Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

110. Memorandum of Discussion at the 314th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, February 28, 1957¹

Washington, February 28, 1957

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1, an oral briefing by Allen Dulles on “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security.”]

2. Review of Basic National Security Policy: Basic Problems for U.S. Security Arising Out of Changes in the World Situation (NSC 5602/1; NIE 100–3–57; NSC 5707; memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Review of Basic National Security Policy: Proposed Council Agenda”, dated February 19, 1957²)

Mr. Cutler briefed the National Security Council on the new procedure under which the NSC Planning Board proposed to carry out its task of revising our Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5602/1). (A copy of Mr. Cutler’s briefing note is included in the minutes of the meeting.)³

Mr. Cutler then invited the Council’s attention to the proposed agenda for future Council meetings to be devoted to the discussion of basic national security policy, as set forth in the reference memorandum of February 19, 1957. After noting the various issues which would be discussed by the Council between today and the middle of May, Mr. Cutler touched on the matter of a discussion paper “on national security costs in relation to total national resources”. He indicated that there had been some questioning of the wisdom of discussing this issue at the first Council meeting on the subject of basic national security policy, rather than at the end. Mr. Cutler said that the reason for getting this issue discussed early in the Council’s deliberation was that it provided an opportunity to thrash out the problem early in the game and obtain the views of the Council on this important matter, which the Council and the Planning Board could keep in mind as they dealt with subsequent issues.

After briefly describing the character of NSC 5707 and the relation of this paper to the National Intelligence Estimate on The World Situation (NIE 100–3–57), and to the Annex to NSC 5707, entitled “Economic Considerations”,⁴ Mr. Cutler invited the Director of Central Intelligence to comment briefly and generally on the aforementioned National Intelligence Estimate.

(At this point (10:10 a.m.) Secretary Dulles entered the Cabinet Room, replacing Under Secretary Herter at the table.)

After repeating the three basic ground rules governing the Council’s discussion of NSC 5707, Mr. Cutler invited the National Security Council to consider the introductory paragraph to NSC 5707, entitled “Basic Problems for U.S. Security Arising Out of Changes in the World Situation”. Having read this paragraph, Mr. Cutler commented that it was intended to stress the factors of change and extreme fluidity in the existing world situation. He also pointed out that this absence of stability enhanced the danger of war through miscalculation. He invited the comments of the members of the Council but there were none.

Mr. Cutler thereafter asked the Council to consider the first of the seven major problems identified by the Planning Board in NSC 5707, namely, the problem entitled “Increasing Nuclear Capabilities”, reading as follows:

“The Problem:

“The increasing ability of the United States and the USSR to destroy each other in nuclear general war, and growing realization of this fact, more and more deter the United States and the USSR⁵ from taking actions involving serious risk of general war. However, events during the past year have increased the fear of the United States and the USSR be coming involved in general war as a result either of spreading local conflicts or of actions by one power which the other would consider an unacceptable threat to its security.

“Consequences for U.S. security include:

• “a. U.S. Attitudes. Public support for U.S. security policies, particularly policies involving risks of war, will increasingly depend on public conviction that the United States has an effective and usable military capability.⁶ If public confidence should weaken, this could put into question whether and how the United States would counter Soviet actions jeopardizing U.S. interests.
• “b. U.S. Alliances. Our allies will increasingly (1) weigh the added security of U.S. alliances against what they may regard as the increasing risk of association with the U.S., (2) be susceptible to Soviet nuclear threats, (3) seek nuclear weapons in order to pursue their own interests.
• “c. Local War. The Soviet bloc may be increasingly encouraged to initiate actions short of general war if it believes the United States lacks the capability or the will to react effectively on a local scale and would not react by resort to general war. Such actions would most likely take the form of indirect aggression, i.e., exploiting local conflicts or civil war. Deterrence or defeat of such actions will increasingly depend upon the United States maintaining forces to cope speedily with local Communist or Communist-inspired aggression in a manner calculated to localize the conflict.⁷
• “d. Soviet Attitudes. The establishment of U.S. bases and nuclear-capable forces near the borders of the USSR would (where fully available) increase U.S. military strength but would increasingly stimulate Soviet counter-measures.
• “e. Disarmament. Feasible and effective measures to control armaments are increasingly urgent.”

