Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

156. Memorandum of Discussion at the 343d Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, November 7, 1957¹

Washington, November 7, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Active and Passive Measures to Protect the Civil Population (NSC 5408; NSC 5606; NSC Actions Nos. 1642, 1691, 1760 and 1776; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Civil Defense Legislative Program for FY 1958”, dated January 3, 1957; NSC 5709; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “A Federal Shelter Program for Civil Defense”, dated July 2 and August 14, 1957; NSC Action No. 1811)²

General Cutler opened the meeting by noting that at its meeting last week,³ the NSC heard reports on three of the four studies called for by the Council’s action of April 4, 1957 relating to various aspects of a Federal Shelter Program.⁴ He indicated that, with those studies as background, the Council would hear a presentation today of a study made over a period of several months by the Security Resources Panel of ODM’s Science Advisory Committee, which study deals with the relative value of various active and passive measures to protect the civil population in case of nuclear attack and its aftermath, taking into account probable new weapons systems.

Thereafter he noted that today’s presentation was for information and discussion purposes only; that the Council was not being asked to take action thereon today; that later copies of the Panel’s report⁵ would be circulated for study, comment, and recommendation by the responsible departments and agencies.

General Cutler noted that each of the attendants at the meeting had been furnished with a copy of today’s program, which includes a list of the individuals who worked on the project, and with a copy of CIA’s “Current Appraisal of the Civil Defense Shelter Program in the USSR.”(Copies of these documents are incorporated in the Minutes of the meeting and attached to this Memorandum.)⁶

General Cutler then introduced Mr. Robert C. Sprague, Director of the Security Resources Panel. Mr. Sprague reviewed the highlights and major recommendations of the Panel’s report. (A copy of the Panel’s report is in the Minutes of the meeting.)⁷

Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and member of the Security Resources Panel, next provided the Council with an oral presentation of the highlights of the Panel report dealing with Active Defense.

Professor Wiesner was followed by Mr. William Webster, New England Electric System and member of the Security Resources Panel, who made an oral presentation on the highlights of the Panel report dealing with shelters.

Dr. Robert D. Calkins, President of the Brookings Institution and member of the Security Resources Panel, next provided an oral presentation of Costs and Feasibility of the recommendations made in the Panel report.

Mr. William C. Foster, Olin-Mathieson Chemical Corporation and member of the Security Resources Panel, then made an oral presentation on the elements of the Panel report relating to Management and Organization.

Mr. Foster and Mr. Sprague offered brief concluding remarks on behalf of all of the members of the Security Resources Panel.

At the conclusion of the formal presentation General Cutler asked Mr. Robert Lovett, as a member of the Advisory Panel, if he would say a word. Mr. Lovett replied that while he had no authority to speak for these old “re-treads” on the Panel, he believed that all of them certainly agreed that the report which had been presented was a very competent job. Moreover, the conclusions had been forced upon the members of the group against their own liking and inclination. Their conclusions presented a grim picture but there was light at the end of the tunnel. There was a solution. This was cold comfort but nevertheless comfort. While Mr. Lovett saw nothing too desperate in our present situation, it was clear that urgency of U.S. action was very real indeed.

The President commented that he was extremely sorry that insufficient time had been provided for discussion and clarification of the Security Resources Panel’s conclusions. Had time permitted, for example, he would have liked to explore further the views of the Panel on the organization of the Department of Defense. He was inclined to believe there was much to be said for the Panel’s recommendation that the Office of Defense Mobilization and the Federal Civil Defense Agency be consolidated. Since there was so little time for discussion the President added that we would want to call on the members of the Security Resources Panel and the Advisory Group in the future. The President then went on to further exploration of certain matters. What he asked, can the American people be expected to put up with in terms of the allocation of the Gross National Product over the next several years? Was the Panel proposing to impose controls on the U.S. economy now? After all, this Administration had gotten rid of controls on the economy as soon as it came into office because of its conviction that in the absence of controls the American economy would develop more rapidly. Are we now to advocate the re-introduction of controls? Enlarging on a comment made in the course of the presentation about the 38-billion-dollar ceiling on the Defense Department program, the President reminded those present that he had urged upon the Congress appropriations amounting to 39.5 billion rather than 38 billion. In spite of a number of meetings with members of Congress on the budget, in spite of the fact that he had gone on television to urge the validity of his proposed appropriation, Congress had nevertheless cut the figure.

