I first took up with him the draft statement to be made by
Israel2 and said I thought
this represented a scrupulous effort to conform to our
understanding. I suggested, however, that in the fourth paragraph
there be introduced “among other things” after “subject”, and that
in the first paragraph of page 2 the reference be direct to the
UN resolution and not via the US
memorandum.
I then showed the Ambassador the draft statement for Ambassador
Lodge on Israeli
withdrawal, draft #3.3 He glanced through it and said it seemed to be
admirable. I pointed out I had not yet myself read it; undoubtedly
there would be some change, but I thought the general tenor would
remain unchanged.
He then said that his Government (and I judge particularly Mrs.
Meir) felt a grave concern
over the danger that the Egyptians might in fact come back into Gaza
and that that would be intolerable to them and create a very
difficult situation for the Government. He wondered if I could not
give him any reassurances on this point and whether I had any
unpublicized information as to what were in fact the Egyptian
intentions. . . . I said to the Ambassador that I had no information
[Page 326]
whatsoever beyond what
was equally available to him in the reports of the Secretary
General. We both I think assumed the Secretary General would not
have made the statements he had made without having obtained what he
thought were assurances from Egypt that they could be carried out,
but even so there was of course the risk that Egypt might
subsequently repudiate these understandings or disavow them. I did
not see how there could be an avoidance of some risk on this score.
I said it was up to Israel to judge whether it was better to take
these risks or to take the risks of staying on in occupation with
the antagonism that that would create toward Israel and with
unpredictable future consequences.
I said that the attitude of the Arabs toward Israeli withdrawal
indicated to my mind at least that the Arabs judged that Israel
would gain by withdrawal, particularly in terms of the
reestablishment of better relations with the US. Obviously the Arabs
had hoped for a permanent breach between Israel and the US and were
grievously disappointed that this prospect was disappearing. They
certainly felt that Israel would gain more by withdrawal than by
staying, and I myself felt this was a fair estimate of the
situation. However, that would have to be judged independently by
Israel.
I said of course the US would use whatever influence it had to bring
about the conditions for which we both hoped, but that it could not
be assumed that just because the US wanted something that it would
automatically happen. I said we had no authority over Egypt.
The Ambassador thanked me and expressed his great appreciation for
the time and effort which I had devoted to this matter. He said he
wished very much that I would be in New York to make the US
presentation. I said this would not be practical. He said he hoped
if Lodge did it that
Lodge would be
thoroughly instructed so he would not be drawn into secondary debate
which might qualify or alter the formal position first put forward.
I said he could be confident that Lodge would be adequately instructed in this
matter.
A few minutes later I received from him a written memorandum asking
me to include a passage that the US considers that the assumptions
and expectations expressed by Israel were legitimate or reasonable
or something of that sort.4
[Attachment]
DRAFT STATEMENT FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE ON ISRAELI
WITHDRAWAL
During the long weeks in which the General Assembly has been
occupied with the grave situation in the Near East, the United
States has sought a solution which would be based on justice and
which would take account of the legitimate interests of all the
parties. The United States position was manifested from the very
beginning in its Resolution before the Security Council which
called upon Israel to withdraw and which called for the
withholding of assistance to Israel if it did not withdraw. The
United States views in this respect have been steadfast and were
most recently and most authoritatively set forth by President
Eisenhower in his
public address of February 20. In this endeavor we have
recognized that it is incompatible with the principles of the
Charter and with the obligations of membership in the United
Nations for any Member to seek political gains through the use
of force or to use as a bargaining point a gain achieved by
means of force.
It now appears that the General Assembly’s efforts to restore
peaceful conditions in the area following the hostilities of
four months ago are about to come to fruition. In its most
recent efforts to find a solution, the Assembly, on February 2,
adopted two resolutions. The first of these reiterated the
earlier calls for Israeli withdrawal behind the armistice line.
The second requested the Secretary-General, once that withdrawal
is completed, to carry out the measures proposed in his report
of January 24. The implementation of these measures would
constitute solid progress toward lasting conditions of peace in
the area.
The United States welcomes Israel’s announcement that it is
making a complete and unconditional withdrawal behind the
armistice line in accordance with the United Nations
resolutions. The United States takes note of the declarations
made in the statement of the delegate of Israel.
The United States has from the beginning made clear its belief
that after the withdrawal of British, French and Israeli forces,
there should be established conditions different from those
which had previously prevailed. As Secretary Dulles stated before the
Assembly on November 1, 1956: “There needs to be something
better than the uneasy armistices which have existed now for
these eight years between Israel and the Arab neighbors.”
