Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

114. Memorandum of Discussion at the 318th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 4, 1957¹

Washington, April 4, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. A Federal Shelter Program for Civil Defense (NSC 5408; NSC 5606; NSC Action No 1642; Cabinet Paper 56–32/1, dated December 21, 1956; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Civil Defense Legislative Program for FY 1958”, dated January 3, 1957; SNIE 100–5–57; NSC 5709)²

In the course of his briefing of the National Security Council on NSC 5709, Mr. Cutler emphasized paragraph 6, which contained a number of important considerations on the over-all problem of protecting the civilian population which had deeply troubled the Planning Board. (A copy of Mr. Cutler’s briefing note is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)³ He also read the recommendations of the Planning Board as set forth in paragraph 7 of NSC 5709, and concluded with a summary of Special National Intelligence Estimate 100–5–57 on the foreign reaction to the adoption by the United States of a large-scale shelter program. At the conclusion of his briefing, Mr. Cutler called on the Director of Defense Mobilization for his comments.

Mr. Gray said that the shelter program was one in a whole range of problems of the non-military defense of the continental United States. He believed that members of the Executive Branch, as well as members of Congress, had taken a “spotty approach” to the problem of shelter up to the present time. Some of these individuals took a shelter program very seriously; others dismissed it out of hand. Mr. Gray said that he personally took all such measures of non-military defense very seriously, because he believed that these measures constituted a genuine deterrent to war by the Soviet Union. In any event, it was clear to Mr. Gray, he said, that we need forthright policy with respect to shelter, whereas at the present time we are at a kind of halfway point between a policy calling for evacuation of target areas and a policy of providing shelter. It was also clear to Mr. Gray that up until the present time most of us had had an “all or nothing” approach to the problem of shelter against nuclear attack; that is, we tended to say that if we cannot afford to spend $32 billion (as advocated by the FCDA shelter program), there was no point in spending anything on a shelter program. Accordingly, Mr. Gray endorsed the Planning Board’s recommendations for the development of studies which would get the relevant facts together. Mr. Gray said that the Science Advisory Committee of ODM was very willing to undertake the study assigned to it in the recommendations of the Planning Board in NSC 5709. However, the Committee was not sure that it would be able to complete the study that was called for by the suggested date of July 1, 1957.

On a narrower point, Mr. Gray said, he personally felt that it had been a great mistake to permit the erection of new Federal Government buildings without any provision in them for shelter. The reasons for this lapse, he thought, was that no one has been assigned the authority to direct the inclusion of shelters, and he accordingly recommended that the President assign such authority somewhere in the Executive Branch. Mr. Gray concluded his comments by supporting the recommendations set forth by the Planning Board in NSC 5709.

Mr. Cutler then called on the Federal Civil Defense Administrator for his views.

Governor Peterson expressed himself as in thorough agreement with the Planning Board’s recommendations in NSC 5709, and stated his belief that in studying the feasibility of a shelter program we should proceed very slowly and with deliberation. However, with respect to all the different cost estimates for the several shelter programs that had been mentioned (his own, that of Dr. Teller, and that of the Naval Radiological Laboratory), Governor Peterson said he was obliged to point out that there are about ten different cost components in any shelter program. The total cost figure, therefore, depended on how many of these cost components were included in the total estimate. He cited as examples whether the cost components included the provision of food and water in the shelters, the provision of bedding, medical supplies, etc., etc.. Accordingly, no one really has a very clear idea of what any given shelter program will ultimately cost.

Governor Peterson also suggested that the Council bear in mind what alternatives are open to us if we have or do not have a shelter program. It was certainly the feeling of FCDA that if any shelter program were undertaken it should proceed slowly and deliberately. FCDA also was strongly in favor of dual-use shelters; for example, shelters which might serve as underground garages in the event that they were never put to use for their primary purpose of shelter from nuclear attack.

With respect to our previous policy of evacuation of our people from target areas, Governor Peterson pointed out that this policy had been proposed and adopted before we realized the full magnitude of the problem of radioactive fallout. In the present circumstances it was, of course, foolish to talk about tactical evacuation of a target area; although if strategic warning were available we could certainly “thin out” our cities in advance of the attack.

