Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, National Security Policy, Volume XIX

103. Memorandum of Discussion at the 308th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, January 3, 1957¹

Washington, January 3, 1957

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1-3. Portions of item 3 entitled “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security” are printed in the editorial note, volume XXII, page 338.]

4. Definition of the Term “Limited Initial Resistance” (NSC Action No. 1599; NSC 5612/1; NSC 5617; NSC 5701;² Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia”, dated January 2, 1957³)

Mr. Lay asked the President and the Council whether they wished now to consider the definition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the term “limited initial resistance”. The President replied that he had read such definitions over a long period of years, and hadn’t on the whole found them very helpful. He then read to himself the JCS memo⁴ which had been distributed to the members of the Council at the beginning of the meeting (covered by the reference memorandum of January 2). Upon finishing the memorandum, the President commented that he had “nothing against it”. He then went on to observe that what we ought to do with these underdeveloped countries was, in the first place, to see that by virtue of our military assistance program these countries have forces strong enough to assure internal stability. Thereafter it should be the objective of our program to see that they have sufficient forces to prevent enemy infiltration of their borders, and perhaps a small resistance force. That, however, was about the limit. In Pakistan we had certainly gone much too far, the more so because attacks by the Soviet Union will not be made on these countries in isolated fashion. Nor would the United States ever be likely to fight in India or in Pakistan. If we have to fight, we will fight in Moscow in order not to have to fight in Washington.

Secretary Humphrey warned the Council that we would never get out of our financial and economic troubles in connection with our assistance programs until we genuinely revised the objectives of our national security policies vis-à-vis the different foreign countries.

Mr. Brundage expressed the opinion that the definition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of “limited initial resistance” seemed “pretty good” to him, though he had some qualifications on the time span of 45 days.

The President stated that personally he could scarcely imagine the United States getting deeply involved in war in South Asia with ground forces. The area was simply too peripheral to our vital interests. [1 sentence (35 words) not declassified]

The President commented, with respect to the discussion of money, that Prime Minister Nehru had not talked money with him at all in the course of his visit.⁵ There was much that was still unclear about Nehru’s policies, but the President said that at the end of his conversations with Nehru he was at least sure of one thing: Nehru did not want Russia running his country.

The National Security Council:⁶

a. Noted and discussed the definition by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly as to the period of time involved in each case, of the term “limited initial resistance” as used in NSC 5612/1 and as applicable to the term “limited resistance to external aggression” used in paragraph 68 of NSC 5617 (subsequently issued as NSC 5701).

b. Noted the President’s statement that the definition of the term “limited resistance” will have to be determined in each case according to we security interests of the United States.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Prepared by Gleason on January 4.
2. Regarding NSC Action No. 1599, dated August 30, 1956, see vol. XXI, p. 250, footnote 14. For text of NSC 5612/1, “U.S. Policy in Mainland Southeast Asia,” dated September 5, 1956, see ibid., p. 253. NSC 5617, “U.S. Policy Toward South Asia,” dated December 7, 1956, was amended and issued as NSC 5701 on January 10, 1957.
3. The January 2 memorandum is filed in the minutes.
4. The memorandum from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, dated December 21, 1956, is printed in volume XXI, p. 276.
5. Prime Minister Nehru of India made an official visit to the United States December 16–20.
6. Paragraphs a–b that follow constitute NSC Action No. 1649, approved by the President on January 10. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)