After pointing out the two footnotes on page 2,⁸ Mr. Cutler said that this problem could perhaps be summarized by the statement that on the one hand the increasing nuclear capabilities of the United States and the USSR tended to create a greater deterrent to general war. On the other hand, these increasing capabilities enhanced the risk of local conflict and of general war through miscalculation. He asked for specific comments and, in particular, asked Secretary Dulles whether in his opinion the Planning Board had been correct in its statement of the problem and of the consequences for U.S. security.

Secretary Dulles replied that certainly increasing nuclear capabilities constituted one of the great problems which we faced. But he said that he could certainly not agree entirely with the Planning Board’s analysis of this problem or, indeed, with the other six problems set forth in NSC 5707. In point of fact, the Planning Board was not asking questions of the National Security Council; it was simply making statements with respect to these problems.

Mr. Cutler said that of course what the Planning Board was looking for was guidance, and it made little difference whether they sought the guidance in the form of statements or in the form of questions.

Secretary Dulles repeated that he did not dissent from the proposition that increasing nuclear capabilities was a major topic for discussion by the National Security Council. But it seemed to him that the Planning Board’s statement of the problem and the consequences of increasing nuclear capabilities and, indeed, the whole of NSC 5707, took an unduly pessimistic view of the situation faced by the United States. At an earlier period, the Council had feared that increasing Soviet nuclear capabilities would lead more and more to the development of neutralism. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union has actually threatened two of our allies with the possibility of nuclear attack, the trend toward neutralism in Western Europe has actually lessened and the ties between ourselves and our Western European allies have actually been strengthened. There is indeed a greater desire among Western European nations than ever before to develop a capacity to react against Soviet attack and to work closely with the United States.

Mr. Cutler commented that if the Planning Board had stated the effect of increasing nuclear capabilities on U.S. alliances in the form of a question, the Secretary would have given a resounding “no” to the idea that the alliances were being weakened by the development of these nuclear capabilities.

The President expressed agreement with the views of Secretary Dulles, and indeed said he felt that Secretary Dulles’ case was obvious. For example, the British would not be talking of taking their troops out of Western Europe if they thought it at all likely that we would also take our U.S. forces out of Western Europe.

Secretary Humphrey commented that our real trouble stemmed from the fact that our Western European allies are relying too much on the United States and not enough on themselves. The real question is how much the United States can afford. There is danger that our allies will end by placing all their reliance on the United States. Mr. Allen Dulles observed that there was an element of truth in this, but that the allied attitude was rather natural, in view of the fact that the United States had a monopoly on nuclear weapons in the Free World. Secretary Humphrey repeated with emphasis his view that our allies were practically placing their whole life and survival in the hands of the United States, in terms, first, of its massive retaliatory capability, and secondarily, on the maintenance of U.S. armed forces in Western Europe. Secretary Wilson expressed the belief that Secretary Humphrey’s appraisal of allied thought on this matter was perhaps a little extreme, but that the thinking of our allies was certainly moving in the direction indicated by Secretary Humphrey.

Mr. Cutler then asked for an expression of opinion from the Council as to the element of mutual deterrence which seemed to be developing as a result of the increasing nuclear capabilities of the United States and the USSR. Did the Council agree with the position taken by the Planning Board with particular respect to the point, in subparagraph c, that the Soviet bloc might be increasingly encouraged to initiate action short of general war if it believes the United States lacks the capability or will to react effectively on a local scale or would not react by resort to general war?

In response to Mr. Cutler’s request for guidance, Secretary Dulles said he took particular exception to the statement that deterrence or defeat of Soviet aggression on a local scale would depend upon the United States maintaining forces which could cope speedily with local Communist aggression. Why, he asked, should the United States alone be saddled with the responsibility for reacting speedily to such Soviet local aggression? It has been our theory in the past that such a reaction should largely be the responsibility of the countries which were attacked. We would do the “big stuff” (large-scale retaliatory attack). Our allies were expected to handle local hostilities.

The President commented that with respect to subparagraph c on local war, he believed that the Planning Board had entered into a field which was highly speculative in character, and one in which it was hard to reach clear and firm conclusions. Secretary Dulles repeated his view that the sentence on the necessity of U.S. forces as a deterrent to local acts of aggression by the Soviet Union ran contrary to the entire basic strategy of the United States. Secretary Humphrey agreed with Secretary Dulles that this idea was certainly contrary to what the United States desired, but that it nevertheless seemed to be the way things were heading. Secretary Dulles continued, saying that the deterrence of local aggression should depend, for example on the development of a worthwhile and effective German Army in Western Europe and similar effective forces being developed by our allies elsewhere in the Free World, such as in Turkey and in Korea. Therefore, he believed this statement on deterrence to be essentially false.

