Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Africa, Volume XVIII

94. Memorandum of a Conversation, Washington, November 19, 1957¹

Washington, November 19, 1957

SUBJECT

• Algerian Debate in the U.N. General Assembly

PARTICIPANTS

• French Foreign Minister Christian Pineau
• M. Louis Joxe, Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Ambassador Hervé Alphand
• M. Charles Lucet, Minister of the French Embassy
• M. Jean de la Grandville, Counselor of the French Embassy
• M. Francois de Laboulaye, Counselor of the French Embassy
• M. Francois de Rose, Chief of the Treaty Section of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs General André Martin, Deputy for Air to the French Chief of Staff
• M. Albert du Chalet of the French Atomic Energy Commissariat
• The Secretary of State
• Mr. Adlai Stevenson
• Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary
• Mr. G. Frederick Reinhardt, Counselor
• Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary for EUR
• Mr. Walter N. Walmsley, Deputy Assistant Secretary for IO
• Mr. Joseph Palmer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for NEA
• Mr. John N. Irwin, II, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
• Mr. B.E.L. Timmons, RA
• Mr. John Bovey, AF/N
• Mr. Matthew Looram, WE

Mr. Pineau stated that with regard to the French Government’s policy on Algeria, the Gaillard Government² had now reintroduced the Loi-Cadre, which had been defeated last September, with two modifications to the original bill. First, in addition to the Algerian territorial assemblies which would be provided for in the bill, there would also be constituted community councils (“conseils des communautés”) in each territory. The role of these councils would be solely to insure that the territorial assemblies did not vote discriminatory measures against the European community. Secondly, the electoral system for Algeria would be set forth in a separate bill linked to the Loi-Cadre. This would provide for proportional representation on a basis of universal suffrage in order to permit an equitable representation of all minorities. These two modifications would provide additional guarantees to the European population without detracting from the basic principles of the Loi-Cadre. During the imminent U.N. General Assembly debate, Mr. Pineau stated, he would set forth the policies of the French Government and the frequent efforts made by the French Government to contact the rebels. These efforts had always failed in view of FLN insistence on the prior condition of France’s recognition of Algerian independence which was, of course, impossible for France to accept. He would stress the favorable evolution of the military situation in Algeria since the last debate and emphasize the fact that despite this success, France still intended to go ahead in working out the political evolution of Algeria. He would also say that the French Government continued to be ready to meet with the rebel leaders at any time and any place to discuss a cease-fire and the security guarantees which would be given the various rebel elements.

In reply to the Secretary’s question as to what type of resolution the French expected to emerge from the debate, Mr. Pineau stated that the French desired a resolution which would resemble as closely as possible the resolution of last February. This was not ideal from the French point of view, but would be acceptable. In any event, France was opposed to any resolution which set up a U.N. “good offices” body or which brought Morocco and Tunisia into the picture. Actually, the Tunisian and Moroccan viewpoints were not the same on this issue. The Tunisian Government wished to act as an intermediary between the FLN and the French Government; this would never be accepted by French public opinion.³ Morocco, on the other hand, seemed to favor working toward a long-term arrangement establishing a French-Maghreb Federation including Algeria and possibly Spain and Italy. This latter idea was precisely his own idea, Mr. Pineau stated. However, he had told the Moroccan Foreign Minister⁴ that such a concept would be jeopardized if it were linked with an immediate solution of the Algerian problem, which on the contrary, must come first. Mr. Pineau thought that it would be preferable to have direct conversations between France and the FLN.

In reply to the Secretary’s question as to the French estimate regarding the support that a resolution such as Mr. Pineau hoped for might get in the General Assembly this year, Mr. Pineau stated that it was as yet difficult to judge. In this connection the Secretary recalled the very considerable personal efforts which Mr. Pineau had made last year in obtaining the support of other delegates. Mr. Pineau stated that he intended to do the same thing as soon as he returned to New York. He thought it would be most helpful if Ambassador Lodge could give him the same cooperation that he had given last February.

The Secretary said it was certainly our feeling that the Algerian situation would not be improved by an acrimonious debate or by a highly controversial solution. He felt, however, that the atmosphere in the U.N. was not as good as last February, when there were hopes that concrete progress might be made by France toward reaching a political solution of the problem. The Secretary said that he had just had a meeting with some of the Ambassadors of the Baghdad Pact countries who had told him they thought it would be good if the Algerian matter could be disposed of without a bitter debate. These countries were, however, thinking in terms of a possible intervention by Morocco and Tunisia in the matter, which would presumably be unacceptable to France.

Mr. Pineau stated that it was unrealistic to put both these countries on the same level in the eyes of the French public. Tunisia could not realistically be of help in this matter. Morocco, on the other hand, might eventually be able to be of assistance, but its possible usefulness would be completely jeopardized if it were endorsed by the U.N. at this juncture as an intermediary in the issue.

The Secretary stated that he fully shared Mr. Pineau’s feeling that progress would not be served by a bitter debate or by the adoption of a resolution unacceptable to France. Basically, it was up to France to find the solution of the problem. The U.S. would be glad to be of help in this matter, but it was difficult to judge at this point what might be the best way of handling the debate. Last year, he stated, the resolution on Algeria had received unanimous approval, whereas it seemed unlikely from present indications of Soviet policy that the U.S.S.R. would go along with any such procedure. It seemed probable that the Soviets would take a vigorous line in championing the Arab cause.

Mr. Pineau stated that according to the French Delegation to the U.N., there was some sentiment in favor of having a short debate and then putting off the voting on any resolution. He inquired whether we had heard of this idea.

The Secretary replied that we had not had any reports of this nature, but that this would appear to be a good solution if it were feasible. There had been no resolution in the recent U.N. debate regarding the Syrian complaint against Turkey. This was the first time that such a procedure had been adopted. The Secretary had long considered that discussions per se in the General Assembly constituted a healthy process and that final resolutions were not necessarily required. He thought, however, that tactically it would be unwise for the French to put forward the idea in the first instance that there should be no resolution following the Algerian debate. It might eventually prove feasible, nevertheless, in the face of several proposed resolutions, none capable of obtaining a two-thirds majority, that the debate could be terminated without a resolution. Any realistic assessment of the situation, however, would have to await the outcome of Mr. Pineau’s efforts in New York.

Mr. Pineau agreed and stated that after he had canvassed the Delegates at the U.N., he would ask Ambassador Alphand to see the Secretary and to discuss the situation as it appeared at that time. The Secretary agreed and stated that he would also be in touch with Ambassador Lodge in the meantime.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/11–1957. Confidential. Drafted by Looram.
2. The Gaillard government assumed power on November 5..
3. The United States was considering a formula involving Moroccan and Tunisian good offices. (Telegram 1776 to Paris, November 8; Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/11–757)
4. Ahmed Balafrej.