Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

181. Memorandum of a Conversation, Secretary Dulles’ Residence, Washington, March 2, 1957, 2:25 p.m.¹

Washington, March 2, 1957, 2:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Israeli Withdrawal

• PARTICIPANTS
• Mr. Abba Eban, Israeli Ambassador
• Mr. Reuven Shiloah, Israeli Minister
• The Secretary
• U—Christian A. Herter
• L—Herman Phleger
• NEA—William M. Rountree

Ambassador Eban said he had been in touch with Jerusalem at 3 a.m. and again had telephoned from the airport just before the meeting. The text of the United States statement at the United Nations had been misunderstood, and there was something of a political crisis going on in Israel. He had therefore come to see how to remove this misunderstanding. It was the feeling of his Government that Mrs. Meir’s statement of Friday had taken into account every American suggestion, the text having passed through the closest scrutiny by the Secretary and his associates. Israel thought it had had reason to believe that the speech would evoke a corresponding American statement. The first point of concern to his government with respect to Ambassador Lodge’s speech was fundamental. It had been hoped that our endorsement of the legitimacy of the assumptions stated by Israel would be wholehearted, and Ambassador Lodge’s indication only that the hopes and expectations expressed by Mrs. Meir were “for the most part not unreasonable” had caused considerable difficulty. He cited the positive statement of the French as being more in line with what the Israelis had expected.

Continuing, the Ambassador said that from the Israeli viewpoint the crux of the proposal, in defining the United Nations’ functions, was to extract from the Secretary General’s report of February 22 only certain portions and omit that part which said or implied the arrangement would depend upon the sufferance of Egypt. They had intentionally refrained from speaking of the dependency upon Egypt of the arrangement, and that was extremely important to Israel. In Ambassador Lodge’s speech, however, this had lost its value since he had enlarged the quotation and had placed the United Nations function in the context of Egyptian consent. This, the Ambassador felt, had taken the crux out of the whole plan, since it had put forth Egypt as the source of authority.

The Ambassador recognized that there was a controversy between Israel and the United States regarding the Armistice Agreement. His government was disturbed, however, that in his speech Ambassador Lodge had referred to the Armistice Agreement as the context within which the arrangement should be made. Also, he said, it had been understood that the United States would make it clear that if, after Israel had withdrawn, a situation should arise which threatened peace and tranquility, the United States would take action “within and without the United Nations”. Ambassador Lodge had stated only that the United States would act within the United Nations. The Ambassador complained that this represented a change which, if the Israelis had known was planned, they would have resisted.

The Secretary interjected that what Mr. Lodge had said in lieu of the phrase “within and without the United Nations” was reported incorrectly in the New York Times, and that Ambassador Eban’s comments apparently were based on that inaccurate version. Mr. Lodge had in fact altered the wording somewhat to get away from a phrase used in the Tripartite Declaration, but there had been no change in substance. He quoted the text correctly, which made it clear that under the circumstances mentioned the United States would consult with other members of the United Nations to determine what action they or the United Nations should take.

Summing up, the Ambassador said that his Government had been disturbed by the lack of forthrightness in the American endorsement of the Israeli position; by divergences regarding Gaza between what had been said by Ambassador Lodge and what had been agreed; by wording which had involved Egypt in the responsibility for the administration of Gaza; and by the fact that Ambassador Lodge brought in the Armistice Agreement in connection with a Gaza settlement. He felt the sensitive balance for his Government had been adversely affected. He might have been wrong in not having asked for more assurances regarding United States’ support for the Israeli speech. He had subjected the text of the Israeli speech to scrupulous United States review. From what we had told him, he had gained the impression that there was nothing in the Israeli speech which would not have a United States counterpart, and he had assumed that the American statement would not take up any subjects which had not been discussed. He felt the situation might endanger what had been accomplished, and proposed that the United States try to help overcome the problem thus created.