The President asked the Council to think back to the situation we confronted four years ago. At that time the Administration was of the opinion that the one thing we could do which would be most helpful to the Soviet Union would be to scatter our U.S. military forces in any and all areas overseas where we felt it possible that the Soviet Union might some day attack. Indeed, the sending of six divisions of American forces to Western Europe began initially under the guise of an emergency measure. Now it has become permanent. Nevertheless, our policy should be that our friends and allies supply the means for local defense on the ground and that the United States should come into the act with air and naval forces alone.

Mr. Cutler then invited the Council’s attention to the second footnote on page 2 of NSC 5707, as being closely related to the issue the Council was discussing. Certain members of the Planning Board had expressed fear that the United States would refrain from becoming involved in military action to assist a small Free World country lest the result of the involvement end up with the United States becoming involved in general nuclear war.

Secretary Humphrey inquired whether the best answer to the question posed by Mr. Cutler was not likely to be obtained by picking out a few actual situations around the world and inquiring what the United States would do if Communist-inspired aggression broke out in any of these areas. He added that he personally did not agree with the Planning Board’s statement on deterrence of local war depending on the maintenance of U.S. forces to cope speedily with such local Communist aggression. On three separate occasions since this Administration had been in power, the National Security Council had faced the prospect and possibility of local wars caused by Communist aggression. In each case, when the chips were finally down, the military people came in and said that we could not undertake to fight such a war without the use of nuclear weapons. This had occurred in the case of a possible resumption of hostilities in Korea; it had occurred in Indochina; and it had occurred in the matter of Taiwan and the offshore islands. It therefore seemed to Secretary Humphrey that these actions of the Council demonstrated that we have crossed a bridge in the matter of the use of nuclear weapons, and that a lot of the Planning Board’s statement was purely theoretical. In practice, we must face up to the facts and decide what we propose to do.

Secretary Dulles commented that one notable fallacy in the approach to this problem in NSC 5707 was the assumption that any war in which nuclear weapons were used would necessarily develop into a general nuclear war and the United States using nuclear weapons against Moscow. The President, however, had not said this to Mr. Churchill on the occasion of the crisis in Taiwan or the crisis in Indochina. On these two occasions the United States had no intention of attacking Moscow. Accordingly, it is not true that we would be obliged to choose between doing nothing in the event of local Soviet aggression or else of engaging in general nuclear war.

Mr. Cutler stated that the Planning Board had not acted under any such assumption. NSC 5707 merely pointed out that if we were now faced with we same kind of crisis which we faced earlier with respect to the Chinese offshore islands, there would now be a more serious risk of involving the USSR in any hostilities which might eventuate.

Secretary Humphrey agreed with Mr. Cutler, and went on to say that we should ask the military what this country would do at the present time if we were to face another situation such as that in the offshore islands. Would we use ground troops to defend these islands against Communist aggression? Mr. Cutler commented that it rather seemed that when the Planning Board became very specific in its recommended courses of action, Secretary Humphrey complained and asked for more general statements. On the other hand, when the Planning Board was general, Secretary Humphrey always called on it to be more specific.

Mr. Allen Dulles observed that the situation today was very different than it was when the United States was involved in the crisis over Quemoy and the offshore islands. The Soviet capability of damaging Western Europe was far greater than it had been on the earlier occasion.

Secretary Humphrey said that he admitted that we ran the risk of becoming involved in general nuclear war if we used nuclear weapons to fight local wars. Mr. Cutler reminded the Council of the possible actions which it had discussed with respect to U.S. courses of action in the event that the Soviets used military force to reimpose their control over Poland. Secretary Humphrey thought the situation in Poland and that in the Chinese offshore islands altogether different. Poland lay on the borders of the Soviet Union and was regarded by the Soviet Union as vital to its security.

Secretary Dulles asked the Council members to read the first footnote on page 2 of NSC 5707. He insisted that the assumption underlying the views expressed in this footnote was that the United States would not dare to use nuclear weapons in a local war because of fear that such a course of action would involve general war. Secretary Dulles stated that he did not believe this assumption to be correct.

The President commented that if the Soviets were calculating on the wisdom of going to war with the United States, they would not be swayed by any fear that the United States would bomb airfields in Communist China. Their calculations would be based on quite other considerations.

