Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

116. Memorandum of Discussion at the 319th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 11, 1957¹

Washington, April 11, 1957

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1, “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security”. See the editorial note, supra.]

2. Military Mobilization Base Program (NSC Actions Nos. 1503, 1643 and 1680;NSC 5602/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Basic Military Planning Concept to Govern Planning and Development of the Mobilization Base”, dated March 1, 1957)²

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the main business of the Council today was to return to its review of existing basic national security policy. The Council would have before it today two main discussion papers, the first on “Issues Affecting the Military Elements of National Strategy” (NSC 5707/3), and the second on “Military and Non-Military Aspects of Continental Defense” (NSC 5707/4).³ Before turning to these papers, however, Mr. Cutler pointed out that Assistant Secretary of Defense McNeil was present and was prepared to give, in response to Council action, an interim report outlining the military mobilization base program.

Secretary McNeil proceeded to give his report orally to the National Security Council. (A copy of Secretary McNeil’s report is filed in the minutes of this meeting.)⁴

The National Security Council:⁵

Noted and discussed an interim report on the subject by the Department of Defense, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1680–b, as presented at the meeting by Assistant Secretary of Defense McNeil.

3. Overseas Internal Security Program⁶ (NSC Actions Nos. 1290–d and 1486–c; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Constabulary Forces in Countries Threatened by Subversion”, dated November 28, 1955; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Review of Military Assistance and Supporting Programs”, dated December 7, 1955; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Overseas Internal Security Program”, dated March 19, 1957)⁷

4. Review of Basic National Security Policy: Issues Affecting the Military Elements of National Strategy (NSC 5602/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Review of Basic National Security Policy: Proposed Council Agenda”, dated February 19, 1957; NSC 5707;NSC 5707/1; NSC Actions Nos. 1675 and 1680; NSC 5707/2; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Basic Military Planning Concept to Govern Planning and Development of the Mobilization Base”, dated March 1, 1957; NSC 5707/3)⁸

At the conclusion of Secretary McNeil’s report on the mobilization base program, Mr. Cutler indicated that the Department of Defense would be prepared to give the Council a much more detailed report early in June on the same subject.⁹ He then suggested that the Council turn to the last subject covered in the paper on the military elements of national strategy (NSC 5707/3), because this would follow logically on Secretary McNeil’s previous presentation. Mr. Cutler read paragraph 14, which briefly described the new military planning concept in relation to the mobilization base, and paragraph 15, which covered the questions which the Planning Board wished to raise in order to obtain guidance for the part of the revised basic national security policy which would be concerned with the mobilization base. Paragraphs 14 and 15 read as follows:

• “14. The new military planning concept takes into account damage to the mobilization base resulting from nuclear attack against the United States; provides for the requirements for all forces which would be mobilized in general war by M + 6 months; provides for overseas pre-attack stocks; assumes the use of nuclear weapons in general and in local war.
• “15. Questions.
  • “a. Will the new mobilization base required for forces which would be M + 6 months need to be (1) larger or smaller than the present base which assumes substantial wartime production? (2) better dispersed and protected in its key elements?
  • “b. Will the mobilization base resulting from the ‘new military planning concept’ prove inadequate to support a limited war in which the civilian economy cannot for political reasons be drastically cut?
  • “c. If it is estimated that each side will have (1960) the capability substantially to destroy the other, even after sustaining surprise attack, should mobilization base planning allocate resources primarily to (1) offensive and defensive capabilities required for the initial phase of general war; and (2) requirements for military operations short of general war, rather than requirements for subsequent phases of general war?
  • “d. Under the ‘new military planning concept’ should we revise our existing stockpile objectives now based on 3- and 5-year requirements?”

Mr. Cutler asked Secretary McNeil if he could attempt to answer question 15–a. Secretary McNeil replied that the new mobilization base required for forces which would be mobilized by M + 6 would be smaller and more selective than our mobilization base had been in the past. Secretary Wilson commented that when this Administration first came into power the Defense Department officers found themselves confronted with a very large mobilization base plan. In the years since 1953 it had proved very difficult to back out of this larger mobilization base plan, but progress was now being made in getting off this wicket.

