Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

287. Memorandum From the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Howe) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, April 16, 1957.

SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON SUEZ

Ambassador Hare’s negotiations with the Egyptians have produced thus far a revised text of their declaration which is enclosed.² This has not been made public but the British have a copy and Hammarskjold was asked for his comments (by the Egyptians).³

The British meanwhile continued to urge that the matter be taken to the Security Council stating that this will provide the opportunity for the UK to state its intention to pay the tolls to the Canal Authority under protest and thus allow their ships to use the Canal. We had asked the Egyptians whether they would join us in requesting a Security Council meeting.⁴

At this point, Tuesday⁵ morning, the Acting Secretary suggested to the President that we tell the British that, while we remain prepared to meet the commitment made to them, we wondered whether they really want to undertake the risks that Security Council deliberation would entail. The President, however, felt that we should go ahead with the Security Council without reopening the matter with the British.⁶

Late Tuesday afternoon Ambassador Hare telephoned⁷ that the Egyptians responded negatively to our invitation to join in calling the Security Council and at the same time urged us to delay calling a meeting. Ambassador Hare, on a “hunch” felt that we might be getting somewhere in Cairo.

Also late Tuesday afternoon we found that Hammarskjöld’s comments sent to the Egyptians were of a substantive nature which he felt might be helpful in bringing the Egyptian declaration closer to our viewpoint.⁸

In view of these developments and the fact that both Hare and USUN feel strongly that we should not move ahead in the Security Council, the Acting Secretary asked Mr. Dillon to consult the British Ambassador emphasizing two points:

(a) that we intended to honor our commitment but

(b) that in view of the efforts of Hammarskjold and of our continued misgivings with respect to the wisdom of the Security Council action at this time, we believe it desirable to hold off for the time being.

If the British hold to their view we plan on Wednesday to ask that a meeting of the Security Council be called for Thursday afternoon. On this contingency press statements, instructions and opening statements are being prepared.⁹

Incidentally Ambassador Lodge returns from Europe at the end of this week.

The Acting Secretary informed General Goodpaster of these developments and assured him that we would be in touch early Wednesday morning, particularly to give the President adequate briefing for his press conference.

H

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/4–1657. Secret. According to Dulles’ Appointment Book, he was at Duck Island on April 16 but returned to Washington the following morning. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers).
2. See telegram 3201, Document 280.
3. The parenthetical phrase “by the Egyptians” was inserted by hand.
4. See telegram 3403, Document 283.
5. April 16.
6. Prior to the meeting with Eisenhower, Herter met with Dillon, Raymond, Berding, White, Rountree, Murphy, and Howe. According to the memorandum of conversation by Howe, the group agreed that the only apparent reason to go to the Security Council was the commitment given to the British at Bermuda, and it was difficult to see what actually underlay the British insistence. (Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/8–1357) A memorandum of conversation by Goodpaster, dated April 18, records Herter and Dillon’s subsequent conversation with Eisenhower. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Eisenhower Diaries)
7. A memorandum of the telephone conversation between Hare and Rountree, which began at 4:45 p.m. on April 16, is in Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/4–1657.
8. In telegram 787 from USUN, April 16, received at 6:14 p.m., Wadsworth reported that Hammarskjöld had decided to offer his comments on the Egyptian draft declaration, because he had learned from Loutfi that the Soviet Union wanted a meeting of the Security Council so that it could introduce its own proposals for a large conference. Wadsworth commented that in light of the new situation created by this initiative, the U.S. Mission considered the call for a Security Council meeting premature. Wadsworth then quoted in full the comments which Hammarskjöld had sent to Fawzi. (Ibid.) Hammarskjold’s message to Fawzi is printed infra.
9. Dillon briefed Caccia on developments later that day and suggested that Caccia might wish to discuss the matter with Macmillan and Lloyd in time to convey their views on Wednesday morning (April 17). (Memorandum of conversation by Shaw, April 16; Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/4–1657)