governments, for example in Japan, would find themselves under increasing pressure to modify their policies to reflect these trends in public opinion. The steps which they might take as a result would probably not involve major change in their basic policies, at least in the first instance, but might create frictions with the U.S. which could have a serious cumulative impact on relations between them and the U.S.

7. There would, in any event, almost certainly be increased resistance on the part of U.S. allies to any U.S. policies which were believed to carry risks of war. Some allied governments might also become more inclined to modify their positions on such issues as disarmament if they believe that an accommodation with the U.S.S.R. on these issues would significantly reduce the risk of war.

8. If these more independent allied attitudes and policies generated public pressures in the U.S. for a more unilateral U.S. policy, this would become evident to our allies. They might then feel that they could no longer depend on the U.S. and should reduce even further their ties with the U.S. Pressures for limiting U.S. base rights might begin to mount.

9. The U.S.S.R. could play skillfully upon this situation, by suggesting to U.S. allies that it would be possible to reach “reasonable” agreements with the Bloc and thus to re-orient their foreign policies away from the U.S. A conciliatory Communist posture might thus convince a considerable body of opinion in allied countries that it would be feasible to follow a middle course in the cold war and, in this way, surely to avoid the horrors which could now be visited on their countries in the event of war.

10. The cumulative effect of mutually reinforcing events in allied countries, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could thus be gravely to weaken the effectiveness of U.S. alliances. While present governments in most allied countries would probably continue to estimate that U.S. thermonuclear striking power remained adequate to deter Communist attack and would, therefore, maintain the alliances with the U.S. which enabled them to profit from that deterrent, the impact of the forces and events described above could render this connection increasingly tenuous.

11. If the Bloc’s foreign policy became somewhat more aggressive as a result of its achievement of a medium-range missile, some allied governments would begin to doubt that U.S. deterrent power was still effective. This would intensify the trend toward neutralism described above. If the Bloc took actions which made general war seem an imminent probability, the popular demand for accommodation in countries that were under direct pressures from the Bloc and for neutrality in other countries might well become irresistible. While this possibility would exist, at least to some extent, whether or not the Soviets had achieved a medium-range missile, it would be strengthened by this development.

B. Simultaneous U.S. and Soviet Achievement

12. If the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. both developed 1500-mile missiles, the Kremlin would probably consider that this altered the balance of power, potentially at least, to the Bloc’s disadvantage. For while the Bloc had only acquired the capability to destroy U.S. overseas bases and allies, the U.S. would have become able to strike at the centers of Communist power—if it could operate from launching sites on the Bloc’s periphery. The Bloc would try, probably by alternately “hard” and “soft” tactics, to persuade countries on its perphery not to permit such sites to be constructed. If these efforts failed, Communist leaders would probably estimate that they were entering upon a period of relative military inferiority which would last until their acquisition of an intercontinental missile. They might fear that this advantage would stimulate the U.S. to a greater willingness to risk war and feel, therefore, that they had to show even greater caution than at present if they were to avoid war. They would be unlikely, however, to surrender any of their present positions of strength, e.g., in the satellites or East Germany, to this end. They would expect such a surrender merely to strengthen U.S. power and to stimulate the U.S. to further demands, which would be more dangerous to Soviet security and more difficult peacefully to resist.

13. If the U.S. achieved a 1500-mile missile simultaneously with the U.S.S.R., free-world countries would be relieved that Soviet technology had not outstripped that of the U.S., but they would still be concerned at their own increased vulnerability. U.S. possession of a medium-range missile would not, in their view, reduce this vulnerability any more than the existence of SAC does now. The availability of U.S. medium-range missiles would, however, strengthen their confidence in the U.S. deterrent power. The trend toward neutralism would thus be less than if the Soviets alone had achieved a missile but greater than if neither side had achieved a missile.

14. Soviet efforts to dissuade free countries from granting missile bases to the U.S. would probably fail, since these countries would believe that they were maximizing the deterrent to war by allowing such bases to be placed on their territory. This would, of course, not be true if these countries believed that the Soviets were sufficiently in earnest to make war on them if they refused to heed its pressures. They would be less likely to believe any Soviet threats to this effect, and so more likely to grant base rights, in the event of simultaneous U.S. and Soviet achievement of a missile than in the event of prior Soviet achievement. If, on the other hand, the U.S. tried to exploit its achievement of a 1500-mile missile by adopting a tougher stance toward the U.S.S.R., most U.S. allies would probably be moved by their fear of war to seek a more neutral position in the East-West struggle.

II. Effect of Intercontinental Missile

A. Prior Soviet Achievement

15. The Soviet leaders would probably only initiate general war if they felt a high degree of certainty that the U.S.S.R. would not be exposed to nuclear devastation during its course. It seems unlikely that their possession of an ICBM would cause them to feel this degree of certainty. They would fear that sufficient SAC aircraft might survive a surprise attack, whether because they were dispersed or because they were already in the air, to permit the U.S. to retaliate on a very large scale against the U.S.S.R. The Soviet leaders would, therefore, probably only attempt to capitalize on free world reactions to their new capacities by a more aggressive foreign policy in so far as they thought that they could do this without precipitating a thermonuclear conflict.

16. If free world countries believed that Soviet achievement of an ICBM endangered the U.S. retaliatory capability, they would lose confidence in the U.S. deterrent. They might then be willing to break their alliances with the U.S. under extreme Soviet pressure, since they would fear that these alliances might stimulate rather than avert Soviet attack upon them.