In concluding, Governor Peterson said he had one more thing to say. While he clearly realized the fiscal implications of a large-scale shelter program, no one could tell him that the United States could not afford to spend $3.2 billion each year for ten years for a shelter program if securing the shelter program really meant the survival of the United States in the event of a nuclear attack.

Mr. Cutler said he wanted to be sure that the Council understood that the NSC Planning Board had neither taken a position against nor in favor of a shelter program. The Planning Board was merely convinced that it needed a great deal more information on the subject before it could make an informed recommendation to the Council. Mr. Cutler then asked the Secretary of State for his views.

Secretary Dulles said that it struck him that any such extensive shelter program would be extremely costly. In his opinion, we would obtain a much more effective defensive capability if we added the money which such a shelter program would cost to the budget of the Department of Defense in order that it might be used to increase our deterrent military capabilities.

Mr. Cutler then called on the Acting Secretary of the Treasury for any comments which he might wish to make on NSC 5709.

Secretary Burgess⁴ replied that he had no comment to make except to state that the Treasury would be happy to undertake the study suggested for it in paragraph 7–d of NSC 5709. But he had serious doubts whether any “tricks” that could be devised in such a study would save the Government from assuming most of the burden of the cost of a shelter program.

When asked for his views, Acting Secretary of Defense Robertson stated that he agreed in general with the position of Secretary Dulles. He believed that large expenditures devoted to a shelter program would tend to undermine our military deterrent to a Soviet attack by taking away money needed to maintain and develop the deterrent. He did feel, however, that shelters should be built in new industrial plants and in new Government buildings.

Mr. Cutler then explained to the Council the serious dilemma that the Administration would find itself in if, when the issue finally became clear, the Administration had nothing to say one way or another with respect to a shelter program. This would put the Administration in an indefensible position.

Secretary Dulles replied that he did not believe that it would be “indefensible” to tell the American public plainly that there was no really effective (passive) protection against nuclear attack on the continental United States. After all, we have had to acknowledge that we have been wrong in adopting a policy which called for the evacuation of target areas. Secretary Dulles repeated his view that the best way to spend our resources and direct our efforts was on active measures of deterrence, so that we could be sure that the enemy would not dare to attack. Thus, if there must be a choice between static defense measures and active measures to deter attack, there was no real choice, and this fact would be readily understood by the American people. Secretary Dulles added that he thought there would be some use in a program which called for the inclusion of shelters in newly-erected public buildings, but he reiterated his opposition to any large-scale shelter program.

The President, turning to Secretary Dulles, asked him to suppose a situation in which, ten years from now, the United States and the USSR each had obtained all the hydrogen weapons it could wish. Suppose also that one of the two protagonists was ready to dig in and stick out a nuclear war, whereas the other protagonist was not. The side which had the shelters to take refuge in was likely to win the war after the initial exchange of nuclear blows. Nevertheless, the President added that he leaned toward Secretary Dulles’ views for the moment at least, although this matter of shelters was a very serious problem. The President added that, as he had been saying for the last five years, war is currently coming to such a state that it is no longer war in any traditional sense, but rather a contest between death and survival. This was the consideration which had earlier induced him to call together the panel of scientist and scholars who made the study of the Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development.⁵ The President added that he thought that the studies called for in paragraph 7 of NSC 5709 should be undertaken as a matter of urgency, but leaving to Mr. Cutler and the Planning Board the determination of the precise dates for the completion of these studies.

Admiral Radford added the comment that he had seen an advance copy of the British White Paper on the problem of the defense of Britain in a nuclear war.⁶ The British reasoning was along the lines earlier suggested by Secretary Dulles. The British felt that they could not afford both an elaborate passive defense program as well as a program which called for building an active deterrent to nuclear attack. Accordingly, in the White Paper they had come out strongly in support of the deterrent program for the defense of the British Isles.