Responding, the Secretary stated that Ambassador Lodge’s speech was basically what he had shown Ambassador Eban on the evening of February 28.² Mr. Eban had glanced through it and had thought it was all right. He had a copy of the draft which the Ambassador had seen and had checked it carefully against the text delivered by Ambassador Lodge and against the memorandum discussed among the Israeli, French and American officials. There was not in this early draft an expression regarding the hopes and expectations stated by Israel. In his letter delivered after the Ambassador had seen the text, Mr. Eban had asked that something be said to the effect that the hopes and expectations in the Israeli statement were legitimate, or reasonable, or something of that sort. Certainly what Ambassador Lodge said was “something of that sort”. The phrase “for the most part” in Ambassador Lodge’s statement did not qualify the “not unreasonable”. While the negative might have been avoided, the Secretary felt that Mr. Lodge’s statement had adequately met Ambassador Eban’s request. The Secretary repeated that we had not omitted the substance of the wording which had been agreed upon regarding United States consultation with other Nations as to action to be taken if the situation should break down following the Israeli withdrawal. The only reason for any change was to get away from the wording of the Tripartite Declaration.

Concerning Ambassador Eban’s complaint that the Armistice Agreement was mentioned in Ambassador Lodge’s speech, the Secretary pointed out that such a reference had been included in the draft which the Ambassador had seen. The Secretary had written in pencil “within the framework of the Armistice Agreement”³ as something to be picked up in the next draft. The Ambassador knew, the Secretary said, our view with respect to the Armistice Agreement, and recognized that there was a difference of opinion between us. We believed that the Armistice Agreement, unless formally removed, provided the legal framework for any action, and without the Armistice Agreement we could not call for the non-belligerency of the parties and endorse the Israeli right of free passage through the Straits as a non-belligerent. The Secretary could not accept the proposition that Ambassador Lodge’s statement was a derogation of what he thought was the understanding. Perhaps Ambassador Eban should have gone over the draft more completely. Ambassador Lodge, he commented, has had difficulties of a slightly different character from those of the Secretary, since Mr. Lodge was working largely with the Arabs and the Secretary was carrying out close consultation with Israel. He thought that perhaps one of the reasons for the Israeli concern might have been that Ambassador Lodge, in delivering his speech, spoke more emphatically regarding points which would satisfy the Arabs; that, however, was a matter of inflection and represented no departure from the text. Only at the end of the speech did Ambassador Lodge add anything not in the text, which otherwise conformed with what was prepared in Washington. The Secretary repeated that the only change of importance was related to the phrase “within or without the United Nations”, and he did not feel that was an important change. He considered it was a matter of extreme importance that Israel go forward with the implementation of the decision announced on Friday, and said he would be pleased to receive the Ambassador’s present views on that subject.

The Ambassador commented, in connection with the Secretary’s reference to his having seen a draft of Mr. Lodge’s speech, that he had not understood he was being invited carefully to study the text, and of course he did not have time to consult his Government. The Secretary responded that he had not thought there was anything in the text not in harmony with what had been discussed.

Ambassador Eban stated that in view of the detailed discussions which had been held, he recognized that Israel was not entitled to anything beyond that already agreed. The question was what could be done within that context. He wondered whether some way might be found to express the thought that the United States welcomed Israeli assurances regarding full and prompt withdrawal, and to state our understanding that Israel intended to implement this decision forthwith through a meeting with the Chief of Staff of the United Nations forces. The statement might then recall the efforts of the United States, notably the dispatch of the Aide-Mémoire of February 11, to the end that prompt withdrawal would be carried out; refer to the Israeli assumptions; and state positively that those assumptions were reasonable and valid in the light of previous actions by the General Assembly. It might be said specifically that the United States believed that ships of all nations, including Israel, had the right of free passage through the Straits, and that in the United States view the United Nations should carry out the responsibility for the administration of Gaza until a settlement was reached. The statement might point out that this view appeared to be shared by others, and that Israel should place its faith in the United Nations and the determination of friends of justice in implementing with great speed its decision to withdraw. Two points would be extremely valuable: an affirmative rather than a negative statement with respect to Israel’s hopes and expectations, and a definitive statement of the United States view that the United Nations should administer Gaza until there was a settlement.

The Ambassador referred again to the fact that the Secretary General in his statement of February 22 had referred to the Egyptian element with respect to the responsibility for Gaza, and this appeared to have been endorsed by the United States in Ambassador Lodge’s statement. Inclusion of the whole quotation from the Secretary General’s report had weakened the Israeli position.