With reference to a statement in Secretary McNeil’s report, on the number of rounds of 155 mm. ammunition which had been procured by the Defense Department for the mobilization base, Director Brundage inquired whether anybody could describe the kind of future war in which the United States would be likely to use 11,000,000 rounds of 155 mm. ammunition. The President seemed impatient, and said let the whole thing go to hell in a basket; it would require a great big academic study.

In further comment on the difficulties of making economies, Secretary Wilson stated that there were still veterinaries in our armed forces although there were no horses. Secretary Wilson said he could not seem to get rid of these people. Amidst much amusement, the President defended the presence of these veterinaries, on the ground that they were needed to inspect the meat (not always Government-inspected prime beef) which our soldiers ate. Returning to a serious vein, the President said that of course we have had a very lopsided mobilization base, and that it had got to be completely changed. He said that, for instance, he was strongly opposed to the maintenance of stand-by plants as part of our mobilization base. Secretary Wilson said that he had started two years ago to begin to break up the packages of machine tools. Among other things, he discovered that we were maintaining tools for aviation engines which we were sure we would never again use.

With respect to the mobilization base, the President said that the basic decision as to its nature would depend on whether, in the face of a future war, we were going to have to be concerned about our national security for a period of only 90 days, or whether we should have to provide for a longer period. The President stated that he believed personally that if the United States could survive a future war for a period of 90 days, we would be in a good position to pull through any subsequent period of warfare. On the other hand, the President said, he did not object to 5-year planning for the stockpiling of raw materials, he explained, because a future war would be so devastating that it might take this country that long a time to get back into production of essential raw materials.

Secretary Humphrey commented that the whole matter seemed academic to him, since the country had 5-year stockpiles in nearly every category.

At this point, Mr. Cutler said that paragraph 15–d of NSC 5707/3 concerned itself precisely with the possibility of revising our existing stockpile objectives, now based on 3- and 5-year requirements. The President stated that we should not add to the existing 3- and 5-year requirements, but that we should not dump on the market stockpile materials we have at hand.

Mr. Cutler then asked the Council to look at question 15–b, and asked the President for his views on the adequacy of the proposed new mobilization base to support a limited war as opposed to an all-out war. The President repeated views he had expressed in the past: that even if we got into a limited war we would immediately call for a general mobilization and full controls, which we would gradually get rid of subsequently just as fast as we could. If we did not put on tight controls at the very beginning of the conflict, everything would skyrocket.

Mr. Cutler went on to read paragraph 15–c, explaining the views of certain members of the Planning Board that mobilization base requirements for military operations short of a general war were more important than the requirements for the subsequent phase of general war. Mr. Cutler asked Admiral Radford for an expression of his opinion on the question asked in 15–c.

Admiral Radford replied that he found that all these questions contributed more to confusion than to clarification. The authors of the questions did not seem to understand how the military people have operated in the development of the mobilization base. In this matter the mobilization base is designed in the first instance to provide for the initial phase of general war and provision for that phase would cover pretty thoroughly the resources which would be required for a local or limited war. Secretary Wilson said that he too found himself confused over semantics and words in these questions. It seemed clear to him that the United States would never become involved in a limited war with the Soviet Union and, moreover, the United States would not pick on small nations and thus begin a small war. Mr. Cutler said he agreed with Secretary Wilson that we would not become involved in a small war by picking on some small nation, but we might nevertheless be drawn into a small war by circumstances beyond our control. Secretary Wilson replied that if this were proved to be the case, the war into which the United States got drawn would not remain a small war.

The President commented that the matters about which the Council had been talking up till now would receive no final answer until the officials of the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization got together and thought through the problem of a rational mobilization base for the United States.

The Director of Defense Mobilization, Mr. Gordon Gray, said he found difficulty in understanding the meaning of the term “the subsequent phases of general war”. The demands of a future war, he believed, would not stop at the end of 90 days. If the actual fighting were over by that time, the President pointed out, there would of course still be the problem of rehabilitation. The President went on to say that he could hardly envisage any massive offensive occurring after the 90-day initial phase of general war. Resources which had not been used up in that 90-day period would have to be devoted to rehabilitation.

Secretary Wilson observed that in formulating the budgets of the Department of Defense for the fiscal years 1959 and beyond under the President’s $39 billion ceiling, Secretary Wilson proposed to take into account three major elements: First, the $39 billion ceiling on new obligational authority; second, estimated cash expenditure; and third, force levels. Secretary Wilson added that it seemed to him essential to make a reduction in the force levels. The President suggested that we had better wait until Congress has begun to consider the appropriation requests of the Department of Defense for the next fiscal year.