The President added that in the light of what had been presented at the Council meeting today it was essential that we neither become panicked nor allow ourselves to be complacent. It was necessary urgently to make an economic, psychological, and political survey of what could and should be done. In this context, perhaps the advent of Sputnik had been helpful. The President added that we certainly did not wish to appear frightened and he had received information today indicating that fear had pervaded the population of the United States. The President believed that we could correct this situation. The problem was whether we could correct the tendency of every American to try to get the maximum for himself out of the operation of our free economy. If we are going to have to use controls on the economy, we had better impose them promptly.

General Cutler then suggested that the Council hear from Mr. McCloy, likewise a member of the Advisory Panel. Mr. McCloy stated that although the figures presented in Mr. Webster’s presentation were indeed impressive, particularly in terms of the human lives which might be saved by a fall-out shelter program, he still had some reservations with respect to the usefulness of the shelter program. With respect to the question of the imposition of controls on the economy, Mr. McCloy doubted that further controls would be needed in order to carry out the improvement of SAC and our air defense capabilities along the lines recommended by the Panel. With respect to the shelter program (which presumably in Mr. McCloy’s opinion might involve the necessity for controls), he suggested that he would like to think further about this matter before reaching a decision. He also pointed out that he had himself not personally been to the Headquarters of the Strategic Air Command and accordingly he was obliged to take the word of others who had been as to the vulnerability of SAC. However, if SAC were in fact vulnerable, it must certainly be made invulnerable. It was also Mr. McCloy’s impression that shortcomings in the process of decision-making and inter-service rivalries were acting as a brake on the progress of our defense effort. Whether or not this was actually the case, the American public certainly believed it to be.

In conclusion Mr. McCloy pointed out that even if the Administration carried out all the defense recommendations proposed by the Security Resources Panel, the United States would still find itself in a situation of instability from the point of view of the political and foreign policy sides of the problem. Our present situation called for an imaginative domestic political program and an imaginative foreign policy.

The President indicated his inclination to agree with Mr. McCloy’s comments on inter-service rivalries and the decision-making process in the Department of Defense. He then referred to the great difficulties which he was encountering in preparation for his speech over television this evening.⁸ There were so many details to be considered for inclusion in the speech that it was extremely hard to see how they could be fitted in while at the same time meeting the required emphasis and the changing situation.

The President then stated that he wished Secretary Dulles to speak to the Council on the effects of some of the Panel’s recommendations on our foreign policy and on the attitude of our Allies. The President was concerned about the effect of the development by the United States of a great shelter program when our Allies would have no such program themselves.

Secretary Dulles commented that in his last remark the President had already suggested what he, Secretary Dulles, wanted to say. The presentation by the Security Resources Panel had dealt with one aspect of the problem facing the United States, namely, the military problem, but the military aspect was only one part of the problem and problem must be viewed in its entirety. Our struggle against the Soviet Union was not solely military nor were the results of the struggle dependent wholly on the military measures taken by the United States. It should be remembered that the Soviet Union had made its greatest gains in terms of taking over other peoples and other areas during the years from 1945 to 1950 when the United States was more powerful than it had ever been before in peacetime and the USSR had not made any appreciable gains even though they now had great nuclear capabilities and general military capacity.

As to the impact on our Allies of the United States embarking on a great shelter program, Secretary Dulles thought that if we were to do so and our Allies could not do the same, we could surely write off all of our European Allies. It might be argued theoretically that the United States as the arsenal of the Free World requires the protection of shelters but to say that the American people must be saved from the effects of radiation and not the British and the French and the others was tantamount to losing our Allies.

