Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

123. Memorandum of Discussion at the 327th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, June 20, 1957¹

Washington, June 20, 1957

[Here follows a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting.]

1. Relative Military Advantage of lRBM–ICBM vs. Manned Aircraft and Non-Ballistic Missiles (NSC Action No. 1690–c; NIE 11–5–57)²

Mr. Cutler reminded the Council that the President, at the March 28 Council meeting, had requested the Defense Department to prepare a report, assuming reasonable success in carrying out plans for the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) and the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), which would set forth the relative military advantages of these missiles in comparison with manned aircraft and with non-ballistic missiles assumed to be available at the same time. He then introduced General Samuel E. Anderson, Director of the Weapons System Evaluation Group of the Defense Department, who was to present the report.

General Anderson made his report (a copy of which is filed in the minutes of the meeting).³ His general conclusion was to the effect that for at least the period 1960 to 1967, it would continue to be necessary to develop different weapons systems, including manned aircraft, ballistic and aerodynamic missiles. The report also recommended a review of the same problem by the Weapons System Evaluation Group at the end of a year’s time.

When General Anderson had concluded his report, the President asked if there were any questions from Council members. Secretary Quarles said he would like to add one point to General Anderson’s report. He indicated his view that the report given by General Anderson pointed up the need for a quantitative measure of the value of the several weapons systems which had been discussed. While we certainly needed to be more selective in our procurement of weapons, General Anderson had brought out the problems which made such selectivity difficult.

The Director of the Budget said he had a question with respect to the continued development of new types of manned aircraft. Were we at the end of the period of spending money on the development of new types of manned aircraft? Secretary Quarles replied that the Department of Defense felt it necessary to continue to develop new types of manned aircraft.

The President said he had one comment to make. One significant matter had not been mentioned in General Anderson’s report. This was understandable, because it had not been requested. This element was the total economic cost in relation to the performance of different weapons systems. Thus it was important that manned aircraft performed their initial missions and often returned to perform subsequent missions. On the other hand, missiles, once launched, never returned from their target. Accordingly, this element of cost should be established—at least in relative, if not absolute, terms—because ultimately there was a limit to what we can afford to pay for these weapons systems. The President again pointed out that the absence of reference to the cost element was not to be taken as a criticism. He had not asked that this element be included, and he emphasized that the report had been a very good one.

The Director of Central Intelligence reminded the Council that the intelligence community was following very carefully the problem of estimating Soviet capabilities in the missiles field. Indeed, a National Intelligence Estimate on this subject had been issued not long ago (NIE 11–5–57; copy filed in the minutes of the meeting). A particular effort was being made to try to determine on which of the various weapons systems the Soviets were placing greater emphasis.

The National Security Council:⁴

a. Noted and discussed a report on the subject by the Department of Defense pursuant to NSC Action No. 1690–c.

b. Noted the comment by the President that, although not requested or included in the above-mentioned report, the economic element of total cost of each of these weapons systems, in relation to their effectiveness, must always be taken into account, in view of the fact that the maintenance of a sound U.S. economy sets limits to U.S. defense expenditures.

c. Noted the President’s approval of the recommendation that the above-mentioned report be reviewed one year hence in the light of technological and other developments during the year.

d. Noted that the Director of Central Intelligence invited attention to the National Intelligence Estimate on “Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missiles Field” (NIE 11–5–57, dated March 12, 1957).

Note: The actions in b and c above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on June 21.
2. Regarding NSC Action No. 1690, see footnote 12, Document 112. NIE 11–5–57 was not declassified. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)
3. Neither General Anderson’s report nor the minutes has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State Files.
4. Paragraphs a–d and the Note that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1733, approved by the President on June 21. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)