Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

286. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, April 15, 1957—3 p.m.

780. Re Suez. 1. In light developments reported in various telegrams, suggest further consideration be given to whether SC action at this time on Egyptian draft declaration would be advantageous to US.

2. Chief objective of UK according to their explanation to us here and to Dept as reflected in Deptel 3403 to Cairo² is to reach interim arrangement for use of Canal without prejudice to final settlement. Dixon has told US this is essentially face-saving device. Possibility SC action seriously prejudicing ability obtain any further modifications in Egyptian position seem to US so strong that other method than SC discussion on Egypt–US negotiations should be sought to make this interim arrangement possible. Unlikely we would now meet UK Easter deadline anyway.

3. Numerous indications French indecisiveness on desirability SC session and Lodge’s report Lloyd’s expressed doubts to French (Paris 5286)³ indicate ambiguity their positions. Nasser’s immediate reactions our suggestion SC action (Cairo 3234)⁴ show Egypt will probably take stiff line in SC and may even revert from present position to original declaration. SYG’s reaction to SC session as reported yesterday (USUN 775)⁵ was that Egypt would be likely to stand firm on present position with undesirable political support, and that UK and France might again be looking for opportunity to prove UN (and US) failure.

4. In summary it seems to us that in absence Egyptian concurrence US would have little to gain from SC meeting and might be risking much. Egypt might be forced to rely on USSR veto. It would sharpen disagreement between US and Egypt on draft declaration without offering much hope for any significant changes. It could expose UN to further UK-French charges of impotence and would probably leave US in position where neither UK nor France pleased and Egyptians alienated.

5. Hare’s suggestion that SYG be allowed to pick up negotiations again (Cairo 3213)⁶ may be worth considering. As Dept aware SYG has retained free hand to make further comments on draft declaration dealing with points of primary interest to US (USUN 776 and 774).⁷

6. After reflecting on all the foregoing, our conclusion is that there is less likelihood of getting desirable modifications in Egyptian position from public action in SC than from further efforts at private negotiations, and serious risk that we will obtain less than we have now, with resulting loss of prestige and influence for the US. In these circumstances, it seems preferable to put the best face possible on what we can finally get by private talks. In so doing we may well be able to lead Egyptians into practical arrangements which will reinforce the paper guarantees which they have given. This should not be too difficult for UK if they are sincere in saying that they want to find a face-saving device to accept what we have been able to get. Viewing the situation from here, we are strongly of opinion that our best interests will be served by presenting in best light we can what we are finally able to achieve directly with Egyptians. We stand to lose so much more than UK stands to gain.

Wadsworth

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/4–1557. Secret; Priority. Received at 4:38 p.m.
2. Document 283.
3. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/4–1557)
4. Supra.
5. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/4–1457)
6. Document 284.
7. Telegram 774 from USUN, April 13, reported that, in response to an Egyptian request, Hammarskjöld planned to give Loutfi his comments on the revised draft declaration. After U.S. officials objected, Hammarskjöld agreed to withhold his comments until he had received the U.S. views. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/4–1357) Upon receipt of telegram 774, which also included a summary of Hammarskjöld’s proposed comments, the Department of State notified the Mission in New York that the comments created serious problems for the United States, as substantive discussions between the Secretary-General and the Egyptians at this time would enable the latter to finalize their present text in advance of any Security Council action. (Telegram 792 to USUN, April 14; ibid.) Telegram 776 from USUN, April 14, conveyed to Washington the text of a message, given by Hammarskjöld to Fawzi on April 14, stating that Hammarskjöld wished to consider the matter further before offering additional comments on the Egyptian draft declaration. (Ibid., 974.7301/4–1457)