160. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, November 11, 1957, 5 p.m.1
OTHERS PRESENT
- Secretary McElroy
- Secretary Quarles
- General Goodpaster
Mr. McElroy said that the Defense budget had been prepared on a basis of guidelines for $38 billion totals for NOA and for expenditures. Service allocations are $8.6 billion for the Army, $10.5 billion for the Navy, and $18.1 billion for the Air Force, with $0.8 billion for Department-wide activities. Beginning and end strength personnel figures for FY 59, in thousands, are, for the Army 900 and 850, for the Navy 645 and 630, for the Marines 188 and 170, and for the Air Force 875 and 850, for a total of 2.5 million personnel.
The President recalled that part of the theory in going down to 2.5 million was that through increased compensation, and resulting better reenlistment rates, we could save on training establishments. Mr. McElroy recalled that we have not provided the increased compensation as yet, and it is not included in the $38 billion. He said there are several areas, including this one, where it seemed that we should do something over and above the $38 billion. These would include $700 million next year for the Cordiner program,2 which he considered should be phased in over a four-year period, and for a 6% average increase for civilians, for those military personnel receiving less than that under the Cordiner proposals, and for retired personnel. Mr. McElroy said he had not provided for increases in prices for procurement that might occur. Also, he had provided for development of missiles on a research basis, but not for maximum procurement. This seemed generally reasonable in that we have not reached this point in our deployment plans, in the proving out of the weapons, or in negotiations with allies. However, he thought we could assume successful development of the IRBM as of a certain date, and successful negotiations by that date, and safely go ahead with a scheduled buildup of operational capability. For the Jupiter/Thor, he thought we should aim at a schedule to attain cumulative strengths of one squadron (of 15 missiles) in 1959, 4 in 1960, 8 in 1961, 12 in 1962, and 16 in 1963. To do this would require $150 million additional in FY 59. With regard to the Polaris, by accepting 85% of design performance we could markedly [Page 663] accelerate the program. This would involve $135 million additional in FY 59 for development costs, and $250 million NOA additional for two missile submarines, each with 16 missiles.
To carry forward, and accelerate, SAC dispersal, and reduction of reaction time, including alert and other measures, he would like to add about $200 million to the $100 million now in the program for these purposes.
In the area of satellite development, $100 million is included in the Air Force budget for work on the reconnaissance satellite. He felt that we should set up an additional $100 million for space development, including a manned missile.
He also had a proposal for increased antisubmarine capabilities, since we think that if we block off a big war we may need the means for a smaller one. No specific figure was mentioned and there did not seem to be consensus as to the priority of this project.
The President said he has a growing suspicion that the carrier has about run its course. He thinks that the atomic missile submarines make a great deal of sense but that the carrier may be passing to a lower level of significance. He recognized that great controversy and protest must be expected on this. He accepted that we will need carriers against certain types of attack but felt that the threat to them of the ICBM with hydrogen weapons is very great. The carrier forces require a great expanse of sea for their operations, and cannot be hidden in the Mediterranean. Hence, they would be immediately vulnerable to destruction. He said he asks himself the question constantly what the guided missile substitutes for. He feels it takes the place of artillery and manned bombers, but does not displace them completely. As of now he feels that the big bomber is the greatest deterrent to major war, and feels the same about the carrier, but considers that this is phasing out.
Mr. McElroy commented that in a situation like Syria or other crises in the Orient, people are very greatly impressed by a carrier show of force. The President raised the question of the life of our present carriers. He thought they should be good for something like another 15 years if simply modernized and kept up to date. He did not see valid reason for laying down any new carriers, and felt the old ones could be used for the missions requiring carriers.
The President said he thought the two most important things in the additional proposals were the pay increase and the proposal for dispersal and alert of SAC, including hangars and extra crews. He said there are several things we must do—we must keep SAC alert and dispersed, we must keep up our 15 carriers, and we must build submarines. He asked what the future level of annual outlay for the IRBMs would be if the additional funds now proposed were provided—would the costs not go up and up or would they remain the same as FY 59. [Page 664] Mr. Quarles said they would keep at about the same level as FY 59. The President stressed that there is nothing sacrosanct about the $38 billion figure, and that he thought allowances could and should be made for important additional programs. He asked whether Mr. McElroy is putting the reconnaissance satellite and the further satellite research and development under one man at the Defense level, and Mr. McElroy said this is what they are considering.
The President then went on to say that if Defense gets these additions they must be prepared to give up such things as excessive executive aircraft, etc. He thought they could certainly find $600 million or more this way. Then he felt we could do what needs to be done for approximately $39 billion or $39.5 billion. If the budget were carefully prepared he thought we could defend a budget that stays below $40 billion.
Mr. McElroy said there is also some question as to whether we can do what the military authorities think we should do in NATO and in Korea with the reduced force strengths. The President thought considerable reductions can be made through streamlining, but that we cannot reduce our combat units there (referring to Army units). Mr. McElroy said he may wish to ease up some on the Army manpower cuts in Europe and Korea, perhaps allowing 20,000 additional personnel for this purpose.
He said he would put the figures up to the NSC on the basis of a $38 billion budget. The President said he should then say what he thought might be the deficiencies—such as SAC dispersal and alert; improved pay; acceleration of missiles (which he is prepared to accept, but which he does not want to go beyond his and Mr. McElroy’s own good judgment). Mr. McElroy said the proposal for missile acceleration does not seem excessive as a pace. The President said the reconnaissance satellite could be added, and then there should be a balancing off of some savings, perhaps resulting in a budget of about $39.5 billion.
Secretary Quarles thought it might be well to let the Chiefs and the Secretaries present some of the needs, and the President accept them. The President said he would accept such a procedure, but is really working for the time when the Department comes in with a unified plan. He would like to see the Chiefs come in agreed on the priorities for additions; for example, they ought to agree on SAC dispersal, Cordiner proposals, etc.
Brigadier General, USA
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries. Secret. Drafted by Goodpaster on November 16. Another summary of this meeting is in a memorandum from Goodpaster to Cutler, dated November 13. (Ibid., Staff Secretary Records, Cutler)↩
- See footnote 3, Document 145.↩