Secretary Wilson then turned to Mr. Brundage and asked whether the planning basis which he had just mentioned appeared satisfactory to the Director of the Budget. Mr. Brundage replied that this question depended on how large a tax cut we would want to have next year. Secretary Wilson replied that the field of tax cuts was not his responsibility.

Secretary Humphrey counseled that we must all take a very practical view of what our domestic situation demands and what our people would insist upon. Secretary Wilson said that we would agree to this if Secretary Humphrey would include also taking account in our budget of the international situation which confronted the country. Secretary Wilson expressed the belief that the United States could readily stand the present tax burden and the present level of expenditures for national defense for an indefinite period if this proved to be necessary. Secretary Humphrey said he agreed with this proposition, but warned that if we were to do this we would be required to keep the country thoroughly scared at successive time intervals. The President remarked that in the course of the last few years he had not received a single letter which advocated a reduction in the budget of the Department of Defense. Secretary Wilson said that there was no need for us to scare Americans; the Russians can be depended upon to do that.

Secretary Humphrey said that nevertheless the Administration was going to have a hell of a time to prevent a tax reduction right now. In fact, in his view, the only way to prevent Small Business from getting $600,000,000 worth of tax relief would be for the President to veto this Congressional proposal. The President turned to Secretary Humphrey and asked him how much he would be willing to pay to save his life. Of course, added the President, in paying what was necessary for our national survival we should in turn reduce expenditures for other types of programs. Secretary Humphrey replied that of course we should pay what we need to pay in order to survive, but the point of the matter was that we did not cut other programs which did not involve our national security.

The President then called for the next question, and Mr. Cutler said that the Council would perhaps best now go back to the first problem set forth in NSC 5707/3, which concerned our capability to oppose local aggression. Mr. Cutler read this section of the paper, as follows:

“Existing policy calls for U.S. ready forces which, with such help as may be realistically expected from our allies, are adequate to deter or cope with local aggression, pending application of additional U.S. and allied power, in a way calculated to avoid hostilities broadening into general war, and which are sufficiently versatile to use either conventional or nuclear weapons as circumstances dictate.

• “3. Questions.
  • “a. Are we devoting adequate effort and resources to developing doctrine and ready forces best calculated to deal with local war without our enhancing the risk of spreading nuclear conflict?
  • “b. Will current plans for increasing integration of nuclear weapons into U.S. forces soon make the united States unable to participate in opposing local aggression without nuclear weapons?
• “4. Alternatives.
  • “a. In addition to our present capabilities, possess a separate non-nuclear capability for conducting successful local wars under all predictable circumstances.
  • “b. Without increasing our over-all effort, sacrifice some part of our other military capability in order to increase our local war capability (nuclear or conventional).
  • “c. Concentrate substantially all of our military resources on the achievement of an improved and more secure massive retaliatory capability.
  • “d. Continue the policy of integrating nuclear weapons with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States; and extend that policy by deciding now that in military operations short of general war, nuclear weapons will be used when required in order to achieve military objectives.”

[1 paragraph (16 lines of source text) not declassified]

When asked by Mr. Cutler for his views on this subject, Admiral Radford stated that the President had just outlined the way the planning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been developing ever since 1953. The military saw no alternative to such planning. He added that it was very easy to formulate the questions which the Planning Board had set down, but extremely hard to answer them. How, for example, would we define the term “local aggression”? The Joint Chiefs of Staff had to be much more definite and clear when they made use of such terms.

[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]

Admiral Radford went on to say that the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were in fact now engaged in carrying out a policy that, in any action in which U.S. forces were involved, we would make use of nuclear weapons if it proved necessary. Accordingly, Admiral Radford called for a clearly-written directive in our basic policy so that we would in the future avoid the confusion on the subject which comes from papers such as NSC 5707/3.

Mr. Cutler defended with warmth the validity of the questions set forth by the Planning Board, after which Admiral Radford commented that the United States had at the present time very powerful military force, much of which was conventional in character. Whether we would need to go beyond the use of conventional weapons to the point of atomic weapons, would depend on the size and character of the local war in which we were involved. The particular advantage which the use of atomic weapons gives us is the capability to defend against being overrun in the future as we were in the initial phases of the Korean war.