Secretary Dulles then returned to the point that our struggle with the Soviet Union and international communism was not just a military struggle. Up to now it has been primarily a cold war. Accordingly, there was great danger that we should so focus our eyes on the military aspects of the struggle that we lose the cold war which is actually being waged, forgetting that an actual military conflict may never be waged. The Soviet Union could make enormous gains in the economic struggle between us if the United States devotes so much of its resources to military measures and shelter programs that no resources remain for waging and winning the cold war.

Secretary Dulles concluded by emphasizing that one point made by the Panel he most emphatically endorsed. The United States must maintain a deterrent capability, a capacity to damage the USSR to such a degree that the Soviets will be unwilling to start a war. This capability we must preserve at all costs. With such a deterrent capability, together with the resources needed to wage the cold war, we would be in a position to conduct our foreign policy in such a manner as to assure victory in the cold war.

The President commented that if those present were a group sitting in the Kremlin, we would probably adopt the recommendations and program of the Security Resources Panel in toto, regardless of the effect of such action on our people. As it was, however, we could not do this. We have before us a big job of molding public opinion as well as of avoiding extremes. We must get the American public to understand that we are confronting a tough problem but one that we can lick. The President concluded by pointing out that as consideration of the Panel’s report proceeded, we would want to be talking again with the members of the Panel who had drawn up this report.

Thereafter General Cutler outlined in a general way what he thought would be suitable Council action with respect to the Panel’s report.

At the conclusion of the meeting the President said he believed it would be interesting to make a test to find out how long the matters which had come before the Council this morning could be kept secret.

He also said that he could not thank the Security Resources Panel and its Advisory Group enough for the marvelous piece of work they had done.

General Cutler then requested the Statutory Members of the National Security Council and certain others, including Messrs. Sprague and Foster, to join the President in his office for a brief time. (See Attached for List of those attending this meeting.)⁹

S. Everett Gleason

At the meeting in the President’s office, after the regular meeting of the National Security Council,¹⁰ Mr. Sprague presented orally highly classified information which he had received from Headquarters, Strategic Air Command on the following subjects:

(1) The relatively small number of SAC planes which (on a recent date when SAC was not in one of its various states of Alert) could have taken off on an attack strike within the probable tactical warning time. Mr. Sprague said that SAC, since the date in question, had made improvements in the number of planes which could take off but that this was a vulnerability which needed to be corrected urgently.

(2) The increased Soviet defenses which made it more difficult for any given number of SAC planes to reach Soviet targets. This difficulty was somewhat offset by the fact that even if SAC planes were intercepted over Soviet territory before reaching their targets, their nuclear weapons would still be detonated and cause fall-out on the USSR.

Mr. Sprague explained that he presented this information as an explanation in support of the recommendations by the Security Resources Panel as to the urgent need for reducing SAC vulnerability and improving SAC reaction time.

After Mr. Sprague had answered a question by Secretary Dulles in elaboration of his oral statement, the President thanked Mr. Sprague and Mr. Foster and the meeting adjourned without further discussion.

James S. Lay, Jr.

The National Security Council:¹¹

a. Noted and discussed the Report to the President, prepared by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee pursuant to NSC Action No. 1691–b–(2), on “Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age”.¹²

b. Requested the heads of the departments and agencies designated below (in appropriate coordination in each case with the heads of the other interested departments and agencies indicated in parentheses) to study the conclusions indicated and to submit initial comments and recommendations to the Council through the NSC Planning Board on or before December 15, 1957, with respect thereto:

(1) The Secretary of State:

(a) Page 11, paragraph IV–C–1: Pooling economic, technological and political resources with allies. (Defense, ODM, AEC)

(b) Page 11, paragraph IV–C–3: Measures to assure uncommitted nations. (Defense, ICA)

(2) The Secretary of Defense:

(a) Page 6, paragraph III–A–1: Lessening SAC vulnerability to Russian bomber attack.

