Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, Volume XVII

157. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 26, 1957, 10:30 a.m.¹

Washington, February 26, 1957, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Israeli-Egyptian Problem

PARTICIPANTS

• French:
  • Mr. Christian Pineau, Foreign Minister
  • Ambassador Herve Alphand, French Ambassador to U.S.
  • Mr. Louis Joxe, Secretary General of the Foreign Office
  • Mr. Jean Daridan, Director of Political Affairs, French Foreign Office
  • Mr. Emile Noel, Chief of Cabinet of Prime Minister Mollet
  • Mr. Jean Beliard, Assistant Press Chief, French Foreign Office
• U.S.:
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary
  • Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary for EUR
  • Mr. C. Douglas Dillon, Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs-Designate
  • Mr. Amory Houghton, Ambassador to France-Designate
  • Mr. J. Burke Wilkinson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs
  • Mr. William R. Tyler, Director, Office of Western European Affairs (part of the time)
  • Mr. Herman Phleger, Legal Adviser
  • Mr. William M. Rountree, Assistant Secretary for NEA
  • Mr. Fraser Wilkins, Director, NE
  • Mr. Charles Sedgwick, Interpreter

Mr. Pineau said he thought it would be appropriate to discuss first the most urgent question: that of Israel. He referred to the recent talk of Ambassador Alphand with the Secretary² and said that he wished to confirm officially what Alphand had said to the Secretary. He said that with regard to the situation in the Gulf of Aqaba, the French Government is in favor of a solution which recognizes that Israel would find herself in a state of legitimate defense in conformity with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter if an Israeli ship were attacked while in the Gulf. Mr. Pineau said that France would be willing to make a statement to this effect jointly with the United States and he thought that the United Kingdom would also be prepared to do so.

Mr. Pineau said that with regard to Gaza the situation is more difficult because there are a number of problems which have not been resolved, such as: whether Egypt is in a state of belligerency or not. If Egypt is to be considered a non-belligerent, then in so far as the United Nations are concerned, the situation would be determined by the terms of the Armistice Agreement, and Gaza should be administered by Egypt. On the other hand, if Egypt is a belligerent, there would be other problems. However, Mr. Pineau said, France could envisage the setting up of a neutral administration for Gaza. In order to achieve this he said that the French Government was prepared to exert pressure on Israel to withdraw her troops, so long as Egypt does not send her troops in.

The Secretary said that he did not see any insoluble problem with respect to the Gulf of Aqaba, because Israel had indicated that it would accept the assurances that would be given. The Secretary said he would, however, wish to qualify this by saying that any assurances which could be given to Israel on Aqaba would depend on a solution of the Gaza problem and the recognition by both sides of non-belligerency.

(At this point the Secretary handed Mr. Pineau a copy of an informal memorandum which the Secretary had given to the President for his talks with Prime Minister Mollet. This copy was subsequently returned to the Secretary by Mr. Pineau at the Secretary’s request.)³

Mr. Pineau said he wondered whether Israel and the U.N. Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjold, both accepted the idea of a de facto U.N. administration in Gaza. The Secretary said that he thought that both agreed on the desirability of this. However, the difference was that Israel insisted that the administration should not be dependent on Egypt, but on the United Nations, as the power replacing Egypt. The Secretary said that Mr. Hammarskjold felt that the United Nations had no authority to substitute itself for the Armistice Agreements, and that any administration in Gaza required the acquiescence of Egypt. This meant that theoretically Egypt’s acquiescence could be withdrawn at any time. However, in fact, said the Secretary, Egypt would probably not want to do this since she would not find it very desirable to come in again and take over responsibilities for the 200,000 refugees and all the attendant problems which they create. The Secretary said that the Government of Israel wanted to be in a position to say to its people that the Egyptian right of occupancy was ended for all time.

The Secretary said he thought that if Israel could take a chance on this and not insist that the administration of Gaza should depend formally on the United Nations in replacement of Egypt, the prospects for Israel’s interests and security being protected would be the best possible.

The Secretary said he agreed that the situation with respect to Gaza is different and that this was why he had suggested on the first page of the memorandum for the President concerning the problem of Aqaba that he thought that agreement could be reached on a declaration. However, with regard to Gaza, it was not so certain whether Israel had a good case or not. The Secretary said that Mr. Hammarskjold considered the Gaza problem extremely important because it was necessary that any solution be consistent with the Armistice Convention and that this was an issue which threatened the collapse of current negotiations. The Secretary went on to say that if Israel should take the chance offered to her she would have gained a certain measure of support from public opinion by giving the United Nations a chance to succeed. If, on the other hand, this solution failed and if Egypt were to intervene and terminate the U.N. administration, or use the area as a base for attacks, then Israel would have world sympathy behind her and would be in a better position than if she now insisted on staying.

