Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

107. Memorandum for the Files by the Deputy Under Secretary of State’s Special Assistant (Bennett)¹

Washington, January 30, 1957.

The following material consists of excerpts from an oral briefing offered Governor Herter at the Pentagon on Friday, January 25, which it seems appropriate to make of record. Governor Herter was accompanied by Deputy Under Secretary Murphy. The statements recorded below are reported principally from the presentation in Mr. Gordon Gray’s office by Mr. Charles Sullivan, Director of the Office of Special International Affairs.

1. The Defense Department considers that atomic capability is a definite part of our military armor today. While we should be restrained in our publicity and should not go about flexing our muscles, we should not hide this fact of atomic power. The success of the SEATO maneuver, Operation Firm Link, at Bangkok last year is a case in point.² Honest John rockets with conventional warheads were used in that operation. Despite serious concern beforehand over reaction in Asia to this step, the operation was highly successful and there was no adverse publicity anywhere except, as to be expected, in the communist press. Failure to include atomic capability openly in our military posture would in Defense opinion raise doubts in Asian minds as to the firmness of U.S. intentions to defend our Asian partners.

2. With respect to NATO, reported UK plans to cut its forces in half could have very serious consequences.³ Such reductions might well start a steady erosion of NATO forces. There is even some feeling in the Pentagon that U.S. forces assigned to NATO could be deeply cut. The prevailing Defense viewpoint is that the UK cannot cut its forces, even with the intent to restore the balance with atomic weapons, and maintain the same strength. NATO strength measured against NATO commitments is already at rock bottom.

3. There is encouraging progress in new weapons, both in U.S. capacity to produce and supply such weapons and in our allies’ capacity to absorb them in their military structures and employ them. [2 sentences (44 words) not declassified]

4. The problem of operating bases in foreign countries is a constant preoccupation. The U.S. now has base rights in 38 countries, and negotiations involving some aspect of base rights are presently going on in some 20 countries. Exaggerated nationalism and constantly rising demands for increased payments and other forms of U.S. aid in exchange for base rights are coming to raise serious questions in some areas as to whether a given base is worth its cost both in financial terms and in terms of deteriorating U.S. relations.

The dollar worth of a base is difficult to estimate, although Defense attempts to calculate it on a completely pragmatic basis. What we are willing to pay to obtain a base depends in some measure on our investment already there (we have put $70 million into the Dhahran air base of which $20-25 million worth could be moved out if we should give it up) and is affected greatly by other bases which we may have in the same general area.⁴ For instance, the price we were willing to pay in connection with the recent five-year extension agreement with Libya was keyed to our knowledge that the financial terms of any agreement are quickly known in other countries.⁵ In the case of Libya we had always to bear in mind that negotiations with Saudi Arabia and Morocco⁶ were coming along soon. As between the Libyan base and the Dhahran air base in Saudi Arabia, Dhahran is more expendable. With respect to Morocco, the Moroccans have been talking in terms of a total of about $430 million in payments and aid. It is anticipated that this unrealistic amount can be substantially scaled down in the negotiations. With respect to Spain, we have already programmed $350 million in aid to Spain through FY 1957 in return for the ten-year treaty which began running in 1953, and already the Spaniards are asking for more.⁷ The JCS is thinking of giving up some of the Spanish bases, or at least not proceeding with planned construction, in view of the availability of the Moroccan facilities (unless, of course, the Moroccan situation should deteriorate).

5. With respect to future base negotiations conducted abroad, staff thinking in Defense is toward avoiding the use of high level missions from Washington in the future. Special representatives of high rank for negotiating purposes invariably results in the host country setting its sights higher and demanding a larger price. The recent Philippine negotiations offer an outstanding example of this point.⁸ Experience would indicate that we would profit through the development in the Defense Department of a small group of personnel highly qualified in the business of base negotiations. Individuals from this group would be available for temporary assignment abroad to assist the resident U.S. Ambassador in the conduct of future negotiations for military facilities.

6. Both in the session in Mr. Gray’s office (presided over by Karl Harr⁹ due to the illness of Mr. Gray) and in the later conversation in Deputy Secretary Robertson’s office, the dilemma of thermonuclear power was touched on. If we have nuclear weapons of such enormous power that we fear to use them because of the consequences which might ensue, and if our enemy knows that we fear to use our power because of the danger of the consequences, then what is the real value of that power as an arm of diplomacy? There was also discussed the other horn of the dilemma—the increasing economic pressures and inflationary dangers at home flowing from the staggering cost of modem day defense equipment.

WTB

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.12–HE/1–3057. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Christian A. Herter, Murphy, and S/S.
2. Regarding Operation Firm link, see vol. XXI, pp. 177–179.
3. For the British announcement of reductions in their armed forces, see The New York Times, April 5, 1957, pp. 1 and 4.
4. For documentation on the Dhahran airbase, see vol. XIII, pp. 249 ff.
5. For documentation on the bases agreement with Libya, see vol. XVIII, pp. 415 ff.
6. For documentation on the negotiations on bases with Morocco, see ibid., pp. 511
7. Documentation on the Spanish bases is scheduled for publication in volume XXVII.
8. For documentation on the Philippine negotiations, see vol. XXII, pp. 579 ff.
9. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for National Security Council Affairs and Plans, ISA.