285. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
3234. Talked to Nasser this afternoon as instructed Deptel 3403.2 His reaction was mixture of interest, suspicion and uncertainty. He began by saying his instinct was look to possible disadvantages rather than advantages. In first place, could he be sure USG was really seeking agreed solution. I attempted lay this ghost and he seemed reassured.
He next said timing did not seem right. If matter was to be referred to SC, he would think should be at end of talks when we could report agreement or disagreement, not now when discussions incomplete. I conceded this would be logical were it not for very real pressures building up on part of users as Canal goes into operation. There was point beyond which this most difficult withstand. Once again he indicated degree of understanding.
[Page 543]Nasser then said that his greatest worry was unfavorable negotiating position in which he might be placed by reference to SC. Fact is, he said, that 1888 Convention could suffice as basic document to govern use Canal. GOE had however gone further and issued first memorandum. Hammarskjold had then come along and exacted further concessions. Second memorandum then issued and after that we had come on scene and obtained further concessions. Now proposed send matter to SC where document as currently and temporarily revised could be crystallized and taken as basis for further demands; would be question of negotiating in future from six points plus revised declaration. This put GOE in difficult position. If it is desired start off on new line, then should begin again at beginning. Perhaps he was being too pessimistic but it looked as though this would be losing, possibly dangerous, proposition for GOE. However, these were first reactions. He would think over, discuss with Fawzi and let me know. I stressed urgency and asked what he thought of joint sponsorship in event study of matter caused him view reference to SC more favorably. He said no objection joint sponsorship if other doubts could be resolved.
Aside from usual display on resolution, atmosphere of conversation was good. Only hint of possible strong reaction was when, speaking of temporary character of present revisions, Nasser indicated that in event of failure to come to agreed solution GOE would expect return to its original draft.
I expect see Fawzi tomorrow re Richards visit and will follow-up. In fact I asked Nasser if could not have reply by then. He said would try.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 974.7301/4–1457. Secret; Niact. Received at 6:10 p.m. Repeated Priority to London, Paris, and USUN.↩
- Document 283.↩