Admiral Strauss stated that as he had read over these paragraphs and footnotes on the first problem of increasing nuclear capabilities, he had been of the opinion that the Planning Board was trying to direct the Council’s attention to the attitude of the public rather than to the policies of the U.S. Government. It was plain enough that there was a lot of talk in the newspapers about the nuclear capabilities of the United States and the USSR canceling each other out. He therefore hoped that the Council could indicate to the Planning Board that our policy should be to try to prevent such public attitudes from crystalizing, or to correct these attitudes before they crystalized.

Governor Peterson suggested that there should be an addition at the end of the first sentence of subparagraph a on page 2. The addition should read, “and an effective non-military defense.”

Mr. Allen Dulles expressed the view that the likelihood of the USSR letting itself become directly involved in general war was rather remote. They would go in for subversion instead.

Governor Stassen inquired whether the Council had not been of the general opinion in the past that if the United States began to use nuclear weapons in a local war, there would be a tendency for such a local war to develop into a general war. The President replied to Governor Stassen by stating that earlier this morning he had been shown a diagram. This diagram indicated that a 2 KT tactical nuclear weapon would create only one-twentieth of the damage wrought on Tokyo by the fire bomb raids of 1945. It therefore seemed “silly” to the President to think that resort by the United States to the use of these small tactical nuclear weapons would necessarily start a general nuclear war. Mr. Cutler speculated that the President’s illustration referred to too small a tactical weapon. Admiral Strauss doubtless had larger and more powerful ones in mind. The atomic bomb used against Nagasaki was of 20 KT. The President nevertheless repeated his view that there was no reason to think we would inevitably involve ourselves in general war if we made use of these tactical nuclear weapons in a local situation. Secretary Wilson commented that one thing was certain: We would have a general nuclear war if the armed forces of the United States and the Soviet Union ever got into direct actual combat.

Governor Stassen returned to his point that if the United States ever started on military action in order to secure a vital U.S. objective and in so doing made use of nuclear weapons, it was very likely that in turn nuclear weapons would be used against the United States. Certainly there was a likelihood of general war in that kind of a situation.

Mr. Cutler expressed the opinion that the Planning Board had been given guidance on the first problem in NSC 5707—that is, increasing nuclear capabilities. He therefore suggested that the Council turn to the second important problem identified by the Planning Board, namely, the decline in Western Europe’s position. He read the problem and the statement of the consequences, as follows:

“The Problem:

“The continuing decline in the power position of Western Europe relative to the United States and the USSR has been emphasized by recent developments, including the Franco-British failure over Suez.

“Consequences for U.S. security include:

• “a. Changing World Role. In the light of their changing status and of nuclear trends, the British, French, and other Western European countries may reconsider the implications of the Atlantic Alliance as well as their commitments elsewhere. Certain areas from which they retract will require strong U.S. support to maintain an independent existence.
• “b. Western European Integration. A more realistic relation between Western Europe’s capabilities and commitments may develop. The internal condition of Western Europe remains sound. If, additionally, the area moves toward closer political, economic, and even military association, a trend toward a declining self-confidence may be partly checked and over time reversed, enabling Western Europe to continue as the strongest Free World area outside the United States. The United States can encourage and assist these moves.”

Mr. Cutler then solicited the views of the members of the Council. Was this not a major problem? Was not the decline of Western Europe’s position more apparent now than it had been before the Franco-British failure in Suez? He directed his questions particularly to Secretary Dulles.

Secretary Dulles said he would commence by striking out the title at the head of the problem—that is, “Decline in Western Europe’s Position”. Far from being in decline, there was now for the first time a real prospect that the position of Western Europe was definitely improving. This was the result of the growing measures toward European integration and delineation of a new relationship between Europe and Africa. Secretary Dulles believed that the Planning Board’s treatment of this problem was again too pessimistic. From a strictly military point of view, he admitted that the position of Western Europe had been declining ever since World War I. This had been most recently demonstrated in Suez. If one simply stopped with this military decline, one could well be pessimistic, but if the move toward European unification goes forward as it appears likely to do, and if a sounder relationship can be developed by Europe with Africa, the position of Western Europe is really much more hopeful than it has been in a very long time.

Mr. Cutler said that the Planning Board had tried to take account of the favorable factors in subparagraph b on page 4. Secretary Dulles said that if this were the case, he felt that there was a lack of balance in the Planning Board’s analysis of the position of Western Europe. Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that in the past Europe had never faced a vast and powerfully armed Russia. Secretary Humphrey said that he personally was more optimistic today than ever before about the prospects of Western Europe. The President commented that both Ollenhauer⁹ and Mollet¹⁰ had told him of their enthusiastic support for the common market scheme for Western Europe. Secretary Dulles said that when he had read over NSC 5707 last night, he had come to the conclusion that its authors were all suffering from dyspepsia.