The President pointed out firmly that the revision of basic national security policy offered us our chance to write the right kind of directive in the matter of the use of atomic weapons. He said he did not think it appropriate to blame the Planning Board for asking these questions. What was important was to see to it that from now on our basic policy gets into line with the planning which had been going on in the Department of Defense for over two years. Secretary Humphrey warmly endorsed the President’s suggestion. Admiral Radford recalled that representatives of the Department of Defense had strongly opposed the statement of existing policy summarized in paragraph 2 of NSC 5707/3 when our current basic national security policy (NSC 5602/1) had been adopted.

Mr. Brundage added that the real problem has been that so far the cost for the so-called new weapons have always been additive. There has been no corresponding subtraction. Admiral Radford denied that this had been the case, and pointed out that one bomber built today could accomplish as much as ten thousand bombers could accomplish in 1945.

The President said that he would very much like to see a draft of a revised statement of the military elements of our national strategy as written in the Defense Department. Mr. Cutler advised the President that such a draft would appear in the final version of our revised basic national security policy, which the Council would consider some time in May.¹⁰ Meanwhile, however, he pointed out that the State Department had a certain interest in this policy area. Indeed, this fact had been emphasized by the action of the Council last week in holding the new Korean policy in abeyance until we could ascertain the effect on our allies of a course of action which would involve modernizing our forces in Korea with purely atomic weapons. The President said that the Council’s action in holding up the paper on Korea was related to a specific international agreement in the shape of the Korean Armistice Agreement. It had nothing to do with the general issue of whether or not to equip our U.S. forces with nuclear capabilities. Secretary Herter observed that Secretary Dulles felt that we still needed a considerable degree of flexibility in the weaponry of our armed forces.

The President stated very clearly his opinion that we had now reached a point in time when our main reliance, though not our sole reliance, should be on nuclear weapons. Up until recently our main reliance has been on conventional forces, to which we have added here and there in various units atomic capabilities. This situation must henceforth be revised.

Mr. Allen Dulles expressed the view that the outbreak of local wars was not the big problem which we faced in the world of today. The most dangerous problem was that of Communist subversion of weak and newly-developing nations. Reference to this problem, he thought, should be included in the paper. Mr. Cutler pointed out that the point was touched on later, and Mr. Dulles went on to say that he greatly feared that Congress would cut the CIA budget to bits and that this would have a serious effect on our anti-subversion programs in weak nations.

The President commented that he really did not know what more he could do in defense of the budget. He made statements on the subject practically every day.

Mr. Cutler at this point suggested that the Council turn to the next major problem, which related to the U.S. alliance system, and which read as follows:

• “5. Existing policy is predicated upon the support and cooperation of appropriate allies and other free countries in furnishing bases for U.S. military power and in providing their share of military forces. It visualizes progressive integration of nuclear weapons into NATO defenses only, with the United States retaining custody of warheads prior to hostilities.
• “6. Questions.
  • “a. What effect does reduced support by our Allies have on our alliance system, including our share of the burden of these alliances?
  • “b. Will the growing gap between the capabilities of the United States and the USSR on the one hand, and the rest of the world on the other make our allies increasingly less willing to provide overseas bases to the United States and to participate effectively in military operations against the Sino-Soviet bloc?
• “7. Alternatives.
  • “a. Provide no nuclear capability to allies (reversing plans for combined U.S.-Canadian air defense, UK IRBM programs, and NATO’s new weapons program), meanwhile supporting allied conventional capabilities.
  • “b. Provide nuclear capability to selected allies, giving nuclear weapons and warheads to the latter where feasible and reducing their conventional capabilities accordingly.
  • “c. Under a NATO command, share with NATO allies the custody and delivery capability for nuclear weapons.”

Mr. Cutler offered the opinion that the most serious question was posed by paragraph 7–b above, and asked Admiral Radford if he would care to comment on the alternative set forth in that paragraph.

