Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

180. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, March 2, 1957—noon.

Delga 831. For Wilcox from Lodge. Re Palestine—Israeli withdrawal. This evening,² I attended the French reception where I saw Mollet and Pineau. I referred to the importance of the Israelis beginning their withdrawal this weekend and urged the French to advise the Israelis as we were doing.³Mollet said nothing, but Pineau spoke up in a frigid voice and said that he did not think that they would be able to do so. He said that withdrawal would have to be phased and that UNEF was not ready to move in. I said I understood UNEF was in a position to move in but that in any case plans should be set in motion for withdrawals and arrivals. Pineau said that he didn’t think so.

I left Mollet and Pineau and shortly thereafter Pineau came up to me and said that my speech this afternoon was different from what they expected.⁴ He said that this was the kind of thing which made Franco-American relations bad.

I asked if he had been shown a copy of my speech. He said that he had seen a copy in Washington and then just before the meeting a teletype copy of my speech had been sent to him from Washington and he was following it as I spoke. He said he was with others and was embarrassed having shown them what had been purported to be the US statement and then had found it was different on delivery.

I said I thought that there had been no changes in meaning. If anything had changed it was merely a matter of tone. Alphand, who was present, agreed that there had been no changes in meaning, but the changes that had occurred had upset Mrs. Meir considerably. Pineau and Alphand both said they understood of course that the changes in the text had been authorized in Washington.

By this time the French seemed to have got their feelings worked out and I said that I still thought they ought to get the Israelis to begin withdrawal this weekend, since in the absence of some move on the Israelis’ part, a very bad situation could develop and make difficult all that we had hoped to accomplish.

Alphand then talked to Eban and after his conversation told me he believed that Eban would try to get something done.

This incident demonstrates how undesirable it is to circulate advance texts of statements to be delivered here particularly before my conversations with the Dept concerning the text have been concluded. It has been standard procedure for 4 years for all texts to be given a last minute revision in the light of the tactical situation here. To show a foreign government a text which in fact is not final makes a great deal of trouble and accomplishes nothing that is good. I hope Dept will avoid this in the future.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–257. Confidential. Received at 1:37 p.m.
2. Presumably March 1.
3. At 2:45 p.m. on March 1, Lodge informed Dulles by telephone that, according to Eban and Rafael, the Israeli Government was not planning to do anything about withdrawing until the General Assembly debate was finished. (Memorandum of telephone conversation by Bernau, March 1; Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Telephone Conversations) At 8 p.m. that evening, Lodge transmitted a written report of his conversation with Eban and Rafael to the Department of State in Delga 824. (Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/3–157)
4. Following the General Assembly session on March 1, the Israeli press officer noted during a briefing that in his speech, Lodge had dealt satisfactorily with the Aqaba question, but that Lodge’s comments concerning Gaza required further study before Israel could comment. (Delga 823 from USUN, March 1; ibid.)