Dr. Flemming wondered how these optimistic views about the future of Western Europe could be fitted in with earlier comments by members of the Council that the British and the French and our other Western European allies could be expected to look increasingly to the United States for military support. As these Western European allies reduced their strength, was the United States expected to take up the slack?

Secretary Humphrey recommended that we back off and let these Western European states develop a greater degree of self-reliance. Much of the self-reliance that they have already developed derives from our policy and action in the Suez crisis. He again repeated that he was optimistic, but said that we must insist that our allies in Western Europe develop self-reliance.

Mr. Cutler observed that matters were in reverse. Our young men (the Planning Board) seemed gloomy. Our older men (the Council) seemed optimistic. Mr. Allen Dulles turned to Secretary Humphrey and said, optimistic or otherwise, the Secretary of the Treasury was going to have to lend the British and the French a lot more money, because they were both about to go bankrupt.

The President said that after all, the British were not saying that they were going to reduce their own defensive forces; they are merely getting weary of what we ourselves are doing in Western Europe— that is, maintaining large forces on the continent.

Governor Stassen expressed the opinion that, earlier, the National Security Council had been too gloomy in its prognostications of what was going to happen to Western Europe. At the moment, however, he feared that the Council was too optimistic. After all, the common market is not yet realized. While he too was basically optimistic on Western Europe’s prospects over the long haul, there were many hard problems facing Western Europe in the immediate future. The President said this all might be so, but the United States cannot take the whole world on its shoulders and nurse these nations. They must learn to help themselves.

Secretary Humphrey predicted that the less we did for Western Europe, the faster they would move in the direction of greater strength and unity. This had been proved only recently in the matter of the EDC. The European Defense Community had failed largely because of the stand-offish attitude of Britain. This attitude had now completely changed. The British now want a free trade area in Europe, of which the British would be a part. We must, of course, watch our step so as not ourselves to get sucked into such an area. The President said he would rather lend what was needed to a united Western Europe than anything we had done up to now to assist our Western European allies individually.

Governor Stassen again warned of undue optimism on the speed of the integration of Western Europe. The President, however, said that Prime Minister Mollet had informed him that the European common market would be a fact by next September, and that Ollenhauer had been equally optimistic. If this proved wrong and the integration didn’t happen, the President predicted that the Western European nations would perish in spite of anything the United States could do to help them. Governor Stassen agreed that the integration would occur, but that it would take five years to become a fact. The President replied that there had been a greater awareness and realization among the Western European powers of their own situation in recent months. This was a most desirable development.

Secretary Dulles pointed out that when he had spoken privately with Macmillan in Paris last December about the Suez situation,¹¹ Macmillan had said that Britain’s worst miscalculation was its miscalculation about the power of the United Nations. From this, said Secretary Dulles, one could deduce that Anglo-French moral weakness was really more significant than Anglo-French military weakness. The Anglo-French debacle at Suez did not so much expose military as moral weakness.

The President stated parenthetically that he was absolutely convinced that the Israelis had jumped the gun on the British and French.

Mr. Cutler then invited the Council’s attention to the third major problem identified by the Planning Board in NSC 5707. He read the statement of the problem and the consequences as follows:

“DECLINE IN THE SOVIET POSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE

“The Problem:

“While the economic and military strength of the USSR itself continues to grow, the Soviet power position in Eastern Europe, including the reliability of the satellite armed forces, has been weakened and its ideological claims have been damaged by Soviet repression in Hungary.

“Consequences for U.S. security include:

• “a. Soviet Position. Eastern European ferment increases both opportunities for Free World encouragement of evolutionary change and dangers from Soviet hypersensitivity to Western actions which the Kremlin considers threatening to its security interests in this area.
• “b. Satellite Change. U.S. political and economic policy can strengthen forces and trends favoring orderly and gradual satellite developments toward independence. Limited economic assistance and cultural exchanges, on a selective basis, will have increasing importance, as will our broad political posture.
• “c. Prospects of Violence. So long as the USSR attempts to dominate Eastern Europe, there will be a danger of further outbreaks of violence. Any significant resort to force inside the area could spread beyond control and eventually involve the United States, even if it decided at the time to refrain from military intervention. The USSR is unlikely to withdraw, in whole or in part, from the area without what it would consider a commensurate retraction of Western power.”