Admiral Radford observed that we were already committed to this action and had already gone down that road as far as our law would permit. For the time being, Admiral Radford thought that the law which prevented us from giving nuclear warheads to our allies was helpful, and he would not advise too hurried a change in the law. He repeated, however, that the alternatives in paragraph 7 do not really exist, because we have already gone too far down the road. Admiral Radford also expressed the view that the thought in paragraph 6–b was much too pessimistic, and that we did not need to worry too much about Soviet blackmailing of our allies in order to render our overseas bases in their territories untenable. The President seemed to agree with Admiral Radford, in pointing out that the Soviets had been writing the same threatening letters to our allies as long as six years ago. The President added, however, that he would like to see a change in the law so that, for one thing, we could prevent powers which do not now have the capability of making nuclear weapons from developing that capability [23 words not declassified].

Admiral Strauss observed that our allies seemed generally content to have the custody of warheads for atomic weapons remain in the hands of the United States provided we supplied these allies with the weapons to which the warheads could be added in case of necessity. Accordingly, Admiral Strauss expressed his agreement with Admiral Radford that it was not desirable to change the law on this subject at this time, although it might be desirable later. On this last point, Admiral Strauss said he was somewhat surprised to discover considerable sentiment in the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of Congress in favor of a change of law which would permit the United States to provide the British with nuclear warheads. Admiral Radford predicted we would come to the point where we would do this, but the timing of the action was extremely important.

[2 paragraphs (20 lines of source text) not declassified]

At this point Mr. Cutler invited the Council to turn to the next general subject, namely the U.S. military assistance programs, reading as follows:

• “8. Existing policy is to provide military and other assistance, including where appropriate new weapons and advanced technology, to dependable allied nations when necessary to enable them to make appropriate contributions to collective military power.
• “9. Question.
  • “Do advances in weapons-technology and the direct and indirect costs involved require changes in our present military assistance policy?
• “10. Alternatives.
  • “a. Significantly reduce indigenous forces by additional deployment of U.S. nuclear forces.
  • “b. In extending military assistance, plan indigenous forces based on a firm commitment that U.S. forces will participate in the defense of the area.
  • “c. Where larger forces do not contribute militarily to U.S. strategy, support only lightly armed forces capable of maintaining internal security with U.S. commitment to assist in the event of external aggression.”

When he had reached paragraph 10–c, Mr. Cutler said he wished to refer at this point to the OCB Progress Report on the “Overseas Internal Security Program”, formerly called the “1290–d program”. He proceeded to brief the Council at some length on this progress report because it related to the alternative posed by paragraph 10–c of NSC 5707/3. (A copy of Mr. Cutler’s briefing note on the “Overseas Internal Security Program”¹¹ is filed in the minutes of the meeting.)

At the conclusion of Mr. Cutler’s briefing, the President observed that the Director of Central Intelligence had a few minutes ago brought up the problem of the weakness of the governments of many of the newly-independent nations, and the fact that they were prey to Communist subversion. Such new governments are helpless unless they have the power to maintain internal order and security in their countries. That was all that we were trying to do in these countries with our overseas internal security program.

Secretary Wilson referred to a statement made by Mr. Cutler in his briefing on this subject, which Secretary Wilson said had troubled him. It related to the Operations Coordinating Board, which, said Secretary Wilson, he understood to be a coordinating and not an operating agency. The President could, of course, have asked the Department of Defense to take charge of the overseas internal security program if he had wanted to.

Admiral Radford said he was extremely anxious to explain the difference between overseas police-type forces and regular military forces—a difference which as just as plain as the differences between these two types of forces in the United States. As a police-type force was gradually built up in a country like Vietnam, for example, it would be possible to recall the regular military forces from the remote villages and reconstitute them as a regular military force. It would also be possible, as a result of the building up of police-type forces, to keep the level of regular military forces from getting any higher.

Turning to the question in paragraph 9, Admiral Radford stated that the substance of paragraph 9 should not have been put in the form of a question, but rather in the form of an affirmative statement. Nevertheless, he warned that we would still have to do a selling job if we were to induce the governments of our friends and allies to reduce the level of their armed forces in return for the modernization of the remaining forces with new weapons. We are making some progress along this line, but a lot remains to be done.

[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]

Admiral Radford said he believed it was a serious mistake to relate these two programs too closely, because they were essentially quite different. Mr. Gordon Gray added his view that it was likewise a mistake to let the notion persist that the 1290–d program (now called the overseas internal security program) could effect great savings in our military assistance programs generally. Admiral Radford expressed agreement with Mr. Gray’s statement.