Mr. Pineau observed that there was a distinction between establishing a case of aggression as a result of individual Fedayeen raids and specific shooting against an Israeli ship. It might be difficult to prove the former to be aggression. For this reason, the French Government felt that it was desirable that the international administration of Gaza should continue until the United Nations decided to the contrary. The Secretary said that Mr. Hammarskjold was juridically correct in turning this down, as he had in his recent talk with Ambassador Eban, because of the existence of the Armistice Agreements, which the United Nations could not abrogate. Mr. Pineau said that perhaps Egypt might agree not to protest a de facto situation, but she could never be brought to agree publicly. The Secretary observed that the present proposal for a United Nations administration, outlined in Mr. Hammarskjold’s report of February 24,⁴ was cleared with Fawzi and Nasser and has Egyptian acquiescence. He added that while Israel was perfectly right in saying that this acquiescence might be terminated any time by Egypt, the question was: which risk is Israel prepared to take. The Secretary said that he thought that the risk would be less if Israel were to accept than if she were to stay on, for in the latter case the cease-fire would come to an end, the UNEF would be withdrawn, and the area might deteriorate into hostilities which the Arabs are not in a position to carry on now but which they might be tempted to provoke with the aid of the Soviet Union. The Suez Canal would almost certainly remain blocked and this was something which concerned all of us. Mr. Pineau raised the question of the possibility of a guarantee to Israel against future Fedayeen attacks, to which the Secretary replied that the United States could not extend such a guarantee, but that he agreed with Pineau that the United Nations was in a position to exert efforts along these lines. Mr. Pineau asked whether the Secretary thought that there would be a chance of a two-thirds majority for a United Nations resolution designed to save face for both parties. The Secretary said he thought this was a difficult matter to determine. Mr. Pineau said that perhaps the UNEF and the UN administration in Gaza could be established without any specific limitation of time, and that Israel could then accept this solution, while reserving its rights which it would exercise if and when this period came to an end. Other powers could take note of this de facto situation, which would continue indefinitely. The U.N. might pass a resolution by a two-thirds vote that both sides should undertake negotiations for a peace settlement, thereby linking in fact, although not explicitly, the duration of the period of administration to the duration of the period of negotiations. It might also be stated that if Egypt’s occupancy were resumed prior to the conclusion of a permanent peace settlement, this would create a new situation which would call for consultation either within, or outside the United Nations.

The Secretary stated that the present moment was critical. Ambassador Eban was returning at 11 a.m. If we could agree on a reasonable position for Israel to take within the next few hours, he thought that there was a good chance that Israel would accept it. If not, there might be tragic consequences. The positions of the two parties were so near to each other that he hoped that a final effort to bridge the gulf that remained would be successful. The Secretary agreed that if Egypt reoccupied Gaza prior to the peace settlement this would create a new situation requiring consultation to consider ways of ending acts of belligerency.

(Mr. Phleger and Mr. Rountree at this point consulted with the Secretary.)

Mr. Pineau then summarized the French suggestions under four headings:

1. The UNEF and a UN administration should be established for an indefinite duration, with the tacit acquiescence of Egypt.

2. Israel would reserve her rights with regard to the termination of this arrangement.

3. Other countries would take note of this arrangement, without approving or disapproving it.

4. It would be recommended to both parties that they undertake negotiations for a peace settlement.

The Secretary commented with regard to point three above that it would be desirable that other countries should also express the hope that the UN administration should last until the conclusion of a peace settlement, and that if negotiations were to break down and Egypt were to reassert her occupancy, this would create a new situation calling for consultation. Mr. Pineau nodded his acceptance of the Secretary’s suggestion. The Secretary said that there was another problem: whether or not Israel admitted the continuing validity of the Armistice Agreements of 1949. He said that if Israel, as has been reported in the press, were to denounce these agreements, she could not obtain the non-belligerency rights which she needs for her position with regard to the Gulf of Aqaba.

(At this point the Secretary was informed that the President had asked that he and Mr. Pineau join Prime Minister Mollet and himself at the White House, and the meeting adjourned.)⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 674.84A/2–2657. Secret. Drafted by Tyler.
2. Reference is presumably to the Dulles–Alphand conversation of February 23; see Document 140.
3. Reference is presumably to Dulles’ memorandum to Eisenhower of February 26, Attachment 2 to Document 154.
4. Reference is presumably to Hammarskjöld’s statement to the General Assembly on February 22; see Document 137.
5. President Eisenhower had been meeting with Mollet at the White House since 10:30 that morning. At 11:38 a.m. they were joined by Pineau, Alphand, Joxe, Dulles, Phleger, Rountree, and interpreter Vernon Walters. (Record of the President’s Daily Appointments; Eisenhower Library) No account of either conversation has been found in Department of State files or at the Eisenhower Library.