The National Security Council:⁷

a. Noted and discussed the interim report on the subject contained in NSC 5709, prepared by the NSC Planning Board.

b. Concurred in the recommendation of the NSC Planning Board that the following studies be made for presentation through the Planning Board to the Council on or before the dates below mentioned:

(1) A study by a Committee representing FCDA (Chairman), ODM,AEC, and the Department of Defense, of significantly different shelter programs (not to exceed five), the percentage of the civil population which would be protected by each, the degree of protection of the civil population afforded by each, and the material requirements and approximate costs of each. (July 1, 1957)⁸

(2) A study by the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization as to the relative value of various active and passive measures to protect the civil population in case of nuclear attack and its aftermath, taking into account probable new weapons systems. (September 15, 1957)⁹

(3) A study by the Council of Economic Advisers of the broad economic effects and consequences of the various alternative shelter programs defined under (1) above. (August 15, 1957)¹⁰

(4) A study by the Treasury Department of the types of Federal financial assistance to private industry and individuals (including consideration of grants, loans and tax incentives), to stimulate construction of shelters under the various alternative shelter programs defined under (1) above, and the estimated cost to the Federal Government of such incentives. (August 15, 1957)¹¹

c. Agreed that, pending receipt of the study now under way under FCDA auspices relative to the Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development, it is not necessary that further study be made on the psychological aspects of the problem.

d. Agreed that, because the foreign reaction as estimated in SNIE 100–5–57 is not of sufficient impact to be determinant in whether or not to adopt the FCDA proposal, no additional study on this subject is necessary.

Note: See following extra page.¹²

[Here follow agenda items 2–6.]

Note (for Item 1): The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted for implementation to the appropriate agencies as follows: (1) FCDA, ODM, AEC, Defense; (2) ODM; (3) CEA; (4) Treasury. The President directed General John S. Bragdon, Special Assistant,¹³ to consult with the Committee preparing the study directed by b–(l) above, and with the CEA in preparing the study directed by b–(3) above.

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on April 5.
2. For text of NSC 5408, “Continental Defense,” dated February 11, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 609. NSC 5606, “Continental Defense,” is not printed, but see Document 81. Regarding NSC Action No. 1642, see footnote 9, Document 100. Cabinet Paper 56–32/1, dated December 21, 1956, summarized Cabinet discussion on a civil defense legislative program. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Cabinet Papers) The January 3 memorandum is filed in the minutes. SNIE 100–5–57 is printed as Document 111. NSC 5709, “A Federal Shelter Program for Civil Defense,” dated March 29, is not printed. (Department of State,S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5709 Memoranda)
3. The briefing note is filed in the minutes.
4. W. Randolph Burgess, Under Secretary of the Treasury.
5. See Document 96.
6. A copy of the British White Paper, entitled “Outline of Future Policy,” published on April 4, is in Department of State, Central Files, 741.5/4–557. It was printed in The New York Times, April 5, 1957, p. 4.
7. Paragraphs a–d and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1691, approved by the President on April 8. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
8. Report to the National Security Council by the Special Committee on Shelter Programs, dated July 1, is ibid.,S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5709 Memoranda.
9. In a memorandum to Gordon Gray, dated May 6, Cutler requested that “the scope of the study by the Science Advisory Committee be extended to take into account the subject of ‘Urban Redevelopment,’ an area which was recommended for inclusion in a comprehensive study of civil defense measures recently proposed by the President’s Committee on Government Organization,” also known as the Rockefeller Committee. (Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, Civil Defense) Cutler’s memorandum confirmed arrangements that the Science Advisory Committee would undertake the study of urban redevelopment, as discussed in memoranda from David Z. Beckler to Gray, May 2, and Gray to Cutler, May 6. (Ibid.) The full study was conducted by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science Advisory Committee. The panel, initially chaired by H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., Chairman of the Board, Ford Foundation, was commonly referred to as the Gaither Committee. See Document 155.
10. The CEA report, “Economic Implications of Alternative Shelter Programs,” dated August 14, is in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5709 Memoranda.
11. The Treasury report, “Financing a Shelter Program,” dated August 14, is ibid.
12. The note, which was probably inadvertently omitted when the document was typed, was subsequently added as a separate page. It is printed below.
13. Major General John S. Bragdon, USA (ret.), Special Assistant to the President.