Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

41. Editorial Note

At the 267th meeting of the National Security Council on November 21, Secretary Dulles gave an extensive oral briefing on his recent activities and his impressions on a wide range of foreign policy concerns. He discussed the Geneva and Foreign Ministers Conferences, his visits to Italy, Spain, and with Marshal Tito, and his survey of problems in the Near East. After his presentation, the meeting continued:

“After a brief pause, the President said that he had a few remarks to make on the subject of Western Europe. Smilingly he said that all the members of the Council realized that this area was one of his pets. Moreover, nearly all those present around this table had been engaged in work with large human organizations. Accordingly all knew the great value to be attached to the morale factor in large organizations. It was by working with the group that the individual achieved his greatest satisfaction and success. Secretary Dulles had just touched on NATO as an organization which U.S. policy should support harder than ever in view of the fact that Germany was not likely to be united for some time to come. Actually, said the President, the Secretary of State really underestimated the case he had made. The unity of Western Europe today, continued the President, would solve the peace of the world. A solid power mass in Western Europe would ultimately attract to it all the Soviet satellites, and the threat to peace would disappear.

“Continuing in this vein, the President said that there was one thing that all of those present could do as individuals to forward the objective he had just mentioned. Whenever occasion arose for any member of the National Security Council to talk in public about foreign policy, that talk should stress the great advantages of a more nearly united Europe—cultural, economic, moral, and otherwise. The President referred to his own speech, made on July 3, 1951, at the English Speaking Union in London, on the general subject of a United States of Europe. After that speech, the President said, he had gotten the warmest compliments of no less a person than Winston Churchill, who said that the speech, from the point of view of logic, was the best speech which had been delivered in this generation.

“At this point, with even greater emphasis the President repeated his view on the desirability of developing in Western Europe a third great power bloc, after which development the United States would be permitted to sit back and relax somewhat. To help to produce such a development it must be demonstrated to all the countries of Western Europe individually that each and every one would profit by the union of them all and that none would lose. The President cited the development of the American historical pattern as an illustration of the point he was making.

“Turning next to NATO specifically, the President exclaimed ‘For God’s sake let us not be stingy with an ally.’ We should, for instance, give our NATO allies the chance to use some of our modern weapons. Nike, for instance, should be made available, although, said the President laughingly, Nike was obsolete—but he didn’t wish to be quoted thereon. In point of fact, however, instead of being generous, we treat many of our NATO allies like stepchildren, and then expect them to turn around and commit themselves to fight with us. By such actions we cut our own throats. Our allies certainly ought to know more about our new weapons. Our policy was in great contrast to the generosity which the British had shown in sharing with us their discoveries about radar at the beginning of the second World War.

“General Twining pointed out to the President that we were making fairly good progress in carrying out the views which the President had just stated. Secretary Dulles said that of course we were inhibited from sharing our atomic weapons with our allies by our own legislation, though Secretary Dulles believed that we could do a lot more in other weapons fields than we are currently doing to share some of the benefits with our allies.

“After repeating once more his suggestion that at every opportunity in public statements and addresses the members of the National Security Council should stress support for the idea of European integration (but should clear their speeches with the Secretary of State), the President terminated this phase of the discussion and inquired whether any member of the Council had any other matters which he wished to bring up for discussion.

“Secretary Wilson said that he had a certain number of things to talk about, but he was not sure that this was the time to bring them up. Important budgetary decisions would have to be made in the next three weeks.

“The President, in response to Secretary Wilson’s statement, said that it would be well to bear in mind the old adage, ‘Be not the first by which the new is tried, nor yet the last to put the old aside.’ While, said the President, he could see a lot in what Secretary Wilson and Admiral Radford had said to him the last time they saw him in the hospital at Denver, he was still convinced that the Administration had the means at hand to make budgetary cuts in the Defense Department if we actually had the courage to go ahead and make these cuts. For example, continued the President, do we really need to have as much air and sea lift as we think we need to have in order to transport our forces rapidly to various trouble spots?

“Secretary Wilson then said that what troubled him with respect to our national security policy, was the fact that we had taken on such a ‘lot of losers’ as allies and clients—for example, Korea, Formosa, and Indochina. The Near East, in Secretary Wilson’s opinion, was on the contrary an area of real value to the United States which some day might become self-supporting.”

After some general discussion on the foreign aid item in the fiscal year 1957 budget, the Council turned to the budget of the Defense Department:

“Secretary Wilson then pointed out that he had tentatively given the Services a total Defense Department ceiling for the FY 1957 budget of $34 billion. The effect of this on the military services had been so explosive that it had almost brought down the Pentagon.

“The President said that of course the Council was aware of how anxious he was to balance the budget, but never, of course, at the cost of the welfare of the United States. Nevertheless, he could not overemphasize the importance to our national security itself of balancing the budget. It was obvious that there would be some tough decisions to make.

“Secretary Humphrey said that there was very little doubt that we were going to balance the budget this year; it was about next year that he was really worried. Director Hughes, with a smile, warned Secretary Humphrey that if he was careless and let another billion slip into the 1956 expenditures, the budget for this year would not be balanced. The President inquired whether it was not likely that the Treasury’s income would continue to go up. Secretary Humphrey replied that this was somewhat difficult to say.

“The President then turned to General Twining and said that he wished to put a question to him. What exactly did General Twining think of the value of the seaward extensions of our early warning line for continental defense? General Twining replied that he thought these extensions were ‘pretty vital now’. The President expressed some skepticism of the value of these extensions, and noted the extremely high cost of developing them.” (Memorandum of discussion by Gleason; Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records)

After more discussion on foreign aid programs, the Council adopted NSC Action No. 1480. As a result of the President’s comments on Western Europe, NSC Action No. 1480–b, approved by the President on December 1, was formally recorded as follows:

“Noted the President’s expressed conviction that European integration, with West Germany playing a part, would be a major contribution to world peace; that a unified Europe (achieved by strengthening and expanding into other areas the concepts of NATO, the Brussels Pact, and the Coal and Steel Community) would constitute a focus of power, in addition to the U.S. and USSR, which would greatly advance the material and moral well-being of European peoples and the security interests of the United States; that encouragement of this concept in speeches by Council participants would be an appropriate way of seeking the objective of European integration.” (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)