Regarding the United Nations measures contemplated for the Gaza
Strip, the United States has taken note of the statement made by
the Secretary-General on February 22. [Here follows a verbatim
quotation of the Secretary-General’s statement of February 22;
see Document 137.]
It is the hope of the United States that the above mentioned role
of the United Nations in the administration of the Gaza Strip
will
[Page 328]
continue for a
transitory period until there is definitive settlement
respecting the Gaza Strip or a final agreement between the
parties. It is also our hope that conditions of lasting peace
will be vigorously sought by the parties with the active
assistance of the United Nations.
With respect to the situation in the area along the Gulf of Aqaba
and Straits of Tiran, I stated on January 28, and again on
February 2, that:
“It is essential that units of the United Nations Emergency Force
be stationed at the Straits of Tiran in order to achieve there
the separation of Egyptian and Israeli land and sea forces. This
separation is essential until it is clear that the non-exercise
of any claimed belligerent rights has established in practice
the peaceful conditions which must govern navigation in waters
having such an international interest. All of this would, of
course, be without prejudice to any ultimate determination which
may be made of any legal question concerning the Gulf of
Aqaba.”
It is appropriate at this time to recall the position of the
United States on navigation through the Strait of Tiran and the
Gulf of Aqaba. In a memorandum of February 11, 1957, made public
the following week, my Government stated:
[Here follows a lengthy quotation concerning the U.S. position on
the Gulf of Aqaba taken from the Aide-Mémoire of February 11,
Document 78.]
These views are to be understood in the sense of the relevant
portions of the report of the United Nations International Law
Commission on the law of the sea, covering the Commission’s work
at its Eighth Session, from April 23 to July 4, 1956.
In connection with the duration of the deployment of the United
Nations Emergency Force in this area, the question has been
raised whether the Secretary-General would give notice to the
General Assembly before the Emergency Force would be withdrawn.
We have noted the Secretary General’s statement in his
memorandum of February 26 that “an indicated procedure would be
for the Secretary-General to inform the Advisory Committee of
the United Nations Emergency Force, which would determine
whether the matter should be brought to the attention of the
Assembly.”
I should like to emphasize at this time the vital necessity of
full and strict compliance with the Armistice Agreement between
Israel and Egypt. Governed by their obligations under the
Charter, Israel and Egypt must base their relations on full
observance. The General Assembly in its various resolutions
dealing with the present problem has recognized this necessity.
Indeed, the Assembly in its first resolution dated November 2,
1956 noted that disregard on many occasions of the terms of the
armistice agreements by the parties thereto was a forerunner of
the hostilities which broke out in late October.
Once Israel has completed its withdrawal in accordance with the
resolutions of the General Assembly, the Armistice Agreement
between Israel and Egypt will again be fully operative. In these
circumstances,
[Page 329]
and in
view of the measures taken by the United Nations to deal with
the situation, there can be no basis for either party to assert
or exercise any belligerent rights.
The United States would like to see as rapidly as is practical a
definitive settlement of the Palestine problem; such a peace as
is contemplated by the Armistice Agreements. We recognize that
this cannot be attained at the present. Therefore, one of our
principal tasks is to create peace and tranquility through the
prevention of aggression. We believe that even if formal peace
with definitive settlements may not now be obtained, we should
vigorously seek to bring about the conditions of security and
tranquility which may as rapidly as possible hereafter make a
peace settlement practicable, and that in the meantime there
should be a strict compliance by both Israel and Egypt with
their international obligations.
If, following the Israeli withdrawal, there should be any
recurrence of hostilities or any violation by either party of
its international obligations, including those of the Armistice
Agreement, then this would create a situation for United Nations
consideration. The United States would consult with other
Members of the United Nations to consider appropriate action
both within and outside the United Nations, with the object of
restoring peace and harmonious relations in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law.
In these difficult matters, the United Nations has a basic
obligation set out in our Charter to suppress acts of aggression
or other breaches of the peace and to bring about by peaceful
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the
peace. We also recall that Article 2 of the Charter provides
that Members in order to get the rights and benefits resulting
from membership shall themselves fulfill in good faith their
obligations under the Charter, and that among such obligations
is that of settling their international disputes by peaceful
means and refraining from the use of force against the
territorial integrity of any state.
We have reached a turning point in the long efforts of the United
Nations to bring order and stability to this troubled area in
the Near East. We have just heard Israel’s announcement that it
will respond to the call of the General Assembly for withdrawal.
It is now incumbent upon all Members of the United Nations, and
particularly those directly concerned, to give their full
cooperation in carrying out the measures proposed by the
Secretary-General in his report of January 24 and endorsed by
the General Assembly on February 2. With good will and a
determination to serve the purposes of the Charter, we can make
significant progress toward a more settled, prosperous, and
happy world.