Mr. Cutler then asked the Council to turn to the final problem in NSC 5707/3, namely, the U.S. base system, reading as follows:

• “11. Existing policy is predicated on allied and other free country contributions of bases and forces.
• “12. Question.

  “Is our present system of bases necessary and justifiable in the light of: (1) political uncertainties, (2) the growing dollar costs involved, and (3) the long-range prospect of intercontinental capabilities?

• “13. Alternatives.
  • “a. Reduce our dependence on overseas bases by placing increased emphasis on U.S.-based and seaborne weapons systems.
  • “b. Expand the overseas base structure in order to improve U.S. capabilities for participation in local conflict.
  • “c. Enhance the continued availability of necessary bases by increasing host participation in the control and operation of bases.”

Having read this section in toto, Mr. Cutler again asked Admiral Radford to comment.

Admiral Radford replied that he and, he believed, all the Chiefs of Staff were in agreement that at the present time the United States needed overseas bases in certain areas and under certain circumstances, although we are gradually moving into a situation where dependence on overseas bases will be lessened. Indeed, the Chiefs believed that it may be impossible for us to use certain overseas bases in the future. Admiral Radford added the thought that it might also be best for the United States in the long run to pay rent for its overseas bases. In any event, we should certainly try to reduce our reliance on overseas bases, even though we may not be able to do so completely for some time.

Secretary Wilson said that our policy should be to attempt to maintain such overseas bases as we have at the present, but not in general to expand them, though of course there would occasionally be exceptions. He noted that these overseas bases had given very great concern to the Soviet Union.

The President commented that the problem of our overseas bases was something that we should have under constant study and review, because some of these bases become less valuable as circumstances change. Secretary Herter confirmed the difficulty of negotiations with respect to overseas bases, citing the instances of Portugal, Spain, and Morocco.

The National Security Council: (Action on Overseas Internal Security Program)¹²

Noted and discussed the report on the subject by the Operations Coordinating Board and the attached “Annual Status Report on Operations Pursuant to NSC Action 1290–d”, for the period December 1955 through November 1956, prepared by the International Cooperation Administration and transmitted by the reference memorandum on March 19, 1957.

The National Security Council: (Action on NSC 5707/3)¹³

Noted and discussed the report on the subject contained in NSC 5707/3, in the light of the reports presented in Items 2 and 3 above.

5. Review of Basic National Security Policy: Military and Non-Military Aspects of Continental Defense (NSC 5602/1; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Review of Basic National Security Policy: Proposed Council Agenda”, dated February 19, 1957; NSC 5707;NSC 5707/1; NSC 5707/2; NSC Action No. 1675; NSC 5707/3; NSC 5707/4)

Mr. Cutler then invited the Council’s attention to the fact that little time remained, and that some attention should be given at this point to NSC 5707/4, which was concerned with the military and non-military aspects of continental defense. In the course of briefing the Council on NSC 5707/4, Mr. Cutler read paragraphs 5 and 6, which constitute, as he believed, the most significant statements of existing national security policy with regard to continental defense. These paragraphs read as follows:

• “5. ‘The strength of the U.S. which must be so maintained is an integrated complex of offensive and defense elements. Each of these elements has its proper role in the defense of the vitals of America against attack and destruction. …¹⁴ We shall not have satisfactory over-all strength if one element is allowed to develop out of proportion to the other elements.’ (Paragraph 2–a, NSC 5408)”
• “6. ‘Just as there must be a proper balance among the several elements comprising our strength, there must also be a proper balance between military and non-military measures within the element of “continental defense”.’ (Paragraph 2–b, NSC 5408)”

Thereafter, Mr. Cutler called attention to the major new factors affecting the aforementioned policy statements, which factors were described on page 2 of NSC 5707/4.¹⁵ He then turned to the policy questions which the Planning Board felt had been raised by the new factors. He pointed out that the questions in paragraphs 13 and 14 of NSC 5707/4 could be passed over very briefly because the Council had only recently authorized a series of studies on the problem of providing shelter to protect the U.S. population from radioactive fallout and from blast and fire hazard. He then read paragraph 15, as follows:

“15. In planning and executing our continental defense programs, should additional emphasis be given to those measures designed to reduce the vulnerability of our strategic retaliatory striking power?**

“** One member believes the following subparagraph should be added:

“Is our early warning system being kept in phase with improvements in Soviet-manned aircraft delivery capabilities (i.e., very high and very low altitudes)?”