The President expressed the opinion that while the word “including” in the third line of the statement of the problem was probably correct, he felt that the term “particularly” would be an improvement.

Because time was running out, Mr. Cutler asked the Council to turn to the fourth problem, namely, the rising position of Communist China. He again read the statement of the problem and the consequence for U.S. security, as follows:

“The Problem:

“Communist China continues its economic and military growth. It is increasingly treated as a great power in the international community, passing its potential local rivals for leadership in the Far East and exerting greater influence in the Communist bloc.

“Consequences for U.S. security include:

• “a. Implications for Free Asia. Non-Communist Asians are increasingly sensitive to Peiping’s preponderant military power and rapid economic growth. Neither of its potential rivals, India or Japan, exerts a successful counter-influence in the area. Elsewhere, most of the other Free Asian states, including India, have been unable to match its rapid economic development.
• “b. Acceptance. Present trends will require increasing effort and resources in order for the United States to prevent Communist China from being admitted to the UN and recognized by additional Governments, and could ultimately jeopardize the continuation of an independent Taiwan unless protected by an acceptable general settlement.
• “c. Sino-Soviet Relations. The increasing role of Communist China in the affairs of the bloc could create opportunities for the United States to exert divisive pressures on Sino-Soviet relations.”

Mr. Cutler pointed out that the statement of the problem and the consequences did not represent the view of any department of the Executive Branch, but only of himself and the members of the Planning Board. He thereafter inquired whether there were any views as to the increasing strength of Communist China and the difficulties that this increasing strength would pose in the future for the United States.

Secretary Dulles replied that he disagreed more strongly with this portion of NSC 5707 than with any other part of the report. It seemed to him that the statement on the rising position of Communist China fully accepted the view that Communist China represented the wave of the future for Asia and that we must accommodate ourselves to this alleged fact. Such views as to the wave of the future prevailed not so very long ago with respect to the Soviet Union in Europe, but certain things had happened, and happened quite recently, to make the situation appear quite otherwise. These same people now feel that the wave of the future is with the Free World countries and not the Communist powers. Everywhere in the world the local Communist Parties have weakened, their discipline gone and their loyalty to Moscow seriously impaired. Indeed, Communist weakness generally had been so exposed that the Communist regimes could no longer even be sure of the loyalty of their own younger generations, who had been brought up with knowledge of nothing but Communist regimes. Thus Communism is not the wave of the future, but is rather a receding wave.

Secretary Dulles further predicted that developments would in the future come in Communist China which would just as effectively prove that Communism was not the wave of the future in Europe. Therefore, Secretary Dulles thought that there was no point whatsoever in the argument that we must make some kind of a bargain with Communist China in order to save Taiwan—for example, admitting Communist China into the United Nations. In the future—perhaps in one year, two years, five years—Communist China will be on the defensive. There is no need for the United States or the Free World, therefore, to accommodate to the Communist Chinese and give them what they want—the view which seems to be implicit in this section of NSC 5707. Indeed, NSC 5707 might be described as a rather dangerous paper. The Secretary said he had been informed that the Filipino Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs had informed his Government that the “policy planning board” had now come to believe that the United States would be obliged to recognize Communist China. The Filipino official was, of course, disturbed and dismayed at this report.

Mr. Cutler pointed out that nowhere did NSC 5707 say anything about recognizing Communist China. Secretary Dulles answered that the paper certainly implied such recognition by the United States. Mr. Cutler said that obviously, then, Secretary Dulles did not agree with position taken by the Planning Board in this section of NSC 5707.

The President immediately returned to the presumed leak of information about the contents of NSC 5707. He pointed out that if this report had been carefully held in the Planning Board, and none of the members of the Council had seen it until today or very recently, how did this Filipino official see the paper? He said that it made him feel almost as though he ought to abolish all meetings, all conferences, and all reports.

Mr. Cutler commented that if the Planning Board was stopped from discussing all alternatives to existing policy, he was unable to see how it could continue to perform its business. The President replied that he did not quarrel in the least with the alternatives and policies discussed in the Planning Board. The real problem was how the contents of this paper had leaked. These leaks were altogether frightening. Mr. Cutler then stated that he knew our policy on Communist China was a sacred cow, and that he himself was personally responsible for raising this issue in NSC 5707. To this, the President replied that he had no objections to raising the issue, but he wanted these issues kept strictly within the limits of the Planning Board and the Council. Secretary Dulles then expressed doubt whether this paper itself had leaked out. The fact of the matter was that the Filipino official had got hold of an idea which was set forth in the paper.

