Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

131. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

Washington, July 16, 1957

SUBJECT

• Force Tabs for JSOP 61²

I forward herewith the divergent views of the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force and of the Chief of Naval Operations, together with a memorandum by the Commandant of the Marine Corps on this subject.³ You will note that these submissions were prepared on a basis of expenditures for the Department of Defense of $39 billion rather than $38 billion. Since their views are in disagreement at the higher figure, I feel little purpose would be served to ask them to rework their submissions until they are given further guidance.

In formulating my own views concerning this subject I have been mindful of several considerations, and prior to indicating my specific proposals, would desire to comment briefly on these points.

a. A major point to be taken into consideration is the financial one. Under a level ceiling for Defense expenditures over the next few years and with consideration for the necessity for modernization, together with the rising costs of new equipment, it is apparent that a cold look must be taken at the entire force structure with a view to determining which elements are necessary and how best and most efficiently to utilize the monies made available to the Military Departments by the Congress. In this connection I would comment simply that, in my opinion, it is more important to modernize than to attempt to hold a high level of personnel in the military services.

b. We must thoroughly understand and accept the strategic concept which has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the President. If we adhere to the principles of this concept, and in light of the probable conditions which would exist in general war, it is apparent that we should re-examine our plans for large-scale deployments of U.S. forces, particularly ground forces, overseas in the first six months after D-day. Further, I would invite attention to the definition of local aggression (or limited war) which has been provided in the approved Basic National Security Policy (NSC 570//8).⁴ This definition clearly indicates that there will be no large-scale employment of U.S. forces, particularly ground forces, in armed conflict short of general war. It is obvious then that there is, under these circumstances, no requirement for a large strategic reserve of ground forces in the United States.

c. An important factor which should have an influence on our force structure is the Military Aid and Assistance Program. This program has made possible the development of indigenous force capabilities throughout the world. These forces are designed to, can now, and should continue to make a substantial contribution to the security of the U.S. and our Allies. Our global planning must take these forces into account and, in the development of our own force structure, we must consider their capabilities. As the forces developed through the Military Aid and Assistance Program are primarily in the form of ground forces and some tactical air forces, I would feel justified in recommending some substantial reductions and definite changes in the Army force structure, together with substantial reductions in our tactical air units.

d. Another factor which must be considered is the increased fire power and capabilities of new weapons coming into inventory. Such new weapons and systems cannot be merely additive. In part, their effect can and should be applied to increase capabilities. In part, their effectiveness should be reflected in a decrease in current forces. Our tendency in the past, however, has been to apply the entire increase to capabilities. We can no longer do this. A case in point is the numerical strength of Air Force wings and Navy and Marine Corps squadrons. The number of aircraft in these units has been kept constant or increased while at the same time the aircraft themselves possess greatly increased capabilities. I believe we can safely reduce the complement of aircraft assigned to units.

e. Political and psychological factors have an influence on our force structure. This is particularly true in regard to overseas deployments. Under a level budgetary ceiling I am convinced that the United States cannot continue year after year to maintain large overseas ground forces and land-based air forces without reducing our own security. As certain of these forces are redeployed I feel that they either can be phased out of the military program or their place taken by smaller units which could lend specialized support to the indigenous forces in overseas areas.

f. Another factor which influences my thinking regarding our force structure is the questionable effectiveness of some of our weapon systems development programs. I am thinking here particularly of the philosophy of close-in air defense of targets in the continental United States under conditions of possible attack by high-yield weapons. Little purpose would be served in expending additional large sums of money on these systems when the resultant over-all damage to the United States in an attack would not be materially decreased. With consideration for our budgetary situation, I feel that we should rely more heavily on our early warning system and our retaliatory capability, and would therefore suggest holding in abeyance or reducing certain continental air defense programs, particularly short-range fighter interceptors and short-range missiles. I would further recommend serious study of ways and means of moving our continental air defenses outside the border of the United States.

g. I am convinced that D-day forces and forces which are immediately available subsequent to D-day are the only ones which would contribute appreciably to U.S. security in general war, as well as being the most readily available forces to cope with situations short of general war. Therefore, the selected reserve forces must be those, and only those, which can be brought into operation in the early stages of an emergency. I feel that the selected reserve forces force requirements, as stated by the various Chiefs of Services, are so large that the selective definition of these forces has lost its meaning.

With the foregoing considerations in mind, I forward below my recommendation concerning budget expenditures, within the 38 billion dollar limitation for the Department of Defense, for the Services for the fiscal years 1959 through 1961, together with an approximation of the total military personnel within the Services, and my thoughts regarding a general order of magnitude of major forces.

a. Budget (Billions of Dollars)

1959	1960	1961
Army	8.7	8.5	8.2
Navy	11.0	11.1	11.2
Air Force	17.6	17.7	17.9
Totals	37.3	37.3	37.3

b. Personnel Strengths (End strength for fiscal years indicated)

1959	1960	1961
Army	850,000	800,000	700,000
Navy	630,000	600,000	590,000
Marine Corps	170,000	150,000	135,000
Air Force	850,000	800,000	775,000
Totals	2,500,000	2,350,000	2,200,000

c. Forces

(1) Army

1959	1960	1961
Divisions	13	12	11
Regiments & Battle Groups	8	8	8
Air Defense Bns.	100	95	80
SSM	40	40	30

(2) Navy

1959	1960	1961
Attack Carriers	14	13	13
ASW Carriers	9	9	9
Cruisers	12	10	10
Destroyers	220	210	200
Submarines	112	112	110
Carrier Air Groups	15	14	14

(3) Marine Corps

1959	1960	1961
Divisions	3 (1 Red strength)	2	2
Air Wings	3 (1 Red strength)	2	2

(4) Air Force

1959	1960	1961
Strategic Forces	40 (including 11 HB)	38 (including 11 HB)	37 (including 11 HB)
Air Defense Forces	28	24	20
Tactical Forces	27	22	18
Airlift Forces	12	11	10
Major Wings	107	95	85

Note: Forces above to be comprised of units as indicated in the Air Force submission.

It may be appreciated that the effect of the reductions indicated above will be severe. If present inflationary trends continue, it will probably be necessary to make further reductions in military personnel and major forces. It is my opinion, however, that in view of the increased effectiveness of modern weapons and the approved strategic concept, the force structure indicated above will not necessitate acceptance of an unreasonable calculated risk to the security of the United States.

In connection with these manpower reductions, I would invite particular attention to the necessity for reduction of overseas deployments. So long as the Korean truce status remains essentially unchanged, I feel it would be most difficult and unwise to reduce U.S. ground forces in Korea below the two division level. This leaves us our NATO commitment as a source of further reduction in ground forces, associated tactical air forces, and their supporting structure in Europe. We must face up to this problem.

I recommend an early decision on this subject in order that program planning may proceed on an orderly basis.

Arthur Radford

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, White House Central Files, Confidential File. Top Secret.
2. Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for Fiscal Year 1961 has not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.
3. Not attached and not found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.
4. Document 120.