(b) Page 6, paragraph III–A–2: Lessening SAC vulnerability to Russian ICBM attack.

(c) Pages 6, 7, paragraph III–A–3: Increasing strategic offensive power.

(d) Page 7, paragraph III–A–4: Augmenting forces for limited military operations. (State)

(e) Page 7, paragraph III–B–1: Eliminating weaknesses in our active defenses.

(f) Pages 7–8, paragraph III–B–2: Further strengthening active defenses.

(g) Page 8, paragraph III–B–4: Developing area defense against ICBM’s.

(h) Page 8, paragraph III–B–5: R&D program for improved antisubmarine effort and for defense against submarine-launched missiles.

(i) Pages 9-10, paragraph IV–A: Changes in organization of Defense Department. (Budget)

(j) Page 11, paragraph IV–C–2: Supplying nuclear weapons to NATO. (State, AEC)

(3) The Director, Bureau of the Budget:

Page 10, paragraph IV–A: Responsibilities of ODM, FCDA, Defense, ana local governments for protection of civil population. (Defense, ODM, FCDA)

(4) The Director of Central Intelligence:

Page 10, paragraph IV–B: Strategic warning and intelligence. (IAC)

(5) The Federal Civil Defense Administrator:

Page 8, paragraph III–B–3: Nationwide fallout shelter program. (State, Defense, ODM,AEC)

c. Requested the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, to submit to the Council through the NSC Planning Board, on or before December 15, 1957, initial comments and recommendations on “Costs and Economic Consequences” (pages 11–13, paragraph V).

d. Noted that the NSC Planning Board would consolidate the responses by the various departments and agencies to the Panel Recommendations into a single report for consideration by the Council.¹³

e. Pending the receipt of the initial comments and recommendations requested in b and c above, requested the Secretary of Defense, in making his presentations to the Council on U.S. Military Programs for FY 1959, to indicate the extent to which the conclusions in the Report will or could be implemented in the FY 1959 programs.

Note: The subject Report subsequently circulated as NSC 5724.

The actions in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted for implementation as follows:

• b-(1): The Secretary of State
• b-(2): The Secretary of Defense
• b-(3): The Director, Bureau of the Budget
• b-(4): The Director of Central Intelligence
• b-(5): The Federal Civil Defense Administrator

The action in c above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers.

The action in e above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense.

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on November 8.
2. For references to NSC 5408, NSC 5606, NSC 5709,NSC Action No. 1642, and the January 3 memorandum, see footnote 2, Document 114. NSC Actions No. 1760, approved by the President on August 5, and 1776, approved by the President on August 23, are not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) The July 2 and August 14 memoranda are not printed. (Ibid., S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5709 Memoranda) NSC Action No. 1811, approved by the President on October 31, is not printed. (Ibid., S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
3. The memorandum of discussion of this meeting is not printed. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File,NSC Records)
4. See Document 114.
5. The Gaither Report was circulated as NSC 5724, Document 158.
6. Not attached but filed in the minutes of the meeting.
7. The report is filed in the minutes of the meeting.
8. See Document 159.
9. The attached list, not printed, indicates that the following attended this meeting: President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles, McElroy, Gray, Strauss, Quarles, Douglas, Twining, White, Allen Dulles, Cutler, Goodpaster, Sprague, Foster, and Lay.
10. The following summary was drafted by Lay. A memorandum of conference with the President of this meeting, drafted by Goodpaster on November 7, is in the Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries.
11. Paragraphs a–e and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1814, approved by the President on November 8. (Department of State,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
12. The page and paragraph references below refer to this report, subsequently circulated as NSC 5724, Document 158.
13. Agency comments and recommendations were consolidated by the NSC Planning Board into a single summary report, NSC 5724/1, dated December 16. Regarding NSC 5724/1, see Document 155.