The President went on to say that the Planning Board had the right to discuss anything that it felt it should discuss in an NSC paper, including the desirability of the assassination of the President; but whatever it discussed, the contents of the discussion must be kept secret. Mr. Cutler stated his view that leaks in this Government came from people whose ox was being gored, and he very much doubted that any disclosure could be traced to a member of the Planning Board. But in any event, he gathered from the discussion of this item that the Planning Board statement on the problem of the rising position of Communist China was not acceptable to the Council. He added, turning in the direction of Mr. Allen Dulles, that the views expressed by the Council on this matter seemed very different from those which were found in the National Intelligence Estimate.

Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that the State Department intelligence people had concurred in the reference National Intelligence Estimate, and Mr. Cutler proceeded to read the statements in the NIE concerning Communist China and Taiwan.

Secretary Dulles said that the course of action which would most certainly undermine the Chinese Nationalist Government on Taiwan and lose the island to the Communists, would be a general settlement between the United States and Communist China. The President said that he agreed with this statement of Secretary Dulles.

Mr. Cutler then directed the Council to the statement of the fifth problem, on the rise of nationalism, which read as follows:

“The Problem:

“The sharply accelerated growth of nationalism and anti-colonialism in Asia and Africa increases both aspirations for a better life and the risk of local conflicts between these newly emerging states.

“Consequences for U.S. security include:

• “a. Local Conflict While generally wishing to follow a policy of non-alignment, these countries will seek political support and military aid from the United States or the USSR in their disputes with each other. In the Middle East, particularly, this process could become cumulative—even to the point of hostilities involving the United States and the USSR.
• “b. Economic Development If aspirations for economic development are frustrated, the likelihood will be increased that extremist elements will come into power. Capabilities in Asia and Africa for economic development vary widely; in some countries the principal problem is lack of administrative and technical skills; in others, additional resources are the major need.
• “c. Base Arrangements. In the Asian-African area, as well as throughout the rest of the world, the retention of U.S. bases has been complicated by the rise of nationalism and lessened concern over Soviet aggression, and by pressures for additional economic aid and military assistance.”

Mr. Cutler expressed the view that there was not much need to discuss this problem at length, but that he would very much desire the views of the Secretary of State on the sixth problem, namely, the increasing role of the United Nations. He read the statement of the problem and the consequences for U.S. security, as follows:

“The Problem:

“The UN General Assembly’s involvement in world problems is increasing. The UN’s considerable prestige makes it a useful instrument not only for preventing or localizing small-power conflicts but also for gaining world support for U.S. policies. However, its membership today includes many countries which do not have the direct interest or ability to act in a responsible way.

“Consequences for U.S. security include:

• “a. Voting Procedures. The growing influence in the UN of nationalist-neutralist forces, as well as the unwillingness of the USSR to abide by certain UN decisions, may lead at times to UN action or inaction contrary to U.S. interests. This may require a re-examination of U.S. attitudes toward the UN.
• “b. Decreased U.S. Reliance. Decreased support of the UN by the United States would, however, undermine the UN’s prestige and its usefulness as a means of settling or limiting international disputes and indirectly damage U.S. prestige.

Mr. Cutler then added some explanatory remarks about the discussion of the problem in the Planning Board.

Secretary Dulles said that, of course, there was a certain risk involved in the increased use of the United Nations, but it was not a very great risk. He recalled that at the very beginning of the UN, at the San Francisco meeting, he had forecast a time when the UN could be conceivably dominated by influence hostile to the United States. This prediction had been made in connection with discussions of the right of withdrawal from the UN. Nevertheless, he went on, U.S. influence in the UN is today greater than it has ever been before, despite the recent admission of a number of Soviet bloc countries. Even in Western Europe the attitude toward the United Nations is improving again. The recent debates on Algeria and Cyprus resulted in unanimous resolutions which pleased everybody. Secretary Dulles said he still believed that the UN is so constituted that if we have a sound defensible position, that position will not be overridden by the pro-Soviet bloc. On the whole, UN developments were encouraging if they were properly used. Of course, the voting procedure is bad and we should probably have some system of weighted voting, as he had once recommended. There should also have been a Charter review, but we were unable to get a review of the UN Charter because this objective was blocked by the very countries who are now squawking loudest about the voting procedures in the United Nations. An example of this is M. Spaak and his article on the UN in the January issue of Foreign Affairs.¹²

Governor Stassen inquired whether Secretary Dulles would not agree that the voting procedure in the United Nations is, theoretically at least, a risk to the United States. There was always the possibility of a number of little countries banding together.