The Secretary said he did not see how the arrangement for the United Nations forces and administration could be made without Egyptian acquiescence, and he did not want to give the impression that he thought otherwise. He had grounds to hope that the prior consent given by Egypt to the Secretary General would not be withdrawn, but of course he had no assurance that Egypt’s consent would go on indefinitely. He did not know how we could destroy the Armistice Agreement in that respect, and he did not want to imply that we could. He had considerable doubts concerning the desirability of trying to rewrite Ambassador Lodge’s speech. He did not feel that we could or should give any unpublicized assurances to Israel. We had found a very great deal of suspicion that there had been secret understandings and our influence in the United Nations in this matter and our ability to be helpful to Israel depended upon our being able to dissipate suspicions of this sort. The Arabs would be furious, and others would sympathize with them, if it were thought that secret arrangements had been made. What we both wanted was, in fact, to bring about the conditions which Ambassador Eban had described with respect to passage through the Straits and de facto United Nations presence in Gaza. The best way to do this, he thought, was to have Egypt realize that we could not challenge its rights under the Armistice Agreement but that we sought an arrangement whereby Egypt would waive those rights in favor of the United Nations. If we should try to override what we believed to be Egyptian rights, then any acquiescence would disappear. We thought certain aspects of Ambassador Lodge’s speech which Ambassador Eban did not like were in fact aspects which would do most to give the Israelis what they wanted, if what they wanted was to have peace. If Israel desired the arrangement to collapse—and there was suspicion on the part of some, not including ourselves, that either Israel or the Arabs or both desired this—the best way to cause a collapse would be to insist upon the proposition that Egypt had no rights in the Gaza area. Some people thought that what Israel was endeavoring to do was to obtain a General Assembly adjournment on the basis of undertaking to withdraw, and then delay that withdrawal without the disadvantages of the General Assembly being in session to invoke sanctions. The Secretary felt that if Israel did not move with the greatest urgency, and was not prepared on Monday to demonstrate that concrete progress had been made, great trouble would arise. He felt that the Assembly would not adjourn until the Israelis had in fact moved out, since some delegations feared that what was involved was a “stalling operation”. The Secretary thought that the matter could be worked out satisfactorily but, as he had already said, Israel must take some risks. The United States would do all it could to see that the United Nations continued in Gaza, but there could be no guarantees in this regard.

The Ambassador commented that he would not suggest a secret arrangement, and that whatever was done must conform to what had been said between the two governments. It might be possible to find some way of saying publicly that the Israeli hopes and expectations were reasonable, rather than “not unreasonable”.

While the Secretary did not himself see any difference between the two, he was willing to consider this. Mr. Shiloah said he did not suggest rewriting Ambassador Lodge’s speech, but perhaps a statement might be made saying in different words some of the things in that speech.

At this point the Secretary and his associates withdrew so that Ambassador Eban and Mr. Shiloah might consider the type of statement which they felt would be helpful. When the discussion was resumed, Ambassador Eban showed the Secretary the draft.⁴ The Secretary expressed doubt regarding the wisdom of issuing such a statement. He said the President had in mind sending to Prime Minister Ben Gurion today an expression of his gratification that Israel had decided to withdraw. That might be an occasion to express in general terms our hopes for the area and our belief that Israel was not unjustified in relying on the resoluteness of the friends of justice, using words similar to those employed in previous statements. This would, of course, be very general but it might be helpful.

Ambassador Eban thought that the framework for a further American expression would be very good. He wondered whether the President might make some reference to Mrs. Meir’s speech, and say that the President considered her statements reasonable and just in the light of prior action by the General Assembly. The President would not be bound in such a letter to use the same terms as those employed by Ambassador Lodge.

At this point the Secretary left the group to draft the text of the proposed communication from the President. Upon his return he showed the text to Ambassador Eban and Mr. Shiloah. After minor modifications were agreed, Ambassador Eban expressed the view that the proposed letter would be extremely helpful. It was arranged that the Ambassador would telegraph the text informally prior to its formal delivery by Ambassador Lawson. Arrangements were made for its release to the press with an embargo until 12 midnight. The Secretary said that if the letter were sent he did not want to make a statement along the lines proposed by Ambassador Eban.

