Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

109. Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)¹

Washington, February 25, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Basic Military Planning Concept to Govern Planning and Development of the Mobilization Base

1. NSC Action No. 1503–b noted the President’s request that the Secretary of Defense together with the Joint Chiefs of Staff make a thorough analysis and report on the basic military planning concept which should govern the planning and development of the mobilization base.²

2. I believe that the new strategic concept (Appendix A), prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by me, provides the basic military planning concept which should govern the planning and development of the U.S. mobilization base. This strategic concept provides for two military eventualities: (a) cold war or military conflict short of general war and (b) general war, initiated with an atomic onslaught by the Soviets or as a result of hostilities which were not initially intended to lead to general war. The U.S. mobilization base must be fully responsive to these eventualities.

3. The introduction of atomic weapons into the military arsenal, and the change which these weapons have made in our strategic concepts of war, dictate a change in logistic planning. In the past, emphasis has been placed on the capability of our industrial facilities to expand for support of our forces in time of war. Our capability of expanding our industrial capabilities was, in fact, an essential element in our U.S. mobilization base. Our experience in past wars made it possible for us to forecast military requirements over an extended period. We were able to economize in times of peace by producing and stockpiling only those military supplies which would be required in war before industrial production could meet the demand. Our time and space advantages were the keys which permitted this type of mobilization planning.

4. The present concept concerning the initiation of a general war by a surprise atomic attack eliminates, for all practical purposes, the effect of our previous time and space advantages from mobilization planning. Our concept of the U.S. mobilization base, as related to potential industrial expansion after war commences, must be brought into agreement with this particular aspect of the strategic concept. Pre-D-day planning for mobilization will improve our capabilities to conduct general war. Our U.S. mobilization base should continue to provide for possible peripheral wars both with and without direct participation by U.S. forces. We must develop logistic objectives that are in consonance with our concepts of general war which will restore to the maximum the advantage previously afforded by time and space factors of our geography.

5. In consonance with our strategic concept (Appendix A) and Basic National Security Policy, the U.S. mobilization base should at this time be so planned and developed that for both general war and conflict short of general war it will:

a. Maintain the active forces in a condition of optimum readiness to execute initial wartime missions.

b. Maintain and support selected reserve forces in a condition of high readiness.

c. Maintain and support the phased expansion to the M + 6 months force levels.

d. Have the capacity to meet the combat requirements of all forces which would be mobilized by M+6 months.

e. Provide pre-D-day stocks of selected supplies and equipment outside the United States reasonably protected to insure that those forces surviving the enemy atomic attack will have a reasonable capability of performing assigned initial tasks effectively despite substantial interruption of resupply from the United States during the initial phase of war.

6. In summary the U.S. mobilization base should be predicated on a military planning concept for meeting two distinctively different mobilization problems:

a. Conflict without damage to the U.S. production base.

b. Conflict characterized by atomic attack on the U.S.

Therefore, mobilization planning must be designed to meet the different eventualities outlined above with emphasis on those elements that will increase our D-day readiness and capability.

7. Your attention is invited to the fact that, for military planning purposes, the strategic concept provides that in military operations short of general war atomic weapons will be used when required in order to achieve military objectives (Appendix A—para. 2–f, page 8). It is understood, of course, that the actual use of these weapons in such a contingency is dependent upon Presidential authorization as set forth in para. 11 of Basic National Security Policy (NSC 5602/1).³

8. It is requested that this memorandum and Appendix A be given a special limited distribution and that the contents be subject to special security precautions with access limited to those individuals having a strict “need-to-know”.

C.E. Wilson⁴

Appendix “A”

STRATEGIC CONCEPT

1. Strategic Concept for General War Beginning 1 July 1960

a. In the event of general war, a war in which the armed forces of the USSR and of the United States are overtly engaged, the basic military objective of the U.S. Armed Forces is the defeat of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to a degree which will assure the accomplishment of the U.S. national objectives in order to preserve the security of the United States and its fundamental values and institutions. It is the policy of the United States that atomic weapons will be integrated with other weapons in the arsenal of the United States. [1 sentence (18 words) not declassified]

b. General war may be initiated either by the Soviets with an atomic onslaught with little or no warning or may be the result of hostilities short of general war which were not initially intended to lead to general war.

c. A general war would consist of two phases, an initial phase of comparatively short duration, and a subsequent phase of indeterminate duration. The initial phase would be characterized by an intensive exchange of atomic blows and the initiation of operations and deployments by Army, Naval and Air Force forces designed to achieve strategic advantage. During this period, the U.S. atomic capability would be exploited fully, to the end that enemy military losses and the loss of the war-making capacity directly supporting enemy forces would be such as to either (a) bring about his capitulation or (b) provide a margin of relative advantage to the United States and its Allies sufficient to assure victory in the subsequent phase of operations. This subsequent phase would be a continuation of the initial phase operations, probably at reduced atomic intensity, and follow-up offensive operations to achieve victory and attain Allied war objectives. The ultimate strategy adopted, as well as the duration and outcome of this subsequent phase, will depend largely on the relative advantage achieved in the initial phase and the remaining relative capabilities.

d. Prior to the outbreak of a general war which developed as an outgrowth of a local or limited war the United States might achieve a significant degree of mobilization, deployment and commitment of resources. Such deployments might not improve our posture for general war. At any time during hostilities short of general war the USSR might initiate a large scale atomic attack, but the alertness of the Allies, the defense preparations and the deployments achieved might reduce casualties to civilian populations and to military forces and establishments from the proportions to be expected in a general war initiated by surprise Soviet atomic attack. However, once a large-scale atomic exchange has taken place, the war situation would probably develop along similar lines to a general war initiated by a surprise atomic attack but with greater Allied capability remaining after the atomic exchange.

e. The United States, in collaboration with its Allies, will:

(1) Defend the continental United States.