Mr. Cutler said there was only time for a mention of the seventh and final problem, Continuing Budgetary Strains; but since this problem would be developed more fully at the next meeting of the Council on the subject of basic national security policy, it would be enough simply to read through the statement of this problem, which Mr. Cutler proceeded to do, as follows:

“Projections of the budget through FY 1961 demonstrate that the United States faces the prospect of continuing budgetary strains, and possibly the return of substantial deficits. Taking the most optimistic assumption of uninterrupted U.S. economic growth at a rate of $16 billion per year, presently approved programs would result in expenditures rising at least as rapidly as revenues through FY 1960 at present tax rates. On the assumption, which Treasury and Budget consider more realistic for planning purposes, that economic growth over this period is interrupted at some time by an adjustment at least as large as that in 1954, expenditures for present programs would result in sizable deficits.

“Assuming such an adjustment, a tax reduction of $6 billion, less than in 1954, would increase the budget gap to nearly $10 billion unless programs are cut. It is quite possible that Congress may in any event impose a tax reduction during this period.”

Mr. Cutler also briefly described the Annex to NSC 5707, which dealt with economic considerations and the budgetary and fiscal outlook for the next few years.

With respect to this problem and Mr. Cutler’s comments on it, the President stated that he was terribly interested in finding ways and means by which we can reduce or eliminate some of our programs. We have got to find ways and means of doing this. It was not so much a matter of the present costs of these programs, but the increasing costs of their upkeep. The President also expressed some doubt about the view that a tax cut would surely mean a loss of revenue to the Government. Under certain circumstances, a tax cut could actually result in an increase in the receipts of the Government rather than a decrease.

The National Security Council:¹³

a. Noted the comments of the Director of Central Intelligence on the highlights of the most recent “Estimate of the World Situation” (NIE 100–3–57, dated January 29, 1957).

b. Noted and discussed the reference report on the subject (NSC 5707).

c. Agreed that, in its current Review of Basic National Security Policy, the NSC Planning Board should proceed along the lines set forth in the reference memorandum of February 19, 1957, as further developed by Mr. Cutler at this meeting.

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Gleason on March 1.
2. NSC 5602/1 is printed as Document 66. NIE 100–3–57 was not declassified. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files) NSC 5707, “Review of Basic National Security Policy: Basic Problems for U.S. Security Arising Out of Changes in the World Situation,” dated February 19, is not printed. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5707 Memoranda) The February 19 memorandum is not printed. (Ibid.)
3. Neither the briefing note nor the minutes has been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files.
4. The Annex is attached to NSC 5707 in Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5707 Memoranda.
5. One Member emphasizes the possibility that the Soviets might gamble on surprise attack if they believed they could effectively knock out U.S. retaliatory capacity. [Footnote in the source text.]

6. Some Members wish to insert the following at this point:

   The public confidence may be shaken if it comes to believe (1) that U.S. military power, which is increasingly being organized around the use of nuclear capabilities, is probably canceled out by powerful Soviet offensive nuclear capabilities and defense capabilities; (2) that U.S. nuclear capabilities are probably not usable to counter Soviet actions in various parts of the world which threaten U.S. interests; (3) that U.S. non-military defenses cannot secure U.S. survival as an effective community against the now known dangers of widespread fall-out in addition to other nuclear devastation. [Footnote in the source text.]

7. Some members believe the following subparagraph should be included at this point:

   Internal Security. The likelihood is increasing that the Soviets will place greater reliance upon covert activities against the Free World in general and on subversive activities directed against underdeveloped areas in particular. [Footnote in the source text.]

8. Footnotes 6 and 7 above.
9. A memorandum of conversation between the President and Erich Ollenhauer, leader of the West German Social Democratic Party, on February 28 is scheduled for publication in volume XXVII.
10. Guy Mollet, Prime Minister of France, visited the United States February 26-28.
11. Not further identified. Regarding conversations between Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd and Dulles at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial meetings in Paris, December 11–14, 1956, see vol. XVI, pp. 1278 ff.
12. Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, “The West in Disarray,” Foreign Affairs, vol. XXXV, January 1957, pp. 184–190.
13. Paragraphs a–c that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1675, approved by the President on March 1. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)