17. If, as seems more likely in the light of the reasoning suggested in paragraph 15, free world countries did not believe that Soviet prior development of an ICBM endangered the U.S. retaliatory capability, they would react to this achievement much as they would to Soviet prior achievement of a medium-range missile—only more so. There would be one new element in their reactions, moreover: They could not help but wonder whether the U.S. willingness to act in their behalf would be reduced by the apparently greater U.S. vulnerability to nuclear attack. To the extent that the U.S.S.R. was able to exploit this doubt, there would be a greater likelihood that some nations, especially those on the periphery of the Bloc, would accede to Soviet pressures. But the course of events would depend so much on the ability of the U.S. to display a convincing determination not to be outbluffed and on the readiness of the U.S.S.R to go far in risking war that speculation of a particularized sort is probably idle.

18. One important variable would be the timing of the Soviet achievement. Its impact would naturally be less if it followed Soviet achievement of such air-nuclear capabilities as would enable the U.S.S.R. utterly to devastate the U.S. For, in this event, Soviet development of an ICBM would—like Soviet development of a medium-range missile—be generally taken to dramatize, rather than to alter basically, the existing situation. Even in this case, however, the strain on U.S. alliances and the trend toward neutralism would probably be greater, on account of the more explicit U.S. vulnerability to instant devastation, than if the Soviets had merely achieved a medium-range missile ahead of the U.S.

B. Simultaneous U.S. and Soviet Achievement

19. If the U.S. achieved a 1500-mile missile at the same time as the U.S.S.R. achieved an ICBM, the leaders of the Bloc would probably conclude that both sides had gained in something like equal proportions and that general war had been rendered vastly more destructive for them both. Their reaction to this situation would probably be along the same general lines as their reactions to a condition of “nuclear stalemate”, which might already have occurred. It would differ from their reaction to prior achievement of an ICBM principally in so far as differing free world reactions seemed to offer lesser opportunities for exploitation.

20. Free world countries would take a less discouraged view of U.S. technological capacities if the U.S. achieved a 1500-mile missile simultaneously with the Soviets than if the U.S.S.R. alone achieved such a missile. They would consider—like the Soviets—that U.S. achievement of a 1500-mile missile and Soviet development of an ICBM made war even more destructive than previously. The extent to which they would consider that this altered the U.S. situation would depend on the extent to which the Soviets had been generally believed, prior to their achievement of an ICBM, to possess the capability to devastate the U.S. Even if such a condition of apparent “nuclear stalemate” had already been believed to exist, however, free world countries might be concerned, at least for a while, lest U.S. or Soviet policy change as a result of the more explicit U.S. vulnerability.

Conclusions

21. Soviet prior achievement of a medium-range missile would greatly reduce the free world’s confidence in U.S. technological superiority and enhance its fears as to the consequences of war. While existing governments’ confidence in the deterrent effect of U.S. retaliatory capabilities would cause them to maintain their alliances with the U.S., they might be under increasing public pressure to adopt a posture which reflected greater independence of the U.S. This could lead them to take a number of steps, none of which would be of great importance individually but all of which taken together could suggest a somewhat more “third force” orientation in the cold war. U.S. allies would, furthermore, almost certainly be more vigorous than now in opposing U.S. policies which they believed to carry any risk of war. They might also be more willing to compromise their present positions on outstanding East-West issues if they believed that this would reduce the chances of war. If U.S. opinion pressed for a more unilateral policy in reaction to these allied attitudes, U.S. allies might wish to reduce even further their dependence on the U.S. The Soviets could hasten the resulting trend toward neutralism by a skillful combination of conciliatory tactics, intended to persuade U.S. allies that accommodation with the Bloc might be had on reasonable terms, and of aggressive gestures designed to emphasize that these countries’ alliances with the U.S. could involve them in war.

22. Simultaneous U.S. achievement of a medium-range missile would help to sustain confidence in U.S. strength but it would not prevent U.S. allies from feeling that they were more vulnerable than before to widespread devastation in the event of war. Trends toward neutralism or accommodation would thus be less than if the U.S.S.R. alone had achieved a missile but greater than if neither side had developed this weapon.

23. Prior Soviet achievement of an ICBM would have the same effects, on a somewhat different scale, as prior Soviet achievement of a medium-range missile. It would also raise doubts in the free world as to the U.S. willingness to resist—and hence the U.S. ability to deter— Communist peripheral expansion, in view of the increased U.S. vulnerability to instant devastation. U.S. alliances could probably still be maintained, unless U.S. inaction in the face of Communist pressure confirmed these doubts, but the threat to the cohesion of the Western coalition would be greater than under any other circumstances envisaged in this paper.

24. U.S. achievement of a medium-range missile at the same time as the U.S.S.R. achieved an ICBM, while leaving doubts as to U.S. willingness to risk ICBM attack by resisting local aggression, would strengthen free-world confidence in the U.S. retaliatory power. The effect of this circumstance on the cohesion of U.S. alliances would thus be somewhat less than that of a prior Soviet ICBM achievement.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records, ICBM Programs. Top Secret. On November 30, Bowie forwarded a copy of this study to the Secretary and the Under Secretary of State with a covering memorandum stating that it was prepared by the Policy Planning Staff and cleared in draft with EUR and FE. Preliminary drafts, internal memoranda, and records of staff meetings reveal that its primary author was Henry D. Owen and that it was based in part on an Office of Intelligence Research study prepared at Owen’s request. (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 66 D 70) The source text is not dated, but the Department of State record copy is dated November 29 and contains a handwritten marginal note that it was sent to Lay at the NSC on November 30 and used at the Council meeting on December 1. (Ibid.,S/P Record Copies, Jan.–Dec. 1955) Copies were sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Special Assistant to the President on Disarmament, the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget and of Central Intelligence and the Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.