Ambassador Eban asked if the Secretary had given any thought as to what would happen Monday at the General Assembly. He had hoped that the session would end, and expressed concern regarding the prospects for a continuation of the debate.

The Secretary replied that the principal question was whether the Israelis would in fact withdraw. Today there were rumors that the government would reverse its decision of Friday, and such rumors were of course not helpful. He felt that the United Nations members must have an indication of irrevocable steps being taken by Israel to withdraw before adjournment of the General Assembly. The Secretary had himself no doubt that Israel would carry out its commitment; however most delegations did not share that confidence. Their doubts were to a considerable degree based upon mistrust of Israel’s motives.

The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador had heard of the current Tass reports purporting to set forth secret agreements made between Israel and the United States. The communists were saying that the United States had agreed to give Israel $125 million, and Israel had agreed to provide American military bases in that country. That was why the Secretary had arranged a meeting with the Arab Ambassadors, during the course of which he had denied that any unpublicized arrangements had been made. It was obvious that the Soviet Union was playing a vicious game, and did not want a settlement since it believed that by keeping the waters troubled it could gain in the area.

The Ambassador expressed the view that the Soviets did not want a war in the Middle East, but at the same time did not want peace. Mr. Shiloah felt that the Soviets sought an equal position in the area and would settle for arrangements such as USSR–US control over a Suez board. The Secretary had no doubt that the Soviets had some such an arrangement in mind, at least as a possibility. He said that in London Shepilov had sought something like a US-Soviet condominium over the area. He referred to the great and historical ambitions of the Soviets with respect to the Middle East.

Reverting to the President’s letter to Prime Minister Ben Gurion, Ambassador Eban expressed the hope that Ambassador Lawson could, in delivering the message, say orally in reply to a question from Ben Gurion, that the United States accepted the Israeli formulation regarding its rights to act in self defense.

Mr. Phleger thought it important that any discussions of this matter should be between Ambassador Eban and the Department in Washington rather than by Ambassador Lawson with the Government of Israel. The Secretary agreed and said if Ambassador Eban wished to write a letter stating what he proposed we would be glad to reply.

Concluding the discussion, Ambassador Eban thanked the Secretary for his continued efforts and said that he would press for prompt action on withdrawal. Mr. Shiloah observed that it would take time actually to effect a withdrawal, particularly from the Sharm el-Sheikh area, which was a long distance from Israel or the UNEF. The Secretary pointed out that UNEF forces were in the general vicinity, and he thought they could be placed in the area without substantial delay. Ambassador Eban expressed the hope that he would be able to announce on Monday that there had been a firm agreement on the schedule for the withdrawal and the United Nations takeover.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–257. Secret. Drafted by Rountree. The Department of State transmitted a summary of the conversation to the Embassy in Cairo as telegram 2936, to the Embassy in Tel Aviv as 845, and to USUN by pouch on March 5. (Ibid., 674.84A/3–557)
2. See the attachment to Document 173.
3. This notation does not appear on the copy of the draft statement printed as the attachment to Document 173. No other copy has been found in Department of State files.
4. Not found in Department of State files. Evidently, Dulles telephoned Eisenhower while he was out of the room. A memorandum of conversation by Asbjornson indicates that at 3:40 p.m. Dulles called the President and discussed “a message to Ben Gurion expressing gratification at the outcome of the Middle East problem”. The memorandum of conversation then indicates that Asbjornson was unable to monitor the conversation between Eisenhower and Dulles because “I was taking dictation from Eban”. (Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Telephone Conversations)
5. At 5:25 p.m., Dulles telephoned Eisenhower. The memorandum of telephone conversation by Asbjornson reads as follows: “After drafting a message to Ben Gurion which he cleared with Eban (see attached) the Secretary telephoned the President, read the message to him and the President cleared it. The Secretary also told the President that Eban thought the message would be very helpful.” (Ibid.) The text of Eisenhower’s message to Ben Gurion is infra.