Mr. Cutler then asked Admiral Radford for his comments.

Admiral Radford replied that we were already giving high priority to measures designed to reduce the vulnerability of our strategic retaliatory striking power. The problem, therefore, was not one so much of additional emphasis as the manner in which we should try to reduce the vulnerability. This matter was the subject of study at the present time by a committee in the Defense Department. It was hoped that this committee would report its findings by July 1. Admiral Radford warned, however, that the measures for reducing the vulnerability of our retaliatory striking power would have to be adjusted under the Department of Defense budget ceiling, as were all other Defense Department programs.

Mr. Cutler inquired as to whether we were actually engaged in dispersing our SAC bases. Admiral Radford replied in the affirmative, and Secretary Quarles gave a brief description of the dispersal program for SAC. Secretary Quarles expressed the opinion that this was a well-planned program, and he would not recommend further dispersal measures at this time. General Twining also confirmed these views that the dispersal program was sufficient as of the present time.

Secretary Humphrey inquired of Admiral Radford as to how far our early warning network was proving effective. Admiral Radford indicated that the committee to which he had just referred was likewise studying this and, indeed, the whole field of continental defense. Meanwhile, he believed, the early warning network was steadily moving outward from the continental borders. He briefly commented on progress with respect to the mid-Canada line, the DEW line, and certain other elements of the early warning system. He predicted, however, that there would be new and serious problems when we moved into the era of the intercontinental ballistic missile.

Mr. Cutler suggested that the Council then give attention to paragraphs 16 and 17, which dealt with the problem of securing an effective defense against the ICBM and the related problem of assuring sufficient warning of the launching of an ICBM to permit the population to use shelter. The President commented that sufficient unto the day was the evil thereof. He added that he personally was doubtful if a course of action of pouring more money into research and development would provide the answer either to the interception of ICBMs or the warning of the launching of ICBMs. The President believed that the only way in which these terrible problems would be solved would be through the functioning of some brilliant scientific mind.

The National Security Council:¹⁶

Noted and discussed the report on the subject contained in NSC 5707/4.

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on April 12.
2. Regarding NSC Action No. 1503, see footnote 5, Document 52. Regarding NSC Action No. 1643, see footnote 7, Document 101. NSC 5602/1 is printed as Document 66. NSC Action No. 1680, taken at the NSC meeting on March 14 and approved by the President on March 17, is not printed. (Department of State,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Regarding the March 1 memorandum, see footnote 1, Document 109.
3. Neither NSC 5707/3 nor NSC 5707/4 is printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5707 Memoranda)
4. The report is not filed in the minutes.
5. The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1698, approved by the President on April 12. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
6. This subject was discussed under the next agenda item.
7. Regarding NSC Action No. 1290, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 844, footnote 10. Regarding NSC Action No. 1486, see vol. X, p. 62, footnote 14. The November 28, 1955, and March 19, 1957, memoranda have not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files. The December 7, 1955, memorandum is not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5525 Series)
8. Regarding NSC 5602/1, the February 19 memorandum, NSC 5707, NSC 5707/1,NSC 5707/2, and NSC Action No. 1675, see footnotes 2 and 5, Document 112. NSC Action No. 1680 is not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
9. The Department of Defense made no presentation to the NSC on the mobilization base program for the remainder of 1957.
10. For the discussion of the final version, which became NSC 5707/8, see Document 119.
11. The briefing note is filed in the minutes.
12. The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1699, approved by the President on April 12. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)
13. The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1700, approved by the President on April 12. (Ibid.)
14. Ellipsis in the source text.
15. The “major new factors” affecting the above statements were contained in the following paragraphs on page 2 of NSC 5707/4:
    • “10. Loss of the overwhelming nuclear superiority which the U.S. has possessed hitherto.
    • “11. Increasing net capabilities of the USSR to damage the United States will threaten total national survival for the first time in U.S. history.
    • “12. Radioactive fallout as an after-effect of thermonuclear explosions vastly complicates both the military and non-military aspects of continental defense.” (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5707 Memoranda)
16. The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 1701, approved by the President on April 12. (Ibid.,S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)