(2) Defend vital areas in the Western hemisphere and overseas.

(3) Destroy or reduce the military potential of the enemy by conducting offensive operations against the military forces of the enemy and the war-making capacity directly supporting those forces.

(4) Conduct operations required to maintain control of essential sea areas and protect vital sea communications.

(5) During the initial phase, conduct a strategic defense in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East.

(6) Subsequent to the initial phase, and as dictated by the military situation then existing, conduct such operations as may be required to achieve Allied war objectives. Consequently, only broad guidance in terms of military objectives can now be determined for the conduct of operations in the subsequent phase.

(7) Accelerate the phased expansion of all U.S. military forces.

2. Strategic Concept for Cold War or for Military Conflict Short of General War Beginning 1 July 1960

a. The basic objective of U.S. national security policy is to preserve the security of the United States and its fundamental values and institutions. During a period of cold war or military conflict short of general war, the Sino-Soviet Bloc regimes can be expected to continue to prosecute through various means an expansionist policy detrimental to the security of the United States and Allies. Military conflict short of general war becomes more likely during this period because of the mutual deterrence to general war resulting from the possession by both sides of the capability to destroy each other even after a surprise attack. Unstable areas of the world, disagreement among nations of the Free World, and fear of atomic destruction will probably offer opportunities for the Sino-Soviet Bloc regimes to exploit subversion and covert or overt armed aggression.

b. The United States and its Allies reject the concept of preventive war or acts intended to provoke war. A basic aim of U.S. military policy is to deter the Sino-Soviet Bloc from using its military power. Hence, during a period of cold war or military conflict short of general war, it is the policy of the United States to affect the conduct of the Sino-Soviet Bloc regimes, especially that of the USSR, in ways that further U.S. security interest and encourage tendencies that lead them to abandon expansionist policies.

c. The military position of the United States for a period of cold war or military conflict short of general war will be influenced by the support and cooperation of appropriate major Allies and certain other Free World countries. The United States must convince its Allies that U.S. strategy and policy serve their security as well as that of the United States. Military assistance will be provided by the United States as necessary to insure the availability of strategic bases and key military facilities and to enable other nations of the Free World to develop forces capable of maintaining internal security, of conducting defensive action against military aggression, and where practicable, of contributing to the collective military power of the Free World. In general this military assistance should be consonant with the economic capability of each nation, except where political or military considerations overrule and should include, wherever appropriate, new weapons and advanced technology.

d. The United States with its Allies must defeat the shifting tactic of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, and improve the relative strategic position of the Free World. This will require military forces capable of:

(1) Providing a position of strength from which to influence international negotiations for peaceful settlement of basic differences.

(2) Reinforcing and exploiting U.S. political, economic, psychological and other actions in the Free World and elsewhere.

(3) Demonstrating U.S. intent and readiness to discharge its mutual security and treaty obligations.

(4) Deterring aggression.

(5) Maintaining the security of the United States, and readiness for initial tasks in a general war.

(6) Dealing swiftly and decisively with military aggression short of general war on a scale best calculated to achieve U.S. objectives and avoid the hostilities broadening into general war.

e. The United States military posture must provide:

(1) A forward deployment of U.S. ready military forces prepared to conduct operations immediately, from positions strategically selected both to counter local aggression and to carry out the initial tasks in a general war.

(2) Mobile ready forces, principally based upon U.S. territory, which can be deployed rapidly to provide reinforcement to forward deployed forces and indigenous forces in defeating aggression, or to fight unassisted in the event forward deployed forces are not available and effective indigenous forces are lacking.

(3) An atomic retaliatory capability, adequately safeguarded and ready for immediate and effective action.

(4) A defense system, including the use of atomic weapons, which will provide an acceptable destruction probability against attacks which the Soviets are capable of launching against the North American continent, in order to protect the war-making capacity and resources of the Western Hemisphere.

(5) Forces as necessary to provide the capability of maintaining essential land areas and sea and air communications.

f. [remainder of paragraph (20 words) not declassified]

g. Although military operations short of general war are not intended to provoke general war, military or political conditions might be created which would precipitate the initiation of general war by the USSR. Further, the United States, under expanding military operations, might achieve a significant degree of mobilization. Therefore, the deliberate initiation of general war by the USSR under these conditions is considered to be unlikely. It would obviously be more advantageous to the USSR to initiate general war by a surprise atomic attack on the United States.

1. Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Military and Naval Policy. Top Secret. Attached to a memorandum from Gleason to the NSC, dated March 1, not printed.
2. Regarding NSC Action No. 1503, see footnote 5, Document 